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ABSTRACT 
Growth literature presents evidence that resource abundant economies comparatively grow less than 
other economies, giving rise to the ‘Resource Curse Hypothesis’. Many researchers have developed 
several theories to explain the ‘Resource Curse’ but there are very few explicit considerations of ‘Debt 
Overhang’ in these explanations. This study concentrates on the ‘Debt Overhang –Resource Curse’ link 
given the significant relationships between debt sustainability and other resource spending. It also 
implicitly   seeks to test key competing theories. The key contribution is the evaluation of the ‘Resource 
Curse’ and ‘Debt Overhang’ phenomena simultaneously using mixed methods analysis. 
 
This thesis consist of three complementary empirical studies organised in chapters under the ‘Debt 
Overhang-Resource Curse’ theme: A Panel Data Analysis of Debt Overhang, Natural Resources and 
Growth in 153 countries from 1970 to 2011; A Time Series Analysis of Sierra Leone’s Debt Overhang, 
Natural Resource and Growth Experience from 1970 to 2011 and A Perceptions and Documentary 
Analysis of Debt Overhang, Natural Resources and Growth in Sierra Leone. 
 
In Chapter Three, the ‘Debt Overhang –Resource Curse’ hypothesis was tested by estimating a system 
of simultaneous equations using the Generalised Method of Moments Three - Staged Least Squares 
estimator for the whole panel and carefully defined subsets.  The results confirmed the ‘Debt Overhang 
–Resource Curse’ hypothesis in the case of least developed countries, mineral rich countries and 
petroleum rich countries although it failed to excel when the whole panel was examined.   
 
The ‘Debt Overhang –Resource Curse’ hypothesis was also confirmed in Chapter Four, when a  
Structural Vector Autoregressive Model was estimated for Sierra Leone : a resource rich, heavily 
indebted poor country at the bottom of the Human Development Index, has recently received large 
economic growth projections. The results for Sierra Leone were further confirmed using cointegration 
and Granger causality tests.  
 
The investigation continued with a perceptions and documentary analysis in Chapter Five. It 
investigated whether perceptions of Sierra Leoneans provide support for the Debt Overhang –Resource 
Curse hypothesis by estimating a structural equation model using Partial Least Squares, utilising data 
collected during a survey of mining communities.  The results of the estimations were triangulated with 
findings from interviews, observations and documentary analysis. This analysis provided support for 
the hypothesis as well as some complementary theories within the Resource Curse debate.  
 
This simultaneous assessment of the impact of both debt overhang and natural resources on growth 
went beyond quantitative investigations to provide proof of the link shared by these elements. It also 
made a rationale for a ‘case-by-case’ analysis of economic growth and development phenomena, 
resulting in policy recommendations with a greater degree of alignment. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THESIS INTRODUCTION, RESEARCH GAPS, RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS AND RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION 
 
1.1 THESIS INTRODUCTION 
“…….natural resource endowments would enable developing countries to make the transition from 
underdevelopment to industrial 'take off’………” (Rostow, 1961). 
 
The above quote paints a clear picture of the growth expectations that come with natural resource 
endowments. However, there has been overwhelming but not unassailable evidence that some resource- 
abundant countries do not grow as rapidly as other countries and suffer from aggravated poverty, poor 
economic performance and, in some cases, political instability because of these endowments. Growth 
has been used to infer development, hence, the ‘Resource Curse’ hypothesis.   
 
Over the years, many studies have expounded different theories in an attempt to explain the lagging 
growth experienced by these resource- rich economies. Political scientists have suggested several 
explanations for the resource curse, mainly through case studies. Economists have not only proposed 
varying rationalisations but have also tested their hypotheses on well selected comparative studies or 
large data sets. Some of these explanations include:  
- The Dutch Disease theory (Prebish, 1950; Sachs and Warner, 1999; Torvik, 2001);  
- The International Trade Theory of Comparative Advantage( Krugman,1987; Amable, 2000; 
Thirlwall ,2002; Wright  and Czeluta ,2004;  Guillo and  Perez-Sebastian, 2010; Mursheda and  
Serino, 2011);  
- The Weak Sustainability explanation (Hicks, 1946; Gelb,1988; Atkinson and  Hamilton, 2003);  
- The Institutional Quality theory (Krueger et. al., 1992; Torvik, 2002; Brollo, 2010; Acemogul 
et al., 2002; Juel and Ross, 2011);  
- The Political Explanation (Collier and Hoeffler, 2000; Ross, 2004, 2006; Basedu and Lay, 
2009; Cotet and Tsui, 2010);  
- The Volatility and Export Instability Theory (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003; 
Cuddington et. al., 2007; van der Ploeg, 2009);  
- The Debt Overhang Theory (Prebisch, 1950; Mazano and Rigobon, 2001) which greatly 
inspires this thesis. 
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Debt is a very crucial issue. According to the Harrod-Domar Model (1946), if debt can raise capital 
accumulation, it will lead to growth. Chenery and Stout (1966) explain in their Two-Gap Model that 
countries are faced with an internal gap between investment and savings and external gap between 
imports and exports. They need supplementary resources to fill these gaps and they often resort to 
borrowing. Given that some of the assumptions made by these models are unrealistic, some empirical 
studies have pointed out the harmful effects of debt on a country’s economy. In the presence of debt, 
returns on investment are sub-optimal (Dooley, 1989; Borenzstein, 1990) and in other cases, debt 
crowds out investment (Serven and Solimano, 1993; Elbadawi et al., 1997). On the broad spectrum, 
debt adversely affects growth (Ndung’u, 1998; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Balassone et al., 2011). 
 
The world is slowly recovering from the financial crisis of 2007. One of the underlying causes of the 
crisis was the problem of debt sustainability at both the micro and macro levels of the economy.  
Although it started in one country, financial contagion occurred through financial intermediaries, stock 
markets and investors’ perceptions of risk, which led it to be experienced in several countries with 
varying degrees of significance. Despite the potential negative impact on several economies, global 
coordination in response to the crisis was weak.  The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) argued 
that developing countries are likely to face increased sovereign risk and growth challenges.  
 
At the outset, the author of this research opined that resource-rich countries can emerge relatively 
unscathed from debt situations because of their wealth. This is because the issue does not rest upon 
being exposed to stock of debt but lies in sustaining the debt with the help of resource rents. Financial 
crises repeat over the years and with ever increasing scope of globalisation, translate into volatility of 
export prices, stock markets and currencies. This phenomenon led to this thesis’ consideration of the 
effect of debt overhang in relation to natural resources.  
 
One of the earliest studies to link natural resources with commodity prices is the work conducted by 
Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950), who introduced the ‘Prebisch hypothesis. They argued that 
resource-based growth would be negatively affected by a decline in the world prices of natural 
resources.  This has influenced recent studies like that by Manzano and Rigobon (2001), which to the 
author’s knowledge is one of the most cited studies clearly investigating the ‘Debt Overhang- Resource 
Curse’ link. Manzano and Rigobon (2001) explain that in the 1970s countries used their natural 
resources as collateral for debt. When commodity prices fell in the 1980s, these countries were left with 
a large amount of debt and a low flow of foreign income from the sale of resources with which to make 
repayments. Thus, according to Manzano and Rigobon (2001), the development problem is as a result 
of the debt-overhang problem. 
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Debt overhang and the resource curse have often been studied separately both prior and subsequent to 
Manzano and Rigobon (2001).  Given the recent debt crisis and the evident lag in the growth of resource 
rich economies, this thesis seeks to test the two phenomena simultaneously. This study will start with 
an analysis of the phenomenon in a large dataset and would then concentrate on a single case, to present 
an in depth analysis of the debt overhang- resource curse hypothesis.  The investigation will be carried 
out in three empirical studies which are all united under the ‘Debt Overhang- Resource Curse’ theme 
using mixed- methods analysis. Growth and debt theory provide the broad theoretical framework for all 
three studies. Data is from time series statistics sourced from various databases, a survey of four mining 
communities in Sierra Leone carried out by the author, a few interviews with selected Sierra Leoneans, 
the author’s observations of life in these communities and documents related to the extractive industry 
in Sierra Leone. 
 
An introduction to this thesis, research gaps surrounding the main research area, research questions and 
the thesis’ contributions towards filling these gaps are contained in Chapter One.  A review of the 
resource curse-growth, debt overhang-growth and debt overhang-resource curse literature is conducted 
in Chapter Two.  This is followed by the empirical investigation of the debt overhang –resource curse 
phenomenon for the panel data of 153 countries in Chapter Three.  The theoretical framework is 
presented in section 3.1.  The methodology used to develop the system of equations is described in 
section 3.2. The system of simultaneous equations is then estimated using the Generalised Method of 
Moments Three - Staged Least Squares estimator for a panel of 153 countries over the period 1970 to 
2011 and carefully defined subsets ranging from Heavily Indebted Poor countries to members of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation Development (OECD). The key results are explicitly 
concerned with the impact of natural resource rents and debt servicing on growth, but this impact is not 
isolated, as a few other transmission channels emerge from the results.  
 
The results of the GMM estimation in Chapter Three are quite general. To ensure a clearer picture and 
better policy alignment, a case study approach ensues.  Sierra Leone, a resource rich, heavily indebted 
poor country at the bottom of the Human Development Index and has recently received large economic 
growth projections, is the selected case. In Chapter Four, a time series analysis of Sierra Leone’s debt 
overhang, natural resources and growth experience from 1970 to 2011 is carried out by estimating a 
structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model based of the theoretical framework formulated in 
section 3.1 of Chapter Three. The SVAR analysis is followed by cointegration and Granger causality 
tests in section 4.4.3 and section 4.4.4  to identify long term relationships between key variables and 
the direction of causality between them. The debt overhang –resource curse hypothesis is confirmed for 
Sierra Leone. Long term cointegrating relationships are revealed with strong Granger causality links. 
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Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the most frequently used measure of output in quantitative studies.  
There have been concerns over measurement issues related to the GDP measure. Development 
economists have also argued that GDP growth does not automatically translate into development and 
the equitable distribution of wealth. Sierra Leone remains one of the world's poorest and least developed 
countries, and there is widespread frustration that the mining boom has done little to improve the lives 
of ordinary Sierra Leoneans.  The aim is to examine whether resource rents in Sierra Leone trickle down 
to the masses, coupled with the goal of confirming whether the results of Chapter Four can be verified 
by the perceptions of Sierra Leoneans. In Chapter Five , this thesis firstly carries out a ‘perception 
based’ study by estimating a structural equation model described in section 5.1.3,  using data collected 
from 1,339 respondents  randomly selected from the communities where the four largest mining 
companies in the country are operating and the capital city. The results reported in section 5.2 confirm 
the debt overhang –resource curse hypothesis for the total sample.  At community level, in addition to 
the debt overhang theory, in some cases a few other theories excel especially the human capital   and 
quality of institutions concepts.   
The analysis goes further in section 5.4 by scrutinising the mining agreements signed by the four 
companies under review with the Government of Sierra Leone, company reports and newspaper articles 
on the four mining companies within a framework covering management issues, financial updates, 
operational reports and activities enclosed in their corporate social responsibility practices.  The 
findings from the document analysis are triangulated in section 5.5 with conclusions reached from 
interviews conducted, the author’s observations of life in mining communities and the quantitative 
results of section 5.2 within socio-economic dimensions.   
This thesis’ simultaneous assessment of the impact of both debt overhang and natural resources on 
growth goes beyond aggregate quantitative investigations and provides support for the debt overhang –
resource curse hypothesis. It makes a strong argument for a ‘case-by-case’ analysis of the debt overhang 
-resource curse phenomena and also encompasses effects on social welfare and economic development. 
The methodology of the mixed methods analysis utilised in this thesis can be applied to other countries   
and would result in much more aligned policy recommendations such as those presented in section 6.1 
for the case of Sierra Leone. 
 
1.2   RESEARCH GAPS 
Institutions and organisations concerned with world development have over the years set certain goals 
and criteria that developing countries should meet. Some of these goals include the United Nations 
(UN) Millennium Development Goals, covering health, food security, social infrastructure and poverty 
reduction, and the criteria set by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC).  The common 
underlying factor in meeting most of these goals and criteria lies within institutional reform and 
14 
 
development spending. From the intuition presented by the Two Gap Theory, countries essentially need 
to borrow to fill the domestic fund gap needed to meet development goals. 
Resource- rich countries are expected to maintain high sustainable incomes from their resource rents 
and are thus anticipated to reasonably meet most of these goals that are closely associated with 
development spending. From the evidence of their performance so far, based on general growth trends 
and success in meeting the development goals set by the UN and MCC, most resource- rich countries 
have been lagging behind. This thesis therefore seeks to investigate whether the servicing of debt used 
to supplement domestic revenue can explain the lagging growth faced by resource rich economies. 
In Chapter Two, this study reviews both the resource curse and debt over hang literature.  Several studies 
evaluate the link between natural resources and growth and external debt and growth, separately. 
Already established theories on the resource curse hypothesis complement one another, but still cannot 
completely explain potential resource curse, therefore a further harmonising theory that is relevant to 
current economic trends is needed. 
The most recent economic upset is the debt crisis and the contagion is possible due to globalisation and 
increased international trade in currency, therefore, the effects of such a crisis have been felt in several 
countries. Debt overhang – natural resource – economic growth linkages are therefore highly relevant 
in complementing already existing theories within the resource-growth debate. Over the years, 
organisations such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, African Development and 
other multilateral lenders have also supplemented government revenues by lending money to different 
countries. 
To the best knowledge of the author, apart from Manzano and Rigobon (2001) there are hardly any 
other highly cited published empirical studies that investigate the debt overhang resource link. Several 
other theories ranging from ‘Dutch Disease’ to ‘Institutional theory’ have provided explanations for the 
resource curse hypothesis. As explained by Manzano and Rigobon (2001), most countries use their 
natural resources as collateral and when they struggle to repay, the debt overhang effect is felt. The 
‘credit crunch’ of the recent recession, has brought debt issues faced by some countries to light.  Hence, 
it is necessary to investigate how both debt issues and resource endowments simultaneously impact on 
economic growth. It is worth examining the past to make changes for a better economic future. 
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1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
In order to fill the gaps described in section 1.2, this thesis seeks to answer the following research 
questions:  
  
Chapter Three of this thesis seeks to answer the following questions: 
- Based on current data available, does debt overhang lead to a resource curse? 
- Is the debt –resource link conditional on development levels or specific to certain regions or 
economies?   
- What other theories are significant in explaining the growth experience of the dataset under 
review? 
 
Chapter Four aims to provide answers to the following questions: 
- Does debt-overhang account for the resource curse in Sierra Leone? 
- Do other resource curse theories apply to Sierra Leone? 
- Is there a long term relationship between debt, natural resources and growth in Sierra Leone? 
- What is the causal relationship between debt and growth and between resources and growth in 
Sierra Leone? 
-  
Chapter Five will provide answers to the following: 
- What evidence of the resource curse hypothesis can be found in Sierra Leone? 
- Is there strong evidence of debt overhang –resource curse perceptions in Sierra Leone? 
- Do natural resources lead to economic development, an improved standard of living and 
reduced inequality in Sierra Leone?   
 
Chapter Six aims to answer:  
- How can Sierra Leone better manage its resource wealth? 
 
Answers to these questions would help this thesis to make the contributions described in the next 
section. 
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1.4 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION 
The relevance of the impact of debt on growth cannot be stated strongly enough given the recent debt 
crises faced by many countries. This ‘Debt Overhang –Resource Curse’ investigation is therefore 
among the most relevant of the hypotheses currently driving the economic growth debate. This thesis 
seeks to offer a much deeper investigation of the phenomenon using current and robust econometric 
techniques. The overall research aim is to diagnose the past, examine the present and make 
recommendations for the future.  
The impact of debt overhang on economic growth and the impact of resources on growth are two 
different phenomena. This thesis’ unique contribution is investigating how debt overhang and natural 
resources simultaneously impact on economic growth.  However, the current research does not intend 
to simply replicate previous studies using a different dataset. Whilst its main focus is the debt overhang 
concept, the study will also implicitly test the effects of other key theories.  This inclusion is based on 
the author’s belief that one theory cannot completely explain the resource -growth dynamics in 
isolation. The use of current statistics and an extensive data set in this research will shed light on the 
role of external debt on the economic growth of resource- rich countries and also complement previous 
studies on the resource curse. 
This thesis will commence investigation at a general level, through a panel analysis of a large sample 
of 153 countries.  The analysis will subsequently become more specific, when it carries out a case study 
enquiry which will provide a well-rounded methodology that can be applied to any other country. The 
type of micro-level analysis that is employed will result in much more aligned policy recommendations 
which will better highlight the impact of debt overhang and resources on key socio-economic indicators. 
The analysis therefore goes beyond economic growth since it also encompasses welfare and economic 
development. 
The case study is specific to Sierra Leone, a country that is rich in natural resources, mainly precious 
minerals, and oil has recently been discovered. Sierra Leone is at the bottom of the Human Development 
Index, has experienced an eleven year civil war which is often attributed to the fight over the country’s 
diamond deposits and is one of the most heavily indebted poor countries. The post-conflict surge in 
extractive activities has resulted in projections that it will be one of the fastest growing economies in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.  In the author’s opinion, these characteristics make Sierra Leone a very interesting 
case study. In addition, to the author’s knowledge,  debt overhang- resource analysis of Sierra Leone is 
non-existent and with high growth forecasts and a  history of high borrowing, such a study is necessary  
to evaluate the past and present and make recommendations for the future.  The methodology applied 
will be applicable to other countries and will aid better policy formulation and implementation. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
2.0   REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
As explained in the general overview, this thesis seeks to evaluate the debt overhang and natural 
resources relationship by revisiting the Debt Overhang -Resource Curse link via analysing a large 
sample of countries and then concentrating on the experience of one country with outstanding 
characteristics.  A review of the resources curse –growth literature, the debt overhang –growth literature 
and literature on how debt overhang and recourses curse are intertwined  and how their interaction 
affects growth and development follows. Both the theoretical and empirical literature are reviewed. This 
review will highlight relevant resource and debt literature and point out the gaps in the literature that 
provide motivation for this thesis’ revisiting of the Debt Overhang -Resource Curse link. 
 
2.1 REVIEW OF THE THEORETICAL RESOURCE CURSE- GROWTH 
LITERATURE  
 
The phrase ‘natural resource curse’ was created because of its paradoxical implication in both academic 
and policy circles (Brunschweiler, 2008). It is widely accepted that natural resources provide 
opportunities for economic growth. While natural resources have benefited countries such as Botswana 
and Norway,  the same cannot be said for Sierra Leone and Nigeria where natural resources have 
contributed significantly to  lagging growth , civil unrest and increased poverty (van der Ploeg, 2010 ).  
 
In summary, much of the theoretical literature on the resource curse hypothesis is formed from varying 
explanations regarding the reason why certain resource rich countries enjoy sustainable economic 
growth and development, whilst others are still underdeveloped or experience lagging growth. These 
theories highlight the transmission mechanisms through which the economic growth and development 
of resource-rich countries may be affected by their natural resource endowments. The common theme 
among many of these explanations is the ‘crowding-out logic’. This logic follows that an abundance of 
or heavy dependence on natural resources ‘crowds -out’ other growth enhancing activities (Gylfason, 
2002; Sachs and Warner, 1999; Mehlum et al, 2006).  The policy problem is thus establishing the right 
mix for the optimal level of each activity and its corresponding policy. In broad classifications, the key 
explanations for the resource curse are: the Linkage theory which encompasses political factors, rent-
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seeking activities, corruption and the  quality of institutions (Wright and Czelusta ,2004; Romer, 1994);  
Neoclassical Growth theory which views savings and investment as the main channels of influence( 
Solow,1957; Swan,1957);  the Dutch disease theory (Sachs and Warner, 1999); the  Endogenous growth 
theory which explores human capital and debt linkages (Manzano and Rigobon, 2001) and a form of 
Eclectic theory  which incorporates different transmission mechanisms and more than one theory into 
one model (Collier ,2009). 
 
Dutch Disease Theory 
One leading theory of the resource curse hypothesis is the ‘Dutch Disease’ explanation (Sachs and 
Warner, 1999; Torvik, 2001).  In the early 1950s, structuralist economists such as Prebish (1950) 
proposed that a worsening in the terms of trade of countries that are mainly exporters of commodities 
would negatively impact on their economic performance.  In 1977, ‘The Economist’ coined the term 
‘Dutch disease’ to describe the decline in the manufacturing sector in the Netherlands that followed the 
discovery of large natural gas deposits in the country in 1959. The discovery resulted in the Dutch 
guilder rising, making Dutch exports of non-oil commodities less competitive on the international 
market,  causing  a decline in the growth of the manufacturing sector, whilst the natural gas sector ,on 
the other hand was able to pay higher wages.  
Corden and Neary (1982) formulated an economic model illustrating the ‘Dutch Disease’.  Their model 
features a non-traded goods and traded good sectors: the booming natural resource sector (for example, 
oil, natural gas, gold, diamonds, bauxite, cocoa), and the lagging sector (generally manufacturing and 
subsistence agriculture). Corden and Neary (1982) explain that a resource boom led to a shift in labour 
from the lagging sector to the booming sector and increased spending due to the extra revenue brought 
in by the resource boom. Accordingly, as labour moved away from the manufacturing sector, the price 
of non-traded goods increased. In the long term, both of these outcomes can lead to manufacturing jobs 
being relocated to countries with lower labour costs, and eventually the non-resource industries 
experience stalling growth. 
The drilling of North Sea Oil in Great Britain in the 1970s resulted in the value of the pound increasing, 
but the country fell into recession. British exports became uncompetitive and British workers demanded 
higher wages.  In short, the British economy suffered a similar economic condition faced by the Dutch 
providing further validation of the ‘Dutch disease’ explanation of the resource curse. Against this 
background the ‘Dutch disease’ theory may provide an explanation for failed sustainable growth and 
development experience in certain resource- rich countries. 
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International Trade Theory 
Closely linked to the Dutch Disease transmission mechanism explanation is the International trade 
theory postulated by researchers such as Smith (1776), Ricardo (1817) and Heckscher-Ohlin (1936), 
which shows that every country has a comparative advantage in something. According to international 
trade theory, countries specialise in whatever sphere in which they possess an advantage. A competitive 
advantage in natural resource production causes most resource rich countries to specialise in resource -
based production. According to Krugman (1987), this form of specialisation has positive supply side 
connotations for economic growth, as it enables the achievement of economies of scale. The Keynesian 
growth theory, on the other hand, postulates that the growth enhancing properties of specialisation   are 
demand-driven (Kaldor, 1981; Amable, 2000; Thirlwall, 2002). The Keynesian growth theory suggests 
that natural resource production and export tend to have lower price and trade elasticities that restrict 
aggregate demand, productivity and economic growth (Amable, 2000). Resource based specialisation 
also limits the development of other tradable sectors.  This form of specialisation is inefficient and is 
symbolised by the volatility of prices and interest rates, low wages and investment, weak real exchange 
rates and a  large decline in welfare, hence the resource curse (van Wijnbergen, 1984; Matsuyama, 
1992; Ross, 2005).  
Crowding-Out Logic 
Following from the ‘Dutch disease’ and ‘Competitive Advantage’ explanations of the resource curse, 
it is clear that a declining manufacturing or traded sector seems to be the market response to a resource 
windfall. The manufacturing sector stimulates economic growth and gains from ‘learning by doing’.  If  
the discovery and exploration  of natural resources results in a temporary worsening of competitiveness,  
the temporary  loss  of ‘learning by doing’  might  mean that the  manufacturing sector will  not be able 
to fully recover when  resources decline,  leading to a resource curse in the long run.  This temporary 
loss in learning by doing that eventually curbs economic growth can be demonstrated in a two-period, 
Salter-Swan model (van Wijnbergen, 1984). Based on this model, in an open economy, Matsuyuma 
(1992) finds that if the manufacturing sector benefits from ‘learning by doing’, the economy moves 
resources away from the manufacturing sector towards agriculture, thus growth is limited. Assuming 
that spill-over effects from  human capital in production are generated only by employment in the traded 
sector,  the results of Sachs and Warner(1995) and Gylfason et al. (1999) indicate that exporting natural 
resources lowers employment in the traded sector, impeding  learning by doing and eventually 
restricting economic growth  
 
Endogenous Growth Theory 
Continuing along the lines of the spill over effects of human capital, the endogenous growth theory 
states that long term growth depends on investment decisions, rather than technological progress.  
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Investment decisions in this case encompass expenditure on human capital formation, research and 
development. This theory explains that where knowledge cannot be internalised entirely, it spills over 
to the whole economy. Proponents of this line of thought include Wright and Czelusta (2004), who    
argue that investment in new knowledge contributes to the creation and extension of mineral reserves. 
In recent years, the returns on investments in knowledge of country-specific minerals have been high, 
and in well-managed resource economies, the production and reserve levels of extractive resources have 
continued to grow. Surprisingly, school enrolment rates and public spending on education tend to be 
low in resource-rich countries. Wright and Czelusta (2004), among others, theorise that the failure of 
resource rich countries to adequately invest in human capital has led to their poor economic 
performance. Some of these economies that experience lower than expected growth relative to their 
resource endowments have low levels of savings that can be invested in the future.  This savings 
shortfall raises the question of sustainability.  This paradigm is based on  the assumption that different 
forms of capital  are substitutable in principle and that only the total capital stock is important to 
“maintain the capacity to provide non-declining utility for infinity” (Neumayer, 2010).   
 
Weak Sustainability Theory 
Hartwick (1977) put forth the ‘Hartwick Rule for weak sustainability’: “Keep a country’s total capital 
stock at least constant to allow for sustained consumption over time and therefore invest into all forms 
of capital at least as much as there is depreciation of all forms of capital”. ‘Genuine Savings’ illustrates 
the combination of consumption and savings, which in theory can be seen as the reinvestment of 
dwindling natural resource capital into other forms of capital (Dietz et al., 2007). The concept of 
‘Hicksian income’ states that a country should only consider the interest on its capital stock as income 
(Hicks, 1946).  Combining the ‘Hartwick Rule for weak sustainability’ and the concept of ‘Hicksian 
income’, it can be concluded that countries are expected to consume the interest on their capital stock 
so that the capital stock remains constant over time.  However, studies such as Gelb (1988), Auty (1993) 
and Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) reveal rather than save or reinvest their resource rents, resource 
abundant countries, consume their income from resource exports giving rise to a possible curse. Some 
Studies have shown that these economies fall into the vicious cycle of rent seeking.  
 
 
Rent Seeking and Institutional Quality: 
Recipients of resource rents often become so politically powerful that they can either obstruct economic 
reform or turn it to their advantage. The  theory of ‘Rent cycling’ emphasises the relationship between 
the economy and politics in resource- rich developing countries. This theory grew out of an observation 
that natural resource rents, geopolitical (foreign aid) rents, and contrived rents affect government policy 
implementation (Tollison, 1982). Krueger et al. (1992) highlight the fact that resource rents can be 
disconnected from the activities that generate them, thus increasing the possibility of inciting political 
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contests for their capture. Consequently, resource rent flows strongly affect both the structure of the 
economy and the incentives of the political state (Lane, and Tornell, 1996; Torvik, 2002; Robinson, 
Torvik, and Verdier, 2006; Auty, 2007). Established rent-seeking, especially by the politically powerful, 
leads to corruption and inadequate governance, thereby crowding out social capital (Bhattacharyya, 
2008; Dietz and Neumayer, 2007). These three effects adversely affect institutional quality, one of the 
main transmission mechanisms of the impact of resource endowments on growth and development.  
 
The main indicators of institutional quality examined by the institutional theory of the resource curse 
include corruption, bureaucratic quality and the rule of law. Corruption reduces investment and its 
productivity (Murphy et al., 1993; Romer, 1994, Boycko et al., 1995; Leite and Weidmann, 1999). 
Addison, Le Billon and Murshed (2000) explain that in countries with resources, there is an increased 
probability of a malicious cycle of rent-seeking, mismanagement and even conflict. One version of the 
institution theory of the resource curse is based on a version of the career concerns model of political 
agency (Brollo, 2010).  Political candidates have career concerns, varied political abilities and diverse 
opportunity costs of entering politics. Brollo (2010) explains that the current leader faces a trade-off 
between using public resources for personal gain (corruption) and using the resources to maximise the 
likelihood of re-election. The trade-off depends on the quality of existing institutions. 
A wider political-economic result of rent seeking is the ‘Rentier effect’. Rentier states rely on resource 
revenues, where the government is the principal recipient of these rents and thus lack the incentive to 
develop policies that promote alternate sources of state revenue such as taxation (Isham et al. (2003).  
According to theory of the ‘Rentier state’, corruption, authoritarianism, and economic stagnation are 
characteristics of the Rentier political economy (Hazem Beblawi, 1990; Karl, 1997; Ross, 2001; 
Basedau, 2009). Some Rentier states fail to implement plans to ensure the equitable distribution of 
resource wealth; the middle class fails to develop, and wealth is concentrated among a small percentage 
of the population and political elites (Chaudhry, 1997; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Auty and Kiiski, 2001). 
 
Conflict 
In some cases authoritarian regimes and ever increasing income gaps result in conflict. Natural 
resources provide both reason and opportunity for conflict. They also indirectly create institutional and 
economic instability. Humphreys (2005) identifies possible causal mechanisms for the onset of conflict:  
‘greedy rebels’, ‘greedy outsiders’; the ‘grievances’ of social groups, price shocks, uneven distribution 
of revenues and natural resources providing the means of finance for rebels. With conflict comes a 
breakdown in the rule of law, accountability and governance; this vicious cycle leads to failing growth 
and development and eventually a resource curse. 
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Volatility 
Another theory that attempts to explain why some resource rich countries fail to experience sustainable 
growth is ‘volatility’.  Volatility covers the variability of resource revenue (Cuddington, Ludema and 
Jayasuriya (2007); commodity prices (Prebisch, 1950; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003) and 
exchange rates. This theory compares the gains from a temporary high income against the adverse 
effects of an inconstant resource income. Resource- rich countries concentrate mainly on exports but 
the effect depends on the type of resource. Agricultural exports are relatively price-inelastic in demand 
and subject to supply shocks.  Mineral exports, on the other hand, have inelastic prices because their 
demand and supply are sensitive to economic activity. Terms of trade variations are larger for mineral 
rich countries making them even more susceptible to fluctuations in export prices and revenues. 
 
These theories typically predict that the effect of natural resources on growth should unmistakeably be 
negative. It should, however, be noted that all the theories put forward to attempt to explain the resource 
curse hypothesis are not mutually exclusive. There is no single explanation of what generates a 
‘blessing’ rather than a ‘curse’. 
 
2.2 REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL RESOURCE CURSE – GROWTH 
LITERATURE 
 
The empirical resource curse literature review considers the body of work based on the theoretical 
explanations already described.  Many models estimated by these empirical studies are founded upon 
different theories of the resource curse and include variables that are expected to capture the 
transmission mechanisms described by theory. In many cases, other channels are also incorporated into 
the regression model as control variables. 
 
Selected studies providing support for or arguments against the Resource Curse Hypothesis: 
 
The term ‘resource curse’ was first used by Auty (1993) who found failures in resource-led 
development. According to Auty (1993), the general assumption is that resource wealth is more harmful 
to the economy in the early and low-income stages of economic development than latter. Auty (1993) 
thus concludes that resource-rich countries not only fail to benefit from resource endowment, but they 
their performance is also weaker than resource poor countries, hence the ‘resource curse’. 
 
Sachs and Warner (1995) pioneered the empirical study of the growth experience of resource- rich 
countries founding a negative statistical significant relationship between natural resource dependence 
and economic growth. They show that resource rich countries even after controlling for initial income 
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per capita, investment, openness and rule of law, on average, grew less during 1970-89.  Following 
Sachs and Warner (1995), an increasing body of research including Gylfason et al. (1999), Rodriguez 
and Sachs (1999), Gylfason (2001), Sachs and Warner (2001) and Auty (2001), have found that 
countries that are rich in natural resources have a tendency to display relatively low rates of economic 
growth.  
 
Most studies, such as those by Auty (2003) and Sachs and Warner (1995) argue that all resources are 
cursed. As estimation methods and data availability has improved, others such as Atkinson and 
Hamilton (2003), Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) Bulte, Damania and Decon (2005), Mehlum, 
Moene and Torvik (2006) have found that the curse is attributed to specific resources, commonly 
minerals.  
 
Collier and Goderis (2007) use a panel cointegration approach to analyse data for countries from 
different regions from 1963 and 2003, to unravel the short and long term effects of commodity prices 
on growth. They find a strong indication of the resource curse hypothesis. Specifically, commodity 
booms are found to have positive short-term effects on output, but adverse long-term effects. In general, 
the results of their research support the view that commodity booms avert countries from productive 
activities and offer incentives for non-productive activities, such as rent-seeking and lobbying. They 
nevertheless find that none of the transmission channels proposed in the literature exclusively account 
for the resource curse. 
 
Njikam (2008) tests the assumption that the growth effects of particular explanatory variables such as 
trade, openness and schooling are the same in resource-rich as resource-poor countries using regression 
analysis over the period 1970-2005. Similar to the classification structure used by Diao et al. (2006), 
Njikam (2008) identifies and compares six groups of countries: coastal, landlocked, mineral-rich, 
mineral poor, more-favourable agricultural conditions and less–favourable agricultural conditions. The 
results of initial growth regressions reveal that growth is more responsive to fiscal deficit reductions in 
mineral-poor countries than in mineral-rich countries. Institutional quality and openness to international 
trade are major determinants of growth in countries with less-favourable agricultural conditions, but 
may be insufficient for growth in countries with more-favourable agricultural conditions.  
 
Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2010) test the Institutional, Dutch disease, Debt overhang, and Human 
capital explanation for the resource curse in a thirty-year panel data set of developed and developing 
countries . The results show that a mineral-resource curse exists only for developing countries. With 
respect to the various explanations of causes of the resource curse, they find strong   support for the 
Institutional theory.  However, the study failed to find any support for the Dutch disease and Debt-
overhang explanations.  
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Sceptics of the resource curse hypothesis point out that many rich countries had abundant natural 
resources at the outset, for example, the United States of America, which is still one of the most 
developed countries in the world. Greasley and Madsen (2010) by means of post-1870 annual data and 
controlling for international knowledge spill overs, uncover a robust negative land resource productivity 
trade-off among major OECD economies and that mineral resource abundance has a positive impact on 
productivity. They conclude that differences in natural resource endowments among currently rich 
countries help explain their relative growth rates, but resource abundance does not translate into a 
universal curse or blessing. Conversely, Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) find evidence of a resource curse 
within certain regions of the United States.  
 
Despite the  results of a large  number of studies  indicating  that  natural resources  have a negative 
bearing on economic growth via different transmission mechanisms,  some  studies , especially those 
with an  improved measurement of resource abundance identify that natural resource wealth has a 
tendency to positively affect economic growth (Davis, 1995; Deaton and Miller 1995; Stijns, 2005 ; 
Stijns, 2006; Raddatz ,2007;Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008; Lederman and Maloney, 2008;Alexeev 
and Conrad, 2009).  
 
One of the first papers to contest the negative resource impact on growth view adopted by Sachs and 
Warner (1995) was published by Davis (1995) who reviews the economic performance of a group of 
mineral-based and non- mineral-based economies.  To overcome the possibility of biased results, Davis 
(1995) uses the Human Development Index and indicators such as education, mortality rates and 
sanitation to assess the reason behind the performance of the two groups of economies. The results 
show that mineral economies outperform non-mineral economies in terms of GDP per capita and a 
variety of human development indicators, implying no evidence of the resource curse. The only gap 
highlighted is between more developed mineral economies and the less-developed economies, showing 
that the resource curse maybe country specific. Similarly, Lederman and Maloney (2003) discover that 
resources positively affect growth. According to them, it is export concentration in resources that hurts 
growth as a result of a diminished accumulation of physical and human capital and a worsening of the 
terms of trade. 
 
Wright and Czelusta (2004) analyse wealth by distinguishing between export revenues and resource 
endowments. They maintain that there is no curse by revealing that mineral extraction is knowledge 
based and highly technological.  In the same year, after controlling for corruption, investment, openness, 
schooling and terms of trade, Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004) conclude that natural resources have a 
positive effect on economic growth. However, they use a ‘share of mineral production in GDP’ as their 
measure of resource abundance. This ratio computes resource intensity rather than abundance and as 
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indicated by Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003), an abundance of mineral and fuel resources may 
not generate the same economic result as abundance of other natural resources. Schliesser (2004) 
suggests there is little proof of the ‘natural resource curse’ and reveals that the empirical relationship 
between natural resource wealth and economic growth vanishes once the negative shocks on commodity 
markets are controlled for. Therefore, he opines that in the case of natural resource rich economies, the 
empirical result known as the ‘natural resource curse’ can be interpreted as a reflection of vulnerability 
to shocks and not as a growth defect.  
 
Ding and Field (2005) estimate a recursive model. Their results indicate a negative link between human 
capital and dependence on natural resources and they conclude that the curse may be a result of a high 
level of resource dependence, which in turn is as a result of the poor development of human capital. 
Along similar lines, Lederman and Maloney (2007) also report the positive impact of natural resources 
on economic growth. On the other hand, similar to the findings by Sachs and Warner (1995), 
Collier (2007) establishes that resources have a negative long term effect on growth. Yet, once long 
term adverse effects are controlled for, an abundance of non-agricultural resources exhibits a positive 
impact on average cross-country growth rates. 
 
Cotet and Tsui (2009) by means of a panel dataset covering worldwide oil discoveries, examine the 
consequences of oil rents on development and extractions using GMM estimation. They failed to find 
any robust evidence of a negative relationship between oil endowment and economic performance, 
conflicting with the oil-curse hypothesis.  However, when extreme outliers in the dataset are dropped, 
a significant positive effect of oil discovery on economic growth is found. Brunnschweiler (2009) also  
fails to  find any evidence of a  damaging  impact  of oil on economic growth  in  a panel of 27 transition 
economies, contrary to those of Kronenberg (2004), that show  there is a ‘‘strong negative correlation 
between natural resource abundance and economic growth’’. 
 
Some economists argue that natural resources provide a low level of externality and, as a result, GDP 
per capita of resource dependent economies tends to grow at a slower rate. Rocha (2010) uses panel 
data regressions to address the issue of externality generation from natural resource exports. The study 
shows that natural resource exports generate positive externalities that are at least as high as the 
externalities generated by manufactured exports. This implies that resource- rich countries that manage 
to increase their exports at a fast rate do not suffer from the natural resource curse. 
 
Dutch Disease Theory 
This review now evaluates studies that are based on the ‘Dutch Disease’ theory of the resource curse.  
Studies based on this theory use various model specifications to show that the gains from natural 
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resources, through either a discovery of new resources or an unexpected increase in the price of the 
resources,  crowds-out other sectors of the economy, especially manufacturing. 
 
Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997, 1999, and 2001) ascribe the curse mainly to Dutch disease effects, and 
to a lesser extent, to rent seeking. Like Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997, 1999, 2001), Auty (1994, 1997, 
2001) also finds evidence of a natural resource curse and concludes that all resources are cursed,  
especially  due to the resulting effect of a reduced openness to trade and slower development of physical 
and human capital. 
 
In a country specific investigation, Herbertsson, Skuladottir and Zoega (2000) examine the Dutch 
disease theory in Iceland, whose natural resource is fish. Herbertsson et al. (2000) find that primary 
exports have a positive short run relationship and a negative long run relationship with the secondary-
sector. Their investigation reveals that the real exchange rate depreciates when primary-sector output 
increases and wages increase with primary-sector wages. They thus conclude that Dutch disease effects 
are transmitted through the labour market instead of the exchange rate. Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 
(2003) explore the possibility of Dutch disease in Nigeria by studying the mechanism through the real 
exchange rate and the prices of tradable compared to non-tradable commodities. Conflicting with 
Herbertsson et al. (2000), they find no evidence of the Dutch disease in their study. 
 
International Trade Theory 
Guilló and Perez-Sebastian (2010) introduce natural input into a dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model of 
international trade and growth.  They test the hypotheses that natural resources can directly affect both 
long-run income and transitional growth, and that this effect can be positive or negative, depending on 
input elasticities. Guilló and Perez-Sebastian (2010) prove that the effect of resources on growth is 
positively significant. They discover that when the natural endowment triple, income per capita can 
increase up to 20%.Continuing along the lines of international trade, Mursheda, and Serino (2011) using 
dynamic panel data analysis show that countries specialising in the export of natural resource based 
products only fail to grow if they do not successfully diversify their economies and export structure.   
 
Endogenous Growth Theory 
The investment explanation based on the Endogenous growth theory is closely related to the trade 
explanation of the resource curse is. It is noted in the available literature that one of the important 
channels through which natural resource dependence affects growth is capital formation. Resource- rich 
countries are often inclined to over-concentrate developmental investment capital into their export 
sector (Karl, 1997; Ross, 1999; Stevens, 2003). Such countries are likely to not to efficiently invest in 
industrialisation eventually leading to slowed down growth rates (Stevens, 2003). 
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Gylfason and Zoega (2002) show that countries with low growth rates tend to experience low 
investment ratios, and it is the case that investment ratios are low in countries that are rich in natural 
resources. Similarly, Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004) present results that indicate that natural resource 
abundance reduces the need for physical investment, thus negatively affecting growth. As usual, there 
is no general consensus on the investment- resource –growth link. Malik and Bond (2009), investigate 
whether there is a direct connection between natural resource abundance and investment and fail to find 
such a connection. They argue that it is the structure of exports that determines investment, and its 
impact on growth. 
 
Conflict Theory 
Several empirical studies have presented evidence that natural resource- rich and dependent countries 
seem to be more prone to lapse into violence. When studying peace and war, it is alleged that natural 
resources not only create indirect economic and institutional causes of violence, they directly provide 
both finance and motive for armed conflict. Countries with natural resource endowments often provide 
easily captured sources of financing for civil wars, rebel coup attempts and competition among 
warlords, as well as general looting and violence (Collier and Hoeffler, 2000;Stevens, 2003; Ross 2004; 
Lujala, Gleditsch, and Gilmore, 2005). This finding of a higher probability of domestic and regional 
conflict in resource abundant countries, especially point-source resources, is supported by several 
researchers including Ross (2004, 2006), Murshed (2004), Humphreys (2005), Fearon, (2005) and 
DeSoysa and Neumayer (2005). Conflicting with the resource-curse argument, Miguel, Satyanath, and 
Sergenti (2004) apply an instrumental-variable approach to examine the determinants of civil war using 
variation in incomes and they find that temporary negative economic shocks initiate civil conflict. 
 
Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Fearon (2005), however, challenge these findings by claiming that the 
conclusions reflected omitted variables rather than a causal relationship.  Ross (2004) also comments 
on the general conclusion of resources causing conflict after conducting a meta-analysis of fourteen 
econometric studies, and finding that primary commodities alone cannot be robustly linked to the 
inception and duration of civil war. According to Ross, the type of resource is crucial in determining 
the effect on growth or incidence of conflict. All the studies reviewed by Ross (2004) failed to show 
any significant relationship between agricultural commodities and violence.  ‘Lootable’ resources such 
as diamonds, narcotics and timber are not found to increase the likelihood of conflict, instead, there is 
some evidence that they have some bearing on the duration of the conflict once it has broken out (Lujal 
et al. 2005). Along similar lines of thought, Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008, 2009) test the impact of 
resource dependence and resource wealth on civil war. Both studies conclude that resource abundance 
reduces the likelihood of civil war onset, while resource dependence seemed to be a consequence rather 
than a cause of civil war.  
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Basedu and Lay (2009) attempt to elucidate why violence is not common to all oil-producing countries 
by employing multivariate cross-country regressions based on modified replication datasets.  Using a 
sample of oil-exporting countries, they discover that, compared to oil-poor countries and contrary to 
the theory of the Rentier state, oil-rich countries succeed in maintaining peace and achieving internal 
stability. Similarly, Cotet and Tsui (2010) examine the effect of oil abundance on political violence 
using a panel dataset of over 100 countries between 1930 and 2003. They show that controlling for only 
country fixed effects removes the statistical association between oil reserves and civil war in a sample. 
They also reveal that oil reserves failed to influence other macro-political violence measures, such as 
attempted coups and irregular leader transitions. The study concludes that oil-rich nondemocratic 
countries have a large defence burden and that oil discoveries do not increase the probability of violent 
confrontations with the state. 
 
Rent Seeking and the Institutional Quality Theory 
Instead of presuming that institutional quality responds endogenously to resources, a considerable body 
of literature suggests that differences between successful and unsuccessful resource-rich countries lie 
in the quality of their institutions. The quality of institutions encompasses rent seeking, accountability, 
corruption and the behaviour of politicians. Leite and Weidmann (1999) point out that there is an 
important interconnection between resource abundance, lower economic growth and corruption. 
 
One of the most recognised papers within the rent-seeking hypothesis of the resource curse literature is 
written by Tornell and Lane (1999), who show that, in an economy with several groups, when more 
income becomes available for redistribution as a result of increases in marginal productivity, each group 
requests higher income transfers. These demands may lead to tax increases greater than the net marginal 
productivity of capital, and thus growth is reduced. Income increases brought about by resource 
windfalls are expected to have this effect on growth.  
 
Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) ascribe the quality of institutions to a country’s initial conditions 
established by its colonial experience.  They opine that, in cases where the colonial settlers worked in 
the overseas territory themselves, the institutional structure tended to promote wealth creation. On the 
other hand, if there were no permanent colonial settlements, ‘extractive institutions’ were set up to 
facilitate the extraction of wealth at the detriment of the indigenous people.  Along this line of thought, 
Engerman and Sokoloff (2002), show that the variations in initial factor endowments play an important 
role in shaping institutions. In contrast to Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002), Glaeser et al. (2004)  establishes 
that human capital accumulation and policy choice determine institutional quality, which improves as 
a result of rising incomes and not vice versa. Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2007) find that countries with 
specific institutional designs fail to industrialise. This failure to develop non-resource sectors makes 
them dependent on primary sector extraction. 
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Robinson, Torvik and Verdier (2002, 2006) develop a theoretical model of the effect of resources on 
growth conditional on institutional quality and political incentives generated by resources. They observe 
that in countries with good institutions, the resource effect is positive because rent seeking and other 
perverse political incentives are alleviated. However, in countries with weak institutions, resources 
remain a curse as they succumb to rent-seeking behaviour. Easterly and Levine (2002) note a similar 
impact of resource endowments on development through institutions. Studies such as Boschini, 
Pettersson and Roine (2005) and Torvik (2006) present evidence that as institutional quality improves 
the consequence of resources changes from a curse to a blessing. Researchers like Acemoglu et al. 
(2003) Fatás and Mihov (2003, 2005) challenge the assertion that macroeconomic policy is a 
transmission mechanism for institutions. Acemoglu et al. (2003) argue that macroeconomic policy 
merely mirrors the quality of a country’s institutions.  
 
Using data from Sachs and Warner (1997), and adding a variable which captures the interaction of 
resources and institutions, Mehlum et al. (2002,2006) perceive that natural resources increase the 
national income if institutions are ‘production friendly’, but lower the national income if they are 
‘grabber friendly’. This dependence on institutional quality is also confirmed by Sala-i-Martin and 
Subramanian (2003), who discover that the mineral resource curse is due to negative effects on 
institutions, with the effect dependent on the particular natural resources being considered.  This 
suggests that the curse may really apply to specific natural resources. Once they control for the indirect 
influence of resources on institutional quality, Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) find no proof of 
an independent effect of resources on growth.  Murshed (2003) deduces that a rich endowment in natural 
resources only becomes a curse conditional on inappropriate policies being practiced. Badly chosen 
policies are the products of poor institutions.  
 
Boschini et al. (2005) use the value of the production of precious metals and diamonds in their model 
when investigating the impact of poor quality institutions on growth, which the study finds to be 
significantly negative. However, Boschini et al. (2007) explain that resource endowment is not the sole 
determinant of this effect. They suggest that the ‘appropriability of a resource’ plays a significant role 
in the cause-effect dynamics. This captures the interaction between the type of resources and the quality 
of the institutions that a country owns. The concept of appropriability estimates the possibility that 
resources lead to rent-seeking, corruption or conflicts, eventually impairing economic development. 
The results from Boschini et al. (2007) indicate that in countries where resources are less appropriable, 
they can contribute to economic growth and vice versa where resources are highly appropriable.  Collier 
and Goderis (2007) test the channels of the resource curse proposed in the literature and find that a 
substantial part of it is explained by high consumption, low or inefficient investment, and an overvalued 
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exchange rate. They also pinpoint that the resource curse is avoided by countries with satisfactorily 
good institutions.  
 
 
Politics and Corruption 
A few studies in economics and political science analyse the apparent resource curse through the lens 
of politics. This link encompasses rent seeking, state ownership, corruption and governance. It is not 
surprising that the literature on this topic has established that with a competent government, natural 
resources have no negative consequences for the economy and may have positive effects.  
 
Asiedu and Lien (2011) empirically investigate the impact of democracy on foreign direct investment 
for resource exporting and non-resource exporting countries. Using data from 112 developing countries 
between 1982 and 2007, they estimate a linear dynamic panel-data model and opine that the impact of 
democracy on FDI depends on the size of natural resource endowments and not the type of resources. 
The study reveals that if the value of the share of minerals and oil in total exports is less than some 
critical value, democracy promotes FDI.  
 
 Libman (2011) studies how intra-national disparities in institutional quality and access to political 
decision-making affect growth in the Russian federation. The paper shows that subnational differences 
in the quality of institutions have some bearing on the effects of natural resources and concludes that if 
institutional quality is poor, resources have a negative impact on growth. Libman (2011) discovers that 
improving the quality of economic institutions is influential in making natural resources a growth factor. 
However, increasing the level of democracy, on the other hand, seems to cause resources to become 
harmful for growth, most likely because of stronger rent-seeking. Arezki and Brückner (2009) 
investigate the impact of oil rents on corruption and government stability for a panel of 31 oil-exporting 
countries between 1992 and 2005. Their results show that increases in oil rents considerably increase 
corruption and degrade political rights, while at the same time leading to a substantial improvement in 
civil liberties; however, they have no significant effect on measures of state instability. 
 
Over the years, reports from the World Bank have shown that the organisation considers majority 
ownership by the state in productive enterprises to be inefficient and wasteful (1981, 1989, and 1995). 
Quinn (1999, 2002), by means of a state-level analysis, highlights that in sub-Saharan Africa, in  most 
capital-intensive industries (mineral or oil exporting sector) wherein the state holds the majority share,  
more inward-oriented development policies result in  reduced economic revenues. Weinthal and  Luong 
(2006) and Quinn and Conway (2008) reach  a similar conclusion; majority state ownership of a 
country’s major mineral or oil export sectors can exacerbate the economic and political problems 
associated with mineral abundant economies. They explain that political elites manage the resource 
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sector with short-term political goals, regularly at the direct expense of long-term economic aspirations. 
Further support for this finding is provided by Robinson et al. (2006), through a theoretical framework 
which indicates that politicians over-extract natural resources because they discount the future too 
much.  
 
Using cross-sectional analysis, a large panel data set and an extended period of time, Bussea and 
Gröning (2011) analyse the influence of natural resource abundance on selected governance indicators. 
The robust results reveal that exports of natural resources lead to a surge in corruption. For other 
governance indicators, such as law and order and bureaucratic quality, Bussea and Gröning (2011) fail 
to find any robust results on their impact on economic growth. Some studies like Wantchekon (1999), 
Auty (2001), Ross (2001), Herb (2003), Jensen and Wantchekon (2003), Stevens (2003),  Smith (2004) 
and Juel and Ross (2011) concentrate on the impact of resources on the type of regime.  Most of these 
studies conclude that authoritarian political systems are more likely in mineral-rich or oil-rich countries. 
Ross (1999, 2001) and Herb (2003) scrutinise the potential stabilising Rentier effects of resources on 
the prevailing regime and reveal that oil rents undermine democracy. Haber and Menaldo (2008) 
develop unique datasets to estimate within-country variance in resource dependence and regime types. 
Their results are contradictory to the findings of studies such as Ross (2000) and Herb (2003) that 
establish a negative relationship between natural resource dependence and democracy using pooled 
cross sectional techniques. Haber and Menaldo (2008) point out that there is no relationship between 
oil and mineral dependence and the undermining of democracy. Furthermore, Cabrales and Hauk (2009) 
propose a theoretical model which emphasises the behaviour and incentives of politicians, which 
clarifies that resource discoveries might be bad for democracy and could lead to revolutions, especially 
in countries with weak institutions.  
 
Smith (2004) also investigates the stabilising Rentier effects in oil states, focusing on their impact on 
democracy. In contrast to studies like Ross (1999, 2001) and Herb (2003), Smith (2004) concludes that 
the level of democratisation does not explain regime stability. Haber and Menaldo (2009, 2011) also 
find little evidence that oil is harmful to democracy, and suggest that previous studies that believe oil 
to foster authoritarianism suffer from omitted variable bias and reverse causality. However, Collier 
(2007) opines that it is not simply whether countries are democratic that ensures a growth enhancing 
impact of natural resources.  Without efficient monitoring of power, competition for resource rents can 
cause democracies to break down. 
 
Resources and Development 
Although economic growth is often assumed to translate into development and improved welfare, in 
many countries this has not been the case.  Some studies have attempted to estimate the impact resource 
32 
 
abundance or dependence has on key development indicators in resource-rich countries. These 
development indicators often include health, life expectancy, infant mortality rates and human capital.  
 
Case studies of the oil-exporting countries highlight the paradox of higher revenue from sales of a 
natural resource commodity leading to declines in welfare (Gelb, 1988, Karl, 1997). 
 
One of the most widely accepted comprehensive estimates of development and welfare is the Human 
Development Index. Bulte, Damania and Deacon (2005), establish that, given an initial level of income, 
lower levels of human development are prevalent in resource-intensive countries.  Their results indicate 
only weak support for a direct connection between resources and welfare and a significant and indirect 
link that operates mainly through the quality of institutions. Similar to Bulte et al. (2005), Pendergast, 
Clarke and van Kooten (2010) argue that rent-seeking leads to corruption and,  in turn, affects wellbeing.   
 
 Besley and Kudamatsu (2006) reveal that populations are healthier under democracies because 
democracies were swifter to implement mortality reducing policies. They also find that mineral 
exporting countries have lower life expectancy. Following Besley and Kudamatsu (2006), Cotet and 
Tsui (2009) consider infant mortality and life expectancy over different periods, using data from the 
World Bank. In contrast with Besley and Kudamatsu (2006), Cotet and Tsui (2009) reveal that an 
abundance of oil had a negative effect on infant mortality and a positive influence on life expectancy 
between 1960 and 1980. Gelb and Grasmann (2009) show that focusing on only the physical gains from 
oil abundance may underestimate the welfare gain because, relative to non-oil countries, oil-rich 
countries gain more in health improvements. Bulte et al. (2005), among others, show that negative 
outcomes in several other measures of human welfare have also been linked to natural resource wealth. 
 
Human Capital Theory 
According to studies like Wood and Mayer (1998), Stijns (2006), Bravo-Ortega and de Gregorio (2007), 
resource abundance is not the main determinant of a country’s growth potential, which instead relies on 
the stock of human and institutional capital available in the country to manage its resources. Studies 
suggest that Africa’s low ratio of human capital to natural resources is a major determinant of its export 
structure, ability to diversify towards manufacturing and its shortfall in economic performance 
compared to Asia (Wood and Mayer, 1998).  Gylfason (2000) highlights that inadequate attention and 
expenditure on education and development of human resources is key to explaining the resource curse..  
 
Stijns (2006) evaluates the connection between resource abundance and the growth of human capital 
and finds there is a positive relationship between per capita rents from natural resources and human 
capital accumulation. This supports the findings of Davis (1995), but contradicts the results of Gylfason 
(2000). Stijns (2006) argues that the measure of resource abundance used by Gylfason (2000) is biased, 
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thus resulting in biased results on human capital.  In a bid to escape the bias in the human capital 
variable, Bravo-Ortega and De Gregorio (2005) use panel data and instrumental variables to illustrate 
that a high level of human capital can offset the negative link between resources and economic growth. 
The main finding is that resources could impede growth in countries with low levels of human capital, 
but in economies with an abundance of human capital, natural resources could boost growth.  Birdsall, 
Pinckney and Sabot (2001) conclude that countries with abundant resources experience lagging growth 
as a result of under- investment in human capital. Moreover, Lederman and Maloney (2007) reiterate 
this finding  by explaining  that countries such as Norway that have successfully utilised their natural 
resources for further development  have done so by improving  their levels of human capital.  
 
Goderis and Malone (2011) estimate a two-sector growth model in which ‘learning-by-doing’ 
stimulates growth. They also explain the time path of income inequality that follows natural resource 
booms in resource abundant economies. Their study evaluates ninety countries between 1965 and 1999.   
They find that with a relatively unskilled, labour intensive, non-traded sector, a decrease in income 
inequality immediately follows a resource boom. Income equality increases steadily over time until the 
initial impact of the boom disappears.   
 
Using cross-country regressions, Alexeev and Conrad (2011)  examine  the association between 
resource abundance and economic growth, incorporating variables to capture the quality of institutions, 
investment in human and physical capital, and social welfare (life expectancy and infant mortality) for 
all countries in the dataset. Contrary to most literature available, Alexeev and Conrad (2011) fail to find 
any substantial verification of a natural resource curse in all the countries. Only the ‘voice and 
accountability’ measure of institutional quality is found to be significantly and negatively affected by 
oil wealth. 
 
Volatility Theory 
Empirical investigations of the effect natural resources have on growth and development in some cases 
seek to evaluate the volatility mechanism. They examine volatility through commodity prices, trade 
shocks, resource revenues, fiscal policy and exchange rates. Van der Ploeg (2009) explain that it is a 
widely accepted fact that growth depends negatively on volatility and that the direct positive effects of 
natural resources on growth are dwarfed by the indirect negative effects through volatility.  
 
Instead of volatility of the terms of trade, Ramey and Ramey (1995) investigate the connection shared 
by volatility of unanticipated output growth and the instability of commodity prices and growth using 
the Heston-Summers dataset. In their cross-country estimations, Ramey and Ramey (1995) discover 
evidence of a negative relationship between volatility and mean growth rates. This finding is also valid 
in a panel model that controlled for both time and country fixed effects.  Building on the work of Ramey 
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and Ramey (2004), Koren and Tenreyro (2007) and Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009) show that 
volatility is the crucial channel through which resource dependence influences economic growth. They 
find a statistically significant negative correlation between volatility and growth, providing support for 
Ramey and Ramey (2004).  
 
Fatás and Mihov (2003, 2005) also focus on volatility instead of the share of government consumption 
to GDP. As in Ramey and Ramey (1995),  the results of  Fatás and Mihov (2003, 2005) indicate  there 
is a negative correlation between  a country’s average per capita growth rate and output volatility, and 
also  between income per capita growth and  government consumption. Their results also reveal a strong 
positive correlation between fiscal policy volatility and output volatility.  When institutions are 
controlled for, as in Acemoglu et al. (2003), ‘fiscal policy volatility’ remains significant in the growth 
regression, signifying that it is more than just a transmission mechanism for institutional effects. 
 
Aghion et al. (2006) identify strong evidence of a robust and negative relationship between real 
exchange rate volatility and growth performance for eighty-three countries over the period 1960 to 
2000. About a year later, Blattman, Hwang and Williamson (2007) carried out a thorough investigation 
of the growth performance of thirty-five countries during the historical period, 1870 to 1939. Their 
findings show that volatility is indeed harmful to the economic growth of commodity-dependent 
nations. Nelson (2008) approaches the volatility investigation by examining the impact of the volatility 
of export prices on growth in resource dependent economies. He points out that trade shocks have 
‘Dutch disease’ characteristics and thus pose challenges for macroeconomic management.  
 
Extending the investigation of Aghion et al. (2009), Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009) show that 
when commodity prices are volatile, liquidity constraints increase, thus resulting in a decrease in 
innovation and a fall in growth. The results of Bleaney and Halland (2009) conflict with those of van 
der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009), who find that volatility is the key transmission channel of the resource 
curse, and that it is the variability of resource prices rather than the level of resource exports that matters. 
In contrast to Fatás and Mihov (2003, 2005), they fail to find a significant relationship between the 
volatility of government consumption and institutional factors, but the relationship could, however, be 
explained by natural resource exports.  
 
Technological Progress 
Some studies highlight the possible positive effects of natural resource wealth on technological 
progress, especially in conjunction with high ‘learning capacity’ (Maloney, 2002; Lederman and 
Maloney, 2003).  Welsch (2008) argues that studies in  which  the ‘natural resource curse’  is examined 
in an endogenous growth model base their foundations on  the assumption of constant returns to capital 
as the source of sustainable growth, instead of taking into consideration  the creation of knowledge 
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through  research development (R&D). Against this background, using an endogenous growth model 
with natural resources and R&D-based technological change, Welsch (2008) finds an inverse 
relationship between knowledge creation and natural resource intensity, as well as between capital 
formation and natural resource intensity for a cross-sectional data set of 77 countries between 1965 and 
1998.  
 
The resource curse literature rests predominantly upon connecting relatively poor economic 
performance with countries with an abundance of natural resources empirically using different 
methodologies. The findings of the empirical studies vary and in some cases empirical issues are the 
reason. Most of these studies are based on the seminal work of Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997, and 
2001) and are thought-provoking and theoretically relevant from a policy point of view, but suffer from 
a few shortcomings. The most common points of contention surround the availability of certain data 
and the measurement of resource abundance, differentiating between resource abundance and resource 
dependence and estimation issues. This research now evaluates some of the acknowledged empirical 
issues that affect the results of many studies in the resource curse literature.  
 
Empirical Issues 
The first issue is the operationalisation of the independent variable. Most studies fail to distinguish 
between resource abundance and resource dependence in their methodology (Van der Ploeg, 2009; 
Bond and Malik, 2009). Resource dependence or comparative advantage in natural resources is not 
equivalent to resource abundance (Wright and Czelusta, 2004). Most datasets face difficulty in 
accurately measuring mineral deposits and resource based data is unavailable for several different 
countries. Consequently, most of the literature uses ‘Natural Resource Dependence’, since it is easier 
to measure. Its use, however, leads to issues of endogeneity, for which not all studies successfully 
account. 
 
Another issue lies with the measures used as proxies for either resource abundance or resource 
dependence. Sachs and Vial (2001) use the ratio ‘resource exports to total exports’ in their analysis of 
the resource curse hypothesis. They find the measure to have a negative impact on growth. As 
Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2007) condemn Sachs and Warner’s (1995, 1997, 2001) measure, likewise, 
Lederman and Maloney (2007) put forward the argument that Sachs and Vial’s (2001) finding that the 
ratio of natural resource exports to total exports negatively affects growth is identified because they fail 
to control for export diversification. Jean-Philippe (2003) conducts a review of the literature on mineral 
reserves by country, and finds no significant correlation between mineral reserves and GDP growth 
rates. Jean-Philippe (2003) explains that the Sachs-Warner export ratios are not even rough proxies for 
resource endowments and concludes that when more conceptually appropriate measures are used, the 
resource curse effect disappears.  
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Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2007) argue that Sachs and Warner’s (1995, 1997, and 2001) finding of a 
negative effect of resources on growth relies on their proxy for resource abundance: the ratio of resource 
exports to GDP. Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2007) maintain that the ratio of resource exports to GDP is 
a measure of dependence or intensity instead of a measure of abundance. Similarly, Alexeev and Conrad 
(2009) apply the same line of criticism to studies that use oil dependency, measured by the share of oil 
output (or exports) in GDP as the independent variable of interest. Based on this intuition, Wright and 
Czelusta (2004), Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2007) and Alexeev and Conrad (2009) explain that using 
dependency measures introduces endogeneity bias in the regression results. 
 
Neumayer (2004) points out a problem with econometric models regressing GDP growth on some 
measures of resource intensity. This paper explains that the GDP measure considers natural and other 
capital depreciation as income. The study removes depreciation from total GDP to identify what they 
refer to as ‘genuine income’. Using this new measure, it still finds support for the resource curse 
hypothesis; however, the effect is slightly weaker.  Brunnschweiler (2008) proposes two new measures 
for resources: ‘subsoil wealth’ and ‘natural resource wealth per capita’. Only a few studies such as De 
Soysa (2002) use a per capita measure for resource wealth. In relation, the ‘resource wealth per capita’ 
measure suggested by Brunnschweiler (2008) and Basedu (2009) points out that this measure is 
indirectly measured by GDP per capita. This implies that the effect of resource wealth per capita and 
the effect of (non-resource) income per capita are confusing. Basedu (2009) also highlights that 
‘resource wealth per capita’ definitely measures potential income rather than actual income.  
 
Another issue related to ‘per capita’ based measures lies in the Malthusian theory. According to this 
theory, a positive effect of the standard of living on the growth rate of population might result in 
negative feedback from the size of population on the standard of living. Cotet and Tsui (2009) find a 
robust Malthusian effect because of oil abundance, which might reduce per capita GDP growth. 
Therefore a population explosion greater than increases in revenue may be the reason for the lower per 
capita incomes over time, which studies interpret as a resource curse. Cotet (2009) also criticises the 
use of the ‘resources per capita’ measure as an independent variable in cross country analysis, 
explaining that, most of the time, various countries discover oil at different points. The study emphasises 
that comparing cross-sectional oil reserves at a specific point in time may understate the magnitude of 
oil abundance for countries that discover and commence the production oil earlier. In addition, Cotet 
(2009) points out that  population is endogenous to oil abundance; therefore, if oil has a positive impact 
on population growth, normalising oil by the current population can result in an upward bias in 
estimating the effect  of oil on economic growth. Leamer (1984) claims that an appropriate measure of 
resource abundance based on the Heckscher-Ohlin theory is ‘net exports of resources per worker’ in the 
economy.  Lederman and Maloney (2007) use a similar measure, ‘net exports of natural resource-
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intensive commodities per worker’, and do not find resource abundance to exhibit a negative impact on 
growth. 
 
Some of the varying conclusions reached by studies on the affiliation between resource abundance and 
growth are also attributed to modelling and estimating differences. The main debate revolves around 
the use of panel estimation versus cross sectional data and time series analysis, the use of instrumental 
variables, endogeneity issues, omitted variable bias, and time period and data availability. 
 
From a theoretical standpoint, the neoclassical growth model (Barro, 1998) provides the basis for the 
cross-country growth regression framework.  Most cross-section studies provide evidence in support of 
the resource curse hypothesis. On the other hand, Deaton and Miller (1995) and Collier (2009) show 
that time series analyses utilising vector autoregressive models have failed to find such support.  
Despite all the cross-sectional growth regressions in support of the resource curse, there are still critics 
of this methodology. Islam (1995) states compellingly that cross-country regressions suffer from 
omitted variable bias and they fail to make provision for correlation between the initial level of 
productivity and past income per capita. Parente and Prescott (1994) and Van der Ploeg (2007) highlight 
the fact that cross-sectional estimations do not reflect the dynamics of the resource curse and potentially 
suffer from omitted variable bias. It is therefore vital to move from cross-country to panel data evidence 
(Parente and Prescott, 1994; Islam, 1995, Van der Ploeg, 2007).  Manzano and Rigobon (2001) present 
evidence that the curse is not evident in panel estimates; however, it is worth noting that it is not only 
panel studies that fail to find support for the curse.  
 
Arezki and Van der Ploeg (2007) re-examine the cross-country evidence based on Sachs and Warner 
(1995), correcting for the endogenous nature of the explanatory variables by using instrumental 
variables. The findings of those cross-country studies are invalidated by Arezki and Van der Ploeg 
(2007). A large fraction of the resource curse empirical literature does not use instruments for 
investment, institutions and trade and consequently produces biased and misleading estimates.  Care 
must however be taken when considering which variables can be instrumented. For example, the ratio 
of resources to GDP (dependence) is potentially endogenous and, if instrumented, it does not 
significantly affect growth; on the other hand, resource wealth (abundance) has a significant positive 
impact on growth (Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008).  
 
Due to the data available, most studies do not cover an excessively long period of time and data that is 
definitely accurate is not available for precise future revenue from resource endowments. “Growth 
processes take place across the very long run and probably cannot be convincingly summarized by cross 
section regressions of one highly turbulent 20-year period at the end of the 20th century” (Maloney, 
2001). Reflecting on this conundrum from empirical studies, Stevens (2003) argues that a case-by-case 
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approach rather than some sort of generalisation is the way forward in investigating the resource curse 
hypothesis. 
 
 
2.3 REVIEW OF THEORETICAL DEBT OVERHANG-GROWTH 
LITERATURE 
 
Growth Models 
The Harrod-Domar model (1946) is one of the pioneering models for the analysis of growth and shows 
that economic growth is based directly on capital accumulation. According to the model, if debt can 
raise capital accumulation, it will lead to growth. The Neoclassical Growth model by Solow-Swan 
(1956) assumes that technological change and saving are exogenous and the technology process is 
labour-augmenting, proposing that differences in capital per worker and in the effectiveness of labour 
account for the variation in output per worker. In contrast to the growth path suggested by the Harrod-
Domar model (1946), the Solow model indicates that physical capital accumulation cannot account for 
growth over time or the geographic differences in output per person.                                            
                                                                                                                                      
Chenery and Strout (1966), based on the Harrod-Domar growth model, develop the Two-gap model. 
According to this model, the act of filling two gaps is responsible for economic growth. The internal 
gap is between investment and saving and the external gap is between imports and exports. Chenery 
and Strout (1966) explain that the internal gap highlights the necessity for developing countries to 
supplement resources to accumulate capital and that the external gap assumes that imports are necessary 
for the production of investment goods. Consequently, based on the Two- gap model, it can be inferred 
that economic growth is inhibited by an inflow of foreign capital. Oyejide (1985) provides further 
support for this model by claiming that, with swift economic growth, the rate of investment might 
necessarily be greater than that of public savings. Therefore the need might arise for the government to 
make use of borrowing to complement public savings.  Cohen and Sachs’ (1986) model shows two 
phases of economic growth, assuming an endogenous growth ceiling and a possibility of debt 
repudiation. According to this model, in the first phase the growth rate of external resource inflow 
would be greater than the growth rate of output. In the second phase, the inflow of resources and growth 
will both slow down.  Cohen and Sachs’ (1986) model goes on to show that, in line with this slowing 
down of growth and in order to ensure that the country does not default, permanent refinancing (linked 
to output) of debt service will be the only equilibrium strategy.  
 
Such models are criticised because of their impractical assumptions such as a constant capital-output 
ratio and an unlimited supply of foreign credit, resulting in their empirical implications being 
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counterfactual (Eaton, 1993; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). A better practical assumption is that, 
owing to moral hazard or the risk of debt repudiation, countries may not be able to borrow freely (Gertler 
and Rogoff, 1990). Such models, for example, that proposed by Cohen (1991), argue that in reality it is 
possible that countries may not be capable of borrowing freely because of moral hazard or the risk of 
debt repudiation, nor are they in financial autarky.  In these models, low levels of debt are still linked 
with higher growth than in financial autarky. 
 
Assuming no non-Keynesian effects, the traditional view is that in the short term debt can kindle 
aggregate demand and output, but in the long term it crowds out capital and reduces output (Elmendorf 
and Mankiw, 1999). “In the absence of foreign borrowing, growth will proceed at the highest rate 
permitted by the most limiting factor. If the biggest gap is the savings-investment gap, growth is limited 
by the availability of domestic savings ... if the biggest gap is the foreign exchange gap, growth is 
limited by the availability of foreign exchange ... traditionally, the role of foreign borrowing was to 
supplement domestic saving” (Thirlwall, 1978, p. 293).  
 
This argument lays the basic foundation for the need for borrowing (debt). In Modigliani’s (1961) 
aggregate model, debt accumulation can positively affect growth if the increase in debt is complemented 
by government expenditure on productive public capital. The problem, however, is eventual ‘debt 
overhang’. Krugman (1988) defines debt overhang as a state in which the expected repayment on 
external debt falls short of the contractual value of the debt.  “The debt overhang arises in a situation in 
which the debtor country benefits very little from the return to any additional investment because of 
debt service obligations. When foreign obligations cannot be fully met from existing resources and 
actual debt payments are determined by some negotiation process between the debtor country and its 
creditors, the amount of payments can become linked to the economic performance of the debtor 
country, with the consequence that at least part of the return to any increase in production would in fact 
be devoted to debt servicing. This creates a disincentive to investment from the point of view of the 
global interest of the debtor country” (Borensztein, 1990). 
 
Accordingly, the theoretical literature on the connection between growth and the stock of external debt 
focuses mainly on the adverse effects of ‘debt overhang’. In neoclassical growth models, perfect capital 
mobility leads to economic growth.  In endogenous growth models, the mounting cost of foreign capital 
inflow cuts external borrowing, initiating a fall in long term economic growth (Andersen, 1995). In its 
original formulation, the debt overhang theory centres on the antagonistic influences of external debt 
on investment in physical capital. The bounds of the theory have evolved to include the effect of debt 
on a government’s incentives to execute structural, fiscal and domestic debt reforms (Corden, 1989). 
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Transmission Mechanisms (taxes, private savings, public investment, total factor productivity 
(TFP) and domestic long-term nominal and real interest rates, uncertainty) 
 
Iqbal and Kanbur (1997) and Clements, Bhattacharya and Nguyen (2003) clearly explain how debt 
overhang is likely to negatively affect growth. According to them, when a country’s debt level is 
expected to surpass the country’s future repayment ability, expected debt service is prone to be an 
increasing function of the country’s output. Therefore, a fraction of the gains from domestic investment 
are in effect ‘taxed away’ by existing foreign creditors. This ‘taxing away’ will eventually discourage 
investment by domestic investors, foreign investors and economic growth. As highlighted by 
researchers such as Oks and Wijnbergen (1995), Agénor and Montiel (1996) and Maier (2005), a 
situation where the level of debt is greater than the repayment capability of the debtor results in a 
distortionary tax.  This form of marginal taxation, a tax on returns, discourages future domestic and 
foreign investment. Taxation is not the only mechanism through which debt negatively affects growth. 
The theoretical literature highlights major channels through which government debt can affect the 
economic growth rate: private savings, public investment; total factor productivity (TFP) and domestic 
long-term nominal and real interest rates.  
 
Increased uncertainty brought about by debt overhang also lowers investment and growth. As the value 
of the national debt increases, uncertainty about the steps and policies governments will adopt in order 
to meet their debt servicing increases (Agénor and Montiel, 1996; Pattillo, Poison and Ricci 2002). The 
uncertainty about debt repudiation and moral hazard may impede the state’s prospect of borrowing 
capital on international capital markets without constraints. Consequently, the loss of access to world 
financial markets may result in reduced investment and economic growth (Borensztein, 1990; Cohen, 
1993). High debt service payments can ‘crowd out’ the aggregate resources available for public 
spending on infrastructure, human capital and investment (Alejandro, 1981; Taylor, 1983; Serieux and 
Samy, 2001; Clements, Bhattacharya and Nguyen, 2003). Speedy amassing of debt can also be 
accompanied by an increase in capital flight if the private sector suspects forthcoming default 
(Clements, 2003). Most countries therefore seek to ensure a sustainable level of debt, which is 
sustainable if the growth rate of output is equal to or greater than the rate of interest and accumulated 
debt (Nikbakht, 1984; Czerkawski, 1991). Those whose debt has reached unsustainable levels pursue 
conditionalities imposed by lenders to qualify for debt relief. If partial debt is relieved, the debt becomes 
a lump-sum burden and investment is encouraged (Sachs, 1989; Krugman, 1988; Basu, 1997).  
 
It is erroneous to think that debt has an entirely negative impact on growth in every case. There are 
suggestions in the theoretical literature that foreign borrowing has a positive effect on investment and 
growth up to a certain threshold, beyond which its impact is adverse (Clements et al., 2003). The optimal 
level of debt is when the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost of the external capital (Eaton, 1989; 
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Hjertholm, 2000). Researchers including Cohen (1993) and Agénor (2000) illustrate this relationship 
as a kind of ‘Debt Laffer curve’.  
 
2.4 REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL DEBT OVERHANG –GROWTH 
LITERATURE 
 
Empirical studies have investigated the effects of “debt overhang”. This research on debt overhang 
mostly focuses on proving that, in the presence of a large stock of debt, returns from investment are 
sub-optimal (Dooley, 1989; Froot, 1989; Borenzstein, 1990). One group of these papers tests the 
potential crowding-out effect of debt on investment (Warner, 1992; Serven and Solimano, 1993; 
Elbadawi et al., 1997). Another set examines the effect of debt on growth in cross-country regressions, 
focusing on the existence of nonlinear relationships between debt and other economic variables, 
especially investment and growth (Arran, 1990; Borenzstein, 1990; Villanueva, 1991; Cohen, 1993). 
This thesis now reviews studies that empirically investigate the debt overhang phenomenon, some of 
which are considered to be country specific cases, whilst others examine samples of countries. Djikstra 
and Hermes (2001) review several studies on the debt overhang hypothesis and infer that the empirical 
evidence is inconclusive. 
 
Debt and Investment 
Borensztein (1990) finds an adverse effect of debt overhang on private investment in the Philippines. 
Iyoha (1997, 1999) maintains that debt can diminish investment and lower the rate of economic growth, 
utilising data from Nigeria.  Focusing on data for Cameroon, Mbanga and Sikod (2001) display evidence 
of debt overhang on private investment and crowding-out effects on public investment. Ezeabasili, Isu 
and Mojekwu (2011) conduct a similar study for Nigeria between 1975 and 2006. Their results reveal 
a negative link between external debt and economic growth, and a unidirectional causality between 
external debt service payment and economic growth.  Javed and Sahino (2005) carry out an empirical 
analysis of the influence of external debt on the Turkish economy. Their results suggest that, in the case 
of Turkey, a large increase in the stock of external debt affects investment negatively and exports 
positively, but has no effect on growth.  
 
Debt and Growth 
Balassone, Francese and Pace (2011), concentrating on Italy, examine the connection between the 
government debt-to-GDP ratio and real per capita income growth over 1861 to 2009.  Balassone et al. 
(2011) explain that there is a negative correlation between debt and per capita GDP growth between 
1890 and 1914 and that the correlation between the two variables breaks down between 1985 and 2007.  
Conversely, Wejeweera et al. (2005) reveal that in Sri Lanka during 1952- 2002, the country did not 
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have a problem of debt overhang and that indebtedness was not the major obstacle to its growth. For 
the case of Ethiopia, Desta (2005) reaches a similar conclusion. Sen et al. (2007)  verifies the ‘debt 
overhang’ hypothesis using data from Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, China , India, Indonesia, Korea, 
Mexico, the Philippines, Thailand and Venezuela. Ayadi and Ayadi (2008) carry out a comparative 
analysis of the effect of the external debt service burden on economic growth and investment in Nigeria 
and South Africa.  They discover that, in the case of South Africa, debt has a significant positive 
relationship with output growth, whilst for Nigeria debt service is found to exert a positive, but 
statistically insignificant effect on output. 
 
Some researchers concentrate on the impact of debt on growth in specific country groupings. For 
example, regional groupings, by level of income, level of development and level of indebtedness. 
Goldman and Olin (1987) show that the debt overhang that exists in Third World countries is as a 
consequence of the unproductive utilisation of borrowed resources. Elbadawi et al. (1996) confirm the 
impact of debt overhang on economic growth in ninety-nine developing countries and conclude that it 
is the accumulation of debt which has a negative impact on growth.  Fosu (1996, 1999) assesses the 
link between economic growth and external debt for a sample of Sub-Saharan African countries (SSA); 
the study reveals that there is a significant negative association between debt and economic growth and 
a weak negative impact of debt on investment levels. Ndung’u (1998) postulates that lagging growth 
and the investment gap in Africa is as a result of the external debt problem. Greene and Villanueva 
(1991) also find an indication of the debt overhang effect, for a sample of developing countries that 
excludes heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs).  
 
Afxentiou and Serletis (1996) divide their panel of countries into: developing countries, severely 
indebted middle income, moderately indebted low income, moderately indebted middle income, and 
severely indebted middle income and investigates the impact of debt on growth. The results show that 
between 1970 and 1980, external debt did not affect economic growth negatively, but the link turned 
negative between 1980 and 1990. Weeks (2000) estimates a cross-country growth regression using data 
for eighteen Latin American countries .The study reports that external indebtedness has a large and 
negative impact on GDP growth. Hepp (2005), for a cross-section of 122 developing countries, also 
finds a negative debt –growth relationship. Scott (1995) obtains similarly negative results for Sub-
Saharan Africa. Adam (2004) theorises that large debt accumulations in many LDCs result in debt 
overhang, which dampens investment and negatively influences future output.  Abbas and Christiansen 
(2007) explore the effect of domestic debt on low-income and emerging market countries. They find 
that moderate levels of domestic debt, as a fraction of GDP and bank deposits, positively affects growth, 
but when the domestic debt-GDP ratio is greater than a threshold level of 35% of bank deposits, 
domestic debt began to weaken growth. 
 
43 
 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) provide proof of a negative link between public debt and growth. They 
scrutinise economic growth at different levels of government debt in a sample of forty-four countries 
and discover that, when the debt-to-GDP ratio is above 90%, median growth rates fall by 1%. Kumar 
and Woo (2010), after controlling for other determinants of growth, highlight the linear negative effects 
of initial debt levels for growth in advanced and emerging economies. Investigating the economic 
consequences of high burdens of external debt in poor countries, Presbitero (2006) also finds a linear 
and significantly negative link between external debt and growth in low income countries and highly 
indebted poor countries (HIPCs).  
 
Focusing on HIPCs, Cunningham (1993) estimates the impact of debt and economic growth in sixteen 
HIPCs between 1971 and 1987. The results reveal that the negative relationship between a country’s 
growth and debt burden confirms the existence of debt overhang in HIPCs. Sawada (1994) reaches a 
similar conclusion using annual time series data for heavily indebted countries for the period 1955 
to1990. Deshpande (1997) explores the debt overhang hypothesis by empirically investigating the 
investment experience of 13 heavily indebted countries, finding a consistently negative relationship 
between external debt and investment. Using panel data for HIPC and non-HIPC countries, Chowdhury 
(2001) highlights a statistically significant impact of different debt indicators in both groups of 
countries. Presbitero (2005) shows a negative linear relationship between external debt and economic 
growth, and between debt service and investment, especially in low income countries. Studies by 
Eichengreen and Portes (1986), Cunningham (1993), Metwally and Tamaschke (1994) and Elbadawi 
et al. (1996) also note that excessive indebtedness has a significantly negative effect on economic 
growth. 
 
The relationship between debt and growth is not always linear, thus the theory of the Debt Laffer Curve. 
In the empirical studies that investigate the Debt Laffer Curve hypothesis, the level of indebtedness is 
crucial.  Claessens (1990) and Claessens et al. (1991) find that extremely indebted countries are on the 
‘wrong’ side of the Laffer curve, signifying that a partial lessening of debt would increase the expected 
repayment to the creditors. In both papers, however, the position of middle-income countries on the 
Debt Laffer Curve depends on the exact specification of the model, raising concerns regarding how 
robust such findings really are. Elbadawi et al. (1997) directly assesses the nonlinear impact of debt on 
economic growth for a sample of ninety-nine developing countries using panel techniques.  Their results 
imply that at minimal levels, debt stimulates growth, but past a certain threshold accumulated debt has 
a negative impact on growth.  Similarly, Cohen (1997) investigates the nonlinear debt- growth 
relationship.Cohen (1997) utilises a variable that predicts the risk of a debt rescheduling (or debt crisis). 
The result reveals that when the debt to GDP ratio reaches 50% and debt to exports ratio reaches 200%, 
the probability of rescheduling debt or experiencing a debt crisis becomes excessive, significantly 
lowering growth. Pattillo et al. (2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004) empirically study the connection between 
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total external debt and GDP growth for developing countries. They test the debt-growth relationship for  
a sample of about 100 developing countries using various nonlinear specifications and both net present 
value debt and  nominal debt. They prove that debt has an inverted U-curve relationship with growth 
and confirm the debt overhang hypothesis. 
 
Comparable results are found by Clements, Bhatacharya, and Nguyen (2003). Clements et al. (2003) 
investigate the impact of external debt on growth and on the transmission mechanisms of debt in fifty-
five low-income countries between 1970 and 1999. However, they find that higher debt service has a 
non-linear significant ‘crowding out’ effect on public investment and thus growth. Clements et al. 
(2004) show foreign debt has adverse effects on economic growth and public investment via debt 
service. They also confirm the non‐linear relationship between debt and growth.  
 
Cordella et al. (2005) examine how the debt-growth relationship varies with indebtedness levels in a 
panel of 80 developing countries, divided into HIPCs and non-HIPCS. Even though they  find a highly 
non-linear relationship between debt and growth,  in contrast  to Pattillo et al. (2002,2003,2004), the 
results from Cordella et al.(2005)  suggest that there is a negative marginal relationship between debt 
and growth at intermediate levels of debt, but not below the debt overhang threshold, or above the debt 
irrelevance threshold. They also find that economies with good policies and institutions face debt 
overhang when debt increases above 15-30 % of GDP, but the marginal impact of debt on growth 
becomes irrelevant above 70-80%. The study also reveals that the overhang and irrelevance thresholds 
are lower in countries with bad policies and weak institutions.   
 
Checherita and Rother (2010), for a sample of twelve countries in the Eurozone between 1970 and 2008, 
reveal a non-linear impact of debt on per capita real GDP growth. Imbs and Ranciere (2005) discover 
some indication of debt overhang occurring when the net present value of debt to GDP reaches 30-35 
%. Caner et al. (2010), for a large sample of countries, establish that the threshold effect kicks-off at 
growth rates of 77% of GDP, with a lower threshold for emerging markets.  Cecchetti et al. (2011) 
identify a similar threshold effect; this shows that varying thresholds in the relationship between public 
debt and growth have been identified by empirical studies. Other previous empirical studies  that 
confirm the nonlinear effects of debt on growth include Smyth and Hsing (1995), Cohen (1997), 
Elbadawi et al. (1997), Reinhart  and Rogoff (2010) and Kumar and Woo (2010) .  
 
Using the system GMM dynamic panel econometric technique proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) 
and Blundell and Bond (1998), contrary to previously reviewed studies, Schclarek (2004) does not find 
any evidence of an inverted-U shape relationship between external debt and growth. The study also 
points out that it is public external debt and not private external debt that drives the negative link 
between debt and economic growth for a sample of 59 developing and 24 industrial countries between 
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1970 and 2002. Along similar lines as Schclarek (2004), Maier (2005) explores a linear and non-linear 
impact of external debt on growth in developing and transitional countries for the period 1970 – 1999 
using an irregular and unbalanced panel of time-series cross-country data. Maier (2005) detects only 
weak evidence for a reverse Laffer curve effect of external debt to GDP ratio with respect to the growth 
rate and a significant Laffer curve disappears with respect to the total effect. Abiad and Ostry (2005) 
also conclude that in developing countries, excessive public debt does not stimulate an increase in 
primary surpluses.  
 
Once countries have accumulated a certain level of debt, policies pursuing debt relief often follow, 
particularly in the case of heavily indebted countries. As always, there is no consensus on the empirical 
evidence on the impact of debt relief on growth.  Borenzstein (1990), using numerical simulations for 
a representative debtor country, discovers that debt relief does not have any significant quantitative 
effect on growth. 
 
Presbitero (2009) evaluates the impact of debt-relief programmes on different macroeconomic 
indicators in developing countries, focusing on HIPCs. The results indicate a weak link between debt 
relief and economic performance. They also reveal that it is correlated with growing domestic debt, 
which undercuts encouraging achievements in reducing external debt service.  Often accompanying, or 
in some cases following, debt relief is aid. Cahill and Paul (2000) construct a model in which debt and 
aid are complementary.  Despite the fact that the model overestimates the actual amount of aid and debt, 
they reveal a bi-directional relationship between aid, GDP and absorption.  Cordella et al. (2002, 2005) 
provide a framework to explain why aid flows can be pro-cyclic, and the intuition behind the fact that 
donors who are also debt-holders keep giving aid without granting debt relief. Their results indicate that 
as long as the priorities of the governments of indebted countries match those of lenders/donors, they 
will keep receiving aid. Hepp (2005) explains that because donors have increased aid to heavily 
indebted countries, the crowding out of public investments is avoided, reducing the negative impact of 
the level of debt on growth. Hansen (2004) analyses the argument that debt overhang should be a 
negligible issue in HIPCs because they have larger aid inflows than debt service outflows. The study 
shows that aid and debt work through their impact on both investment and growth. If official aid is 
constant and debt service payments are reduced by one percentage point of GDP, growth increased 
approximately by 15 basis points. He cautions that this small effect disappears if aid decreases by the 
same proportion. 
 
Negative or positive correlations between debt stocks and economic growth alone are inadequate to 
explicitly analyse the debt-growth relationship. Some studies therefore consider the issue of causality 
between debt and certain transmission channels through which it affects economic growth. Chowdhury 
(2004) contends that there is a strong causal link from external debt to growth.  Afxentiou (1993) 
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employs the Granger causality test to examine the connection between GNP growth and foreign debt in 
twenty middle-income developing countries from 1971 to 1988. The Granger causality test shows that 
there is no causal relationship between debt and income. Afxentiou (1993) concludes that indebtedness 
alone cannot affect per capita income growth. The results of Amoateng and Amoako (1996) indicate 
positive causality between the GDP growth rate and foreign debt service for a sample of thirty-five 
African countries. The study also analyses the interrelationship between exports, GNP growth and 
foreign debt servicing during 1971-1990 for the 35 countries. The empirical results confirm that after 
excluding exports revenue growth in SSA countries, a positive unidirectional causal relationship exists 
between foreign debt service and GDP growth during 1983-1990. Karagöl (2002) extends the model of 
Cunningham (1992) to investigate the long term and short term relationship between growth and 
external debt service for Turkey during 1956-1996. Similar to Amoateng and Amoako (1996), the 
Granger causality test results show a uni-direction causality running from debt service to economic 
growth.  
 
Boyce (1992) and Ajayi (1997) hypothesise the existence of dual causality between capital flight and 
external debt in Sub-Saharan Africa. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) also find bi-directional causality 
underlying the correlation between debt and growth. Fofack (2009) continues this bidirectional 
discovery by using co-integration and error-correction models to show that dual causality between 
external debt and capital flight cannot be rejected for some countries. He shows that the reverse causality 
from capital flight to external debt is equally strong in a number of countries. In Kumar and Woo’s 
(2010) study of advanced and emerging economies over 1970-2007, they reveal an inverse relationship 
between initial debt and successive growth.  
 
Sichula (2012) estimated a modified linear debt overhang model to show the effect of debt relief on 
both economic growth and private capital  in the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) of the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC). In addition, the study also carried out a causality 
test to determine the causal relationships shared by economic output, private capital and debt service 
obligations. Sichula (2012) revealed a significant inverse relationship between external debt and GDP. 
Debt service does not have any direct effect on GDP or private capital unless via forms of 
macroeconomic variables like debt. In addition, the research showed that as countries in the region 
attained HIPC completion, GDP greatly increased and it is assumed that this was due to a decrease in 
debt service obligations.  
Kasidi and Said (2013) investigated the impact of external debt on economic growth of Tanzania from 
1990 to 2010 using time series data on economic performance and external debt and. Their study 
revealed that there is significant impact of the external debt and debt service on GDP growth. The co-
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integration test however showed that there is no long run relationship of the external debt and GDP for 
Tanzania during the period under review.  
 
Debt and Transmission Channels 
 
-Debt Servicing: 
Some debt-growth studies carefully evaluate the transmission path through which debt impacts on 
medium and long term growth.  Cohen (1993) estimates investment equations for a sample of eighty-
one developing countries between 1965 and 1987 and finds that debt levels fail to account for the 
negative influence on growth for Latin American countries. The study concludes that the crowding out 
effect of debt servicing costs is the main transmission channel.  
 
A popular explanation for the slow growth and economic problems of SSA countries is their large debt 
service payments (Adam, 2004). Green and Villaneva (1991) observe that debt service has a 
significantly negative effect on private investment and thus growth in developing countries.  Elbadawi, 
Ndulu, and Ndung’u (1997) reach a similar deduction in their study of growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
In Chawdhury’s (2001) study on HIPCs, debt servicing as a percentage of either export earnings or 
GDP on the growth rate of GDP per capita is found to have a statistically significant adverse effect on 
growth.  A study conducted by the World Bank (1989) maintains that the large debt service payments 
made by indebted Least Developed Countries (LDCs) hinder their growth.  
 
On the contrary, Savvides, Kumar and McLambo (1996) discover that debt service has an 
insignificantly negative impact on growth. Deshpande (1997) also reaches a similar result from a study 
of thirteen severely indebted countries. Fosu (1999) and Pattillo et al. (2002) also do not observe any 
statistically significant relationship between debt service and growth.  
 
 
-Total Factor Productivity: 
 Fosu (1996, 1999), Pattillo, Poirson, and Ricci (2003) discover that the debt overhang operates mainly 
through total factor productivity (TFP) and investment. In other words, even if investment levels remain 
unaffected, external debt may still affect output growth. Deshpande (1997) scrutinises the association 
between external debt and investment for thirteen severely indebted countries over the period 1971 to 
1991. The study shows a negative relationship between external debt and investment. Schclarek (2004) 
also finds that capital accumulation growth is a significant channel through which external debt affects 
growth, but in contrast with Fosu (1996, 1999) and Pattillo et al. (2003), TFP growth is found not to 
have any significant link with external debt for several developing countries and industrial countries.  
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-Interest rates and taxes: 
There is a large body of literature on the possible adverse effects of high government debt on economic 
growth via higher long term interest rates, and expectations of higher future distortionary taxation 
(Elmendorf and Mankiw, 1999). High levels of public debt can have undesirable effects on capital 
accumulation and growth through higher long-term interest rates (Gale and Orzag, 2003; Baldacci and 
Kumar, 2010).  High debt may also, increase macroeconomic uncertainty and discourage investment 
(Servén, 1997). It may reduce the scope for counter-cyclical fiscal policy, resulting in higher output 
volatility and lower growth (Aghion and Kharroubi, 2007; Woo, 2009). Barro (1979) and Dotsey (1994) 
highlight the uncertainty about higher future distortionary taxation. The role of uncertainty about 
prospects and policies, which may result in greater volatility and lower growth, is pointed out by 
researchers like Burnside et al. (2001) and Hemming et al. (2003), Aghion Kharroubi (2007) and Woo 
(2009). Sargent and Wallace (1981), Barro (1995) and Cochrane (2010) focus on the role of inflation 
in influencing the impact of debt on growth. Other channels discussed in the literature include levels of 
financial development, long term interest rates and volatility.  
 
Financial Markets and Uncertainty 
A number of recent studies on endogenous growth point out that countries with better developed 
financial intermediaries and markets benefit from higher growth rates (Amable and Chatelain, 2001; 
Benhabib and Spiegel, 2000) . Earlier studies, including Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973) and Shaw 
(1973), show that financial sector development results in increased savings and capital accumulation, 
and hence economic growth.  Jen-Te, Chien-Ping and Chieh-Hsuan (2010) use the panel data of twenty 
high external debt countries from Asia and Latin-America to investigate the financial sector 
development-debt-growth connection. Jen-Te et al. (2010) ascertain that excessive debt subdues an 
economy’s financial sector development, eventually deterring economic growth.  As in Patrick (1966) 
and a number of endogenous growth models , Jen-Te et al. (2010) also finds a two-way causal link 
between financial sector development and economic growth.   Along similar lines, Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy (2003) show that an undeveloped financial sector moderates the incentives for foreign 
lenders to lend to countries exhibiting such characteristics. Consequently, this leads to moral hazard, 
increases in the cost of external capital and reduced growth. To reduce the effect of moral hazard, 
creditors apply conditionalities to financing. In some cases, the conditionalities of some lenders such as 
the IMF and World Bank have been argued to have growth limiting effects. 
 
Governments of countries with excessive debt struggle to effectively implement economic policies. 
Lenders and investors are often generally uncertain about the outcome of such policies. This kind of 
uncertainty generates instability in the indebted economy, thus discouraging domestic investment 
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(Claessens, Oks and Van Wijnbergen, 1993). Aizenman and Marion (1999) show that increased 
uncertainty also affects the supply of international credit offered to indebted countries. 
 
Quality of Institutions 
Governments do not carry all the responsibility for the implementation of policies; the quality of 
institutions matter as well. The significance of institutional factors as determinants of the effect of debt 
on economic growth in low and middle-income countries is widely recognised (Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson, 2005; Imbs and Ranciere, 2005; Colombo and Longoni, 2007; Harrabi et al., 2007 and 
Presbitero, 2010). Arslanalp and Henry (2006) argue that weak economic institutions and infrastructure, 
and not excessive debt burdens, are the key deterrents to investment in HIPCs. Presbitero (2008) stresses 
that external debt overhang seems to be relevant in countries with sound institutions, whilst it seems to 
be to be irrelevant for countries with weak institutions.  Kutivadze (2011) scrutinises the impact of 
government debt on growth by controlling for the quality of institutions in countries of varying income 
levels between 1990 and 2007.  Whilst confirming a non-linear relationship between total public debt 
and growth in middle and low-income countries for high income countries, the study fails to find any 
backing for a robust relationship between public debt and growth. Debt structure was found to be 
relevant for growth in middle-income countries.  
 
Domestic Savings 
Based on growth models, domestic savings are vital for growth.  The savings constraint indicates the 
incapacity to save a sufficient amount of resources to promote investment and self-sustained growth.  
Debt servicing can to some extent reduce the capability for accumulating domestic savings, eventually 
putting a strain on economic growth.  Root (1990) explains that the vicious cycle of the saving – 
investment gap is the key hindrance to growth and development in developing countries. Based on the 
Two-Gap model, Tiruneh (2004) arguing from the viewpoint of debtors, stresses that the economic 
debate of foreign borrowing is linked to the growing gap between domestic savings and domestic 
investment. Okafor and Tyrowicz (2008) provide a theoretical framework to test the interconnection 
between foreign debt and domestic savings for a sample of developing countries selected from Sub-
Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean between 1975 and 2004. With the use of instrumental 
variables, they find a negative long term impact of foreign debt on domestic savings when accumulated 
debt has passed a country-specific threshold. Griffin and Enos (1970) and Rahman (1976) also confirm 
a significant negative relationship between savings and debt. Another side effect of debt servicing is 
capital flight. A few studies such as Ndikumana and Boyce (2003) reveal that for every foreign dollar 
borrowed in Sub-Saharan Africa; approximately 80 cents flow out in the form of capital flight in the 
same year. Assuming this money had stayed in the indebted countries, debt burdens would have been 
reduced considerably.  
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The validity of the debt overhang hypothesis has been questioned by writers.  Cohen (1993) tests the 
hypothesis for a sample of eighty-one developing countries over the period 1965 to 1987. Cohen (1993) 
rejects the debt overhang hypothesis, but finds evidence in support of the crowding out effect of debt 
service on investment. Iyoha (1996) concludes that through both debt overhang and the crowding out 
effect, large debt burdens reduce investment in Sub-Saharan African countries. Elbadawi et al. (1996) 
also corroborate a debt overhang effect on economic growth for a sample of ninety-nine developing 
countries chosen from SSA, Latin America, Asia and the Middle East. Similarly, Fosu (1999) identifies 
evidence of the debt overhang hypothesis in an empirical study of thirty-five sub-Saharan African 
countries. Greene and Villanueva (1991), Serven and Solimano (1993), Ndulu, and Ndung’u (1997) 
and Chowdhury (2001) all find evidence in support of the debt overhang hypothesis.  On the other hand, 
Savvides (1992) finds that the ratio of debt to GNP has no statistically significant impact on growth. 
Warner (1992) concludes that the debt crisis fails to reduce investment. In a similar vein, Hansen (2001) 
fails to find any statistically significant effect of external debt on growth in a sample of fifty-four 
developing countries, which includes fourteen HIPCs.  
 
 
2.5   REVIEW OF THE DEBT OVERHANG-RESOURCE CURSE GROWTH 
LITERATURE 
 
Debt Overhang Theory 
 
The main theme of this research which is to investigate the debt overhang –resource curse hypothesis 
has its roots in a branch of the volatility theory, namely, the debt overhang theory. This theory was 
selected because debt issues are relevant to the current economic climate especially the post-first world 
debt crisis of 2007 and the slow recovery of affected economies.  It mainly links the external stock of 
debt to the adverse effects of ‘debt overhang’ in resource rich- countries. Prebisch (1950) and Singer 
(1950) propose the ‘Prebisch’ hypothesis, one of the earliest roots of the eventual debt overhang 
explanations for the ‘resource curse’. They argue that resource-based growth would be negatively 
affected by a decline in the world prices of natural resources.  
To the best knowledge of this researcher, the most widely cited study that put forth a similar theory 
linking debt overhang to resources is by Manzano and Rigobon (2001). They theorise that with the 
existence of credit constraints, resource -rich countries use resources as collateral.  In consequence, 
volatility of resource prices, especially price decreases, affects the ability of these countries to repay 
their debts. Those that could not implement policies to  address the boom-bust cycle of commodity 
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prices suffered the consequences of the debt overhang in the eighties and nineties, thus limiting their 
capability for economic growth, hence the resource curse. 
 
Manzano and Rigobon (2001) and Haussmann and Rigobon (2002) highlight the potential debt 
overhang effect that volatile commodity prices have on economic growth in resource-rich countries.  
These studies explain that abrupt changes in commodity or prices or resource discoveries can lead to 
income boom and bust cycles. In the 1970’s, commodity prices were high and were used by resource-
rich countries as collateral for debt. A decade later, commodity prices fell significantly. Manzano and 
Rigobon (2001), using panel data estimation, reveal that this volatility of commodity prices led many 
resource-rich countries into debt crises. Haussmann and Rigobon (2002) also show that volatile resource 
revenues have adverse effects on household incomes. However, welfare losses are shown to be 
miniscule compared with losses from imperfect financial markets.  It is worth noting that when debt is 
included as an explanatory variable in the panel data estimation, the effect of resource dependence 
disappears (Manzano and Rigobon, 2001).  
 
Manzano and Rigobon (2001) highlight some econometric issues with the Sachs and Warner (1997) 
study that result in the conclusion that there is a negative link between resource abundance and growth. 
They comment that the results of Sachs and Warner (1997) might depend on factors that are correlated 
with primary exports, but have been excluded from the regression. Secondly, total GDP includes the 
production in the resource sector that had been declining. In their estimation, Manzano and Rigobon 
(2001) corrected for those issues and their results indicate that the so-called natural resource curse might 
be related to debt overhang. They explain that where countries with a large amount of resources use 
their resources as collateral for debt, huge decreases in commodity prices result in high debts for these 
countries. When they estimate a model that takes this fact into account, Manzano and Rigobon (2001) 
show that the effect of resource abundance disappears, leading to the conclusion that a debt overhang 
problem that slows growth is the reason behind the underperformance of resource-rich countries, not 
resource abundance. 
 
Haussmann and Rigobon (2002) suggest that the resource curse results from imperfections in the 
financial market. They propose an alternate rationale for the curse based on the interaction between the 
specialisation of the domestic economy in the production of non-tradable goods and financial market 
imperfections.  They show that, as the volatility of profits in the non-resource tradable sector increases, 
so do sector-specific interest rates. This leads to a drop in the output that is larger for the non-resource 
tradable sector. Due to financial market imperfections, a multiplier effect is set in motion, where the 
increases in interest rates lead the tradable sector to also contract, resulting in further increases in 
volatility and interest rates until the sector disappears. 
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Similar to Haussmann and Rigobon (2002), Bulte, Meissner and Swansonii (2010) focus on 
international credit market imperfections and institutional failures within resource-rich economies. In 
particular, Bulte et al. (2010) examine the mechanism through which extreme resource-based lending 
by external financial institutions can stimulate debt and regime change in autocratic developing 
countries. Bulte et al. (2010) model the impact of credit market imperfections on the inter-temporal 
choices of dictators in resource-rich countries. They point out that the indebtedness and poor 
performance of economies with abundant resources is a result of poor contracting by the financial 
sector. According to the study, a dictator’s choice of staying and looting depends on the level of lending 
offered by external banking institutions. 
  
There is no clear cut conclusion of the impact of debt on growth. It is not always that only economic 
growth that matters. The impact of debt on development and poverty is still central for policymakers. 
The theoretical and empirical literature implicitly presents the assumption that overall growth leads to 
poverty reduction; therefore, the direct impact of external debt on poverty is rarely explicitly modelled 
and tested. Schinke (1994) investigates the impact of indebtedness on poverty through the change of 
relative prices of traded goods. The results indicate that debt has different effects on poverty, depending 
on wage rigidities in the labour markets of the trade and non–trade sector. More recently, Agénor, 
Fofack and Izquierdo (2003) and Loko, Mlachila, Nallari and Kalonji (2003) find that the debt indicators 
have a limited, but not negligible effect on non-income poverty indicators. 
 
Unfortunately, most of these studies are burdened with technical shortcomings and may not have 
captured all direct and indirect effects of the external debt problem on economic growth as a result of 
limited data availability. Due to a choice of estimation technique, some of these studies may have 
produced biased estimates or failed to capture country differences and economic shocks. For example, 
Rockerbie (1994) may not have captured the heterogeneities of different countries and major economic 
shocks in the world because he applied the OLS method in his study. This method is generally believed 
to yield biased estimates in cross country regressions. Iqbal and Khan (1998) advise that these results, 
however, should be viewed with caution, because the studies do not correct their overhang variable for 
the degree of concessionality of the loans, implying that the measure of indebtedness used does not 
accurately reflect differences in the burden of future debt service across countries.  Despite the fact that 
these studies provide some evidence for and against debt overhang, Moss and Chiang (2003) and 
Depetris Chauvin and Kraay (2005) argue that these inconclusive results are due to a lack of robustness 
of econometric results. In addition, according to studies like Begg and Berlin (1988) and Moore and 
Thomas (2008), one must be aware of publication bias. They explain that publication bias might explain 
the diverse studies that arise when academic journals publish papers whose findings are ‘statistically 
significant’. 
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This review of both the resource curse and debt overhang literature reveals the lack of studies that 
consider how resource rents and debt servicing simultaneously impact on growth.  This is one of the 
gaps in the existing literature that this thesis wishes to fill. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
DEBT OVERHANG, NATURAL RESOURCES AND 
GROWTH:  A PANEL DATA ANALYSIS 
 
3.1    THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND THE MODEL 
In this section, the theoretical framework upon which this thesis’ empirical analysis is based is being 
described. This provides the foundation for the models developed and estimated. 
  
In growth regressions, most of the time, an ad hoc approach is used in estimations; output growth is 
regressed on a number of variables that are arbitrarily chosen. In other scenarios, a theoretical model is 
developed, but is not estimated; thus, the resulting econometric model is not connected to the theory. 
In this piece of research, the main aim is the evaluation of the possible debt-overhang effect of resources 
in resource-rich countries, which has its theoretical underpinnings in both economic growth and debt 
theory.   Most studies that investigate the empirics of economic growth rely on different versions of a 
growth model with a neoclassical production function of the Cobb-Douglas form. In most of these 
studies, the standard growth model is augmented with specific variables, key to answering the study’s 
main research questions. Among the most used models is that of Robert Solow (1956) and Chenery and 
Stout (1966). For example, Arrow (1962) augmented the standard Solow growth model with variables 
to account for knowledge spill-overs; Lucas (1988), Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), augmented it 
with variables to capture the effects of human capital accumulation.    
Chenery and Stout (1966) Two-Gap model, provides the main theoretical inspiration for this thesis’ 
investigation.  In their Two-Gap Model, they explained that countries are faced with an internal gap 
between investment and savings and external gap between imports and exports. Countries need 
supplementary resources to fill these gaps and they often resort to borrowing.   
In addition to the assumptions of Chenery and Stout (1966) Two-Gap model, this research also assumes 
that: 
1. Resource rich countries use resource rents to fill both the internal and external gaps but they 
are inadequate. 
2. Other capital inflows also help fill the gaps. 
3. Receipt of resource rents and capital inflows; and the servicing of external debt happen 
simultaneously. 
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In a bid to investigate the debt-overhang- resource curse hypothesis whilst incorporating the above 
assumptions made about the economy, this research proposes to augment the Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 
(1992) specification of the Solow-Swan model with both resource rent and debt variables. Wijeweera, 
et al. (2005) and by Cunningham (1993) classified debt servicing as a primary factor of production. 
Given that the economy receives resource rents and other forms of capital and services outstanding debt 
whilst it is growing, it is proposed that the impact of these three main activities be evaluated 
simultaneously in system. The system is made up of the main variables suggested by the Solow (1956) 
model and the Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) version of the Solow-Swan Model which has been 
augmented with debt and resource variables. Hence, a system made up of three equations endogenous 
in growth, debt and capital inflow respectively is specified. 
The following economic relationships to be evaluated within the system are specified: 
௧ܻ ൌ ݂൫ܥܫ௧, ܮ௧, ܵ௧,ܦܵ௧, ܼ௧൯                                                                     (1.0) 
Where:	ݕ௧	 is output,	ܥܫ௧ is capital inflow  ܦܵ௧ is   debt service,  ܮ௧ is the total labour force, ܵ௧,    natural 
resource rent, and  ܼ௧  is a vector of carefully selected growth control variables . 
The debt service relationship is specified as: 
ܦܵ௧ ൌ ݂൫ ௧ܻ, ܦ௧	, ܥܫ௧, 	ܵ௧,ܧܴ௧, ௧ܸ൯                                                                    (2.0) 
Where: ܦܵ௧  is debt service, ܦ௧ is the stock of debt, ܧܴ௧ is the exchange rate and ௧ܸ a vector of debt 
sensitive control variables: 
Along a similar path, the proposed capital inflow relationship: 
ܥܫ௧ ൌ ݂൫ ௧ܻ, ܦܵ௧, ܦ௧, ܵ௧,	, ܺ௧൯                               (3.0) 
Where: ܥܫ௧ is capital inflow, and ܺ௧ is a vector of capital inflow control variables. 
Eq. (1.0), (20.0) and (3.0),  with the subscript ‘t’ referring to time in all cases, provide the basis for the  
system of simultaneous equations that will  be estimated to determine whether the lower than expected 
long term growth of resource-rich economies is a result of debt overhang .  
Utilising the information from the theoretical framework provided by Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) 
specification of   the Solow-Swan model and the  Chenery and Stout (1966) Two-Gap model, following 
on from  Equations (1.0), (2.0), (3.0), and adding an interactive term  in the growth equation to directly 
capture the interaction between resource rent and debt servicing, hence the debt-overhang  resource 
curse hypothesis , this research postulates that the following linear equations be estimated 
simultaneously within a system   :  
 
56 
 
Output Equation: 
௧ܻ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ ௧ܻିଵ ൅ ߙଶܮ௧ ൅ ߙଷܦܵ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙସܥܫ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙହܵ௧ ൅ ߙ଺ܼ௧ ൅ ߙ଻ܵܦܵ௧ାߝଵ               (1.1) 
 
Debt Equation: 
ܦܵ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ ௧ܻ ൅ ߚଶܦ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷܵ௧ ൅ ߚସܧܴ௧ ൅ ߚହܦܵ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ଺ܥܫ௧ ൅ ߚ଻ ௧ܸ ൅ ߝଶ                         (2.1) 
 
Capital inflow equation:  
ܥܫ௧ ൌ ߪ଴ ൅ ߪଵ	ܥܫ௧ ൅ ߪଶ ௧ܻ ൅ 	ߪଷܦܵ௧ ൅	ߪସܦ௧ିଵ ൅ ߪହܵ௧ ൅ ߪ଺ܺ௧ ൅ ߝଷ                    (3.1) 
 Where ܵܦܵ௧ is the interactive term to estimate ‘debt overhang- resource curse’. 
 
3.2 MODEL SPECIFICATION 
To the author’s knowledge, other than Manzano and Rigobon (2001) there are hardly any published 
sufficiently clear attempts to analyse the impact of debt on growth whilst taking into consideration 
natural resources. This first empirical analysis of this thesis seeks to answer the already mentioned 
research questions by estimating the model which specification follows. Employing the information 
from the theoretical framework, and using Equations (1.1), (2.1) and (3.1) , the following system of 
linear equations are specified for estimation:  
Output Equation: 
௧ܻ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ ௧ܻିଵ ൅ ߙଶܮ௧ ൅ ߙଷܦܵ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙସܥܫ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙହܵ௧ ൅ ߙ଺ܵܦܵ௧ା 	൅ ߙ଻ܪܥ௧ ൅ ߙ଼ܫ ௧ܰ ൅ ߙଽܫ ௧ܲିଵ ൅
ߙଵ଴ܦܣ௧ ൅ ߝଵ                          (1.2)  
Where: 		ܪܥ௧	 is human capital,   ܫ ௧ܰ is inflation,  ܫ ௧ܲିଵ is lagged income per capita and   ܦܣ௧ is 
domestic absorption. 
 
Debt Equation: 
ܦܵ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ ௧ܻ ൅ ߚଶܦ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷܵ௧ ൅ ߚସܧܴ௧ ൅ ߚହܦܵ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ଺ܥܫ௧ 	൅ ߚ଻ܱܶ௧ ൅ ߚ଼ܨܤ௧ ൅ ߚଽܥܴ௧ ൅
ߚଵ଴ܩ ௧ܸ ൅ ߚଵଵܵܣ௧ ൅ ߝଶ                                                                                                                       (2.2) 
Where  ܱܶ௧ is terms of trade, ܨܤ௧ is fiscal balance, ܥܴ௧ is credit constraint, ܩ ௧ܸ is initial government 
size and ܵܣ௧ is domestic savings. 
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Capital inflow equation: 
ܥܫ௧ ൌ ߪ଴ ൅ ߪଵ	ܥܫ௧ ൅ ߪଶ ௧ܻ ൅ ߪଷܦܵ௧ ൅ ߪସܦ௧ିଵ ൅ ߪହܵ௧ ൅ ߪ଺ܧܴ௧ ൅ ߪ଻ܫܴ௧ ൅ ߪ଼ܱ ௧ܲ ൅ ߪଽሺܥܫ௧ ௧ܻ⁄ ሻ ൅
ߪଵ଴ሺܥܫ௧ ܦ௧⁄ ሻ ൅ ߝଷ                                               (3.2) 
Where:  ܫܴ௧ is interest rate, ܱ ௧ܲ is openness, ሺܥܫ௧ ௧ܻ⁄ ሻ is the ratio of capital inflow to the GDP and 
ሺܥܫ௧ ܦ௧⁄ ሻ is the ratio of capital inflow to debt stock. 
Therefore, the model to be estimated is a system of equations endogenous in		 ௧ܻ, ܦܵ௧ and ܥܫ௧ 
respectively and all the	ߝ′ݏ  are error terms.    These three variables being estimated simultaneously 
capture the dynamic nature of the economy and provide estimates for the simultaneous economic 
activities surrounding filling the internal and external gaps as explained by Chenery and Strout (1966).  
‘Capital inflows’ is essentially included because all the economies considered in this investigation are 
open economies.  These flows also supplement domestic revenue. Hence it would be quite limiting to 
estimate the described model wherein resource rents is the only source of domestic revenue. 
 
3.3   EXPLANATORY VARIABLES AND EXPECTED SIGNS 
A major shortcoming of many empirical studies is that most regress output growth on randomly selected 
potential determinants.  This often results in estimates that are sensitive to other conditional variables 
(Levine and Renelt, 1992; Bosworth and Collins, 2003). In this research, selected explanatory variables 
have therefore been consistently associated with growth and debt in the literature. 
The output equation, Equation (1.1), shows that economic growth is dependent on growth in the labour 
force, debt service, natural resources, capital inflow and carefully selected growth variables. The growth 
variables contained in vector,	ܼ௧ for the purposes of this study are human capital, inflation, and lagged 
income per capita and domestic rate of absorption. Lagged income per capita is included to test for 
convergence, as in a standard Barro growth model, and is expected to have a negative coefficient.  All 
the factors of production are expected to have a positive impact on output growth.  This will lead to an 
increase in demand, which is stimulated by domestic absorption. This effect further generates increases 
in the use of capital and labour.  The sign on the coefficient of natural resources is undetermined, as it 
is one of the relationships this thesis wishes to investigate and therefore does not intend to view the 
curse as an inevitable outcome of resource endowment. The coefficients continue to be ‘undetermined’ 
in the debt and capital inflow equations. Based on findings by the available empirical literature, it is 
possible for these coefficients to be either positive or negative. Debt service is expected to have a 
negative impact of output growth. From the perspective of the debtor economy, debt service is a tax on 
output. Capital inflow adds to resources available for production, thus increasing output and having a 
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positive impact on growth. It also enables consumers to smooth out consumption over time. Human 
Capital is expected to have a positive coefficient on growth, as it increases output growth through 
increased efficiency in production and greater absorption of technology transfers. The sign on the 
coefficient of the debt-overhang interactive variable is also undetermined as no a priori assumptions are 
made regarding it in this thesis. 
 
The debt service equation, Equation (2.1), illustrates the relationship between debt service and output 
growth, stock of debt, exchange rate and debt variables contained in ௧ܸ.   Both debt service and the stock 
of debt are included in the equation in order to differentiate between the effects of debt overhang and 
‘crowding out’. The vector  ௧ܸ contains terms of trade, fiscal balance, credit constraint, initial 
government size and domestic savings. Terms of trade reflect the external shocks to the economy and 
fiscal balance is assumed to account for the effects of macroeconomic sustainability and stability of 
productivity. The initial size of government is expressed as government consumption as a ratio of gross 
domestic product (GDP).  The coefficient on debt stock is expected to be positive. This study assumes 
that, with a given interest rate, the higher the stock of debt, the higher the level of debt servicing. The 
exchange rate is expected to be positively related to debt service.  A weak currency is often associated 
with exchange rate risk, which reduces the likelihood of foreign investment, thus giving rise to the need 
for increased lending. Positive terms of trade reflect increases in exports which are significant sources 
of foreign exchange, especially for developing countries. The coefficient on terms of trade is therefore 
expected to be negative, indicating that debt service decreases when the terms of trade improve, ceteris 
paribus. Debt service does not only affect output growth, output growth also affects the level of debt 
service.  Output growth is thus expected to have a negative relationship with debt service. If the 
economy grows at a high rate, it reduces the need for debt accumulation and thus lower debt servicing 
requirements. The impact of fiscal balance on debt service depends on the type of fiscal balance (surplus 
or deficit).  If an economy is faced with greater credit constraints (debt/GDP), greater levels of debt 
servicing are expected. Increased domestic savings help plug the savings gap in the economy and reduce 
the need for external funding. Domestic savings are expected to have a negative coefficient.   It is 
assumed that, given a level of output, the larger the initial government size (government 
consumption/GDP), the larger the need for external borrowing, thus debt service. 
The capital inflow equation, Equation (3.1), demonstrates that capital inflow is dependent on output 
growth, stock of debt and variables contained in vector,	ܺ௧. These variables are the exchange rate, 
interest rate and openness. Economies that experience output growth are often willing to offer higher 
interest rates, which will attract more capital inflows. This study expects positive coefficients on output 
growth and interest rates. Openness promotes trade, and hence increases capital inflows, so it is 
expected to have a positive relationship with capital inflow in the model.  Debt stock is anticipated to 
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have an inverse relationship with capital inflows.  External debt levels may indirectly affect output 
growth by discouraging the formation of capital and boosting capital flight.  This implies that increases 
in debt stock would lead to decreases in capital inflow.  
The expected relationships between the dependent variables and main variables of each equation in this 
model have been explained.  The variables contained in each vector have also been examined.   The 
data that will be used in the estimation is described in the next section.  
 
3.4    DATA DESCRIPTION 
This analysis uses a time series data set that covers 153 countries over the period 1970 to 2011. The 
data is collected from several sources. The countries included in the various subsets are based on the 
World Bank definitions. For the resource-rich countries, states that are specifically rich in point-source 
non-renewable resources such as minerals and petroleum are considered. 
 
For the purposes of this study and as the common consensus in the empirical literature, GDP is used as 
the measure of output. Labour is the total number of people in the labour force. Capital inflow is the 
sum of both inward foreign direct investment and grants.  Domestic absorption is calculated as the sum 
of investment, consumption, government expenditure and exports, less imports. Inflation is taken from 
the consumer price index.  The exchange rate is the official exchange rate against the US dollar for each 
economy.  The variable, terms of trade, is the ratio of exports to imports. Initial government size is 
measured by government consumption as a share of GDP. The variable ‘credit constraint’ is measured 
by the debt-to-GDP ratio. Openness to trade is the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP.  
Secondary school enrolment is used as a proxy for human capital. The ratio, Debt/GDP, is used to 
represent the stock of debt. Debt service is included to measure the financial burden of the stock of debt.  
To distinguish between debt overhang and crowding out, this study uses both debt service and stock of 
external debt in the estimation. Natural resources are represented by total resource rents.  
Data for all the variables are collected from Global Development Finance Indicators and World 
Development Indicators (April, 2012 edition), and the dataset published by the World Bank is accessed 
from the Economic and Social Data Service, now part of the UK Data Service, and official national 
statistics published by the various countries. The groupings of the panel subsets estimated are based on 
World Bank definitions. The subsets are: Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs), members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation Development (OECD), 
members of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and Sub-Saharan African 
Countries (SSA). Data on resource-rich countries is collected from the Central Intelligence Agency 
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World Fact  book 2009.This  s tudy  has  se lec ted  count r ies  wi th  mineral and petroleum 
endowments of commercial importance.  
Three year averages of all the series are calculated to net out short run fluctuations, while maintaining 
the time series nature of the data. This is important given that debt affects growth over time.  For 
estimation purposes, most of the variables are growth rates. Monetary value based variables are 
expressed as a fraction of GDP to aid easy comparison. 
 
3.5 MODEL ESTIMATION 
The overall model presented in section 3.2 is made up of three single equations which will be estimated 
simultaneously. The three equations utilise output, debt stock and capital inflow as the dependent 
variables, respectively. The dependent variables are also explanatory variables in the three equations; 
therefore, the model may be subject to endogeneity, resulting in biased estimated coefficients.  In 
consequence, the System Generalised Method of Moments (SGMM) proposed by Blundell and Bond 
(1998) is used to estimate the system of equations for the panel of countries simultaneously. This 
method addresses the potential endogeneity of variables, has recently gained popularity and is widely 
used in applied economic research. Theoretically, the System GMM estimator addresses a variety of 
biases such as the omitted-variables bias, endogeneity, measurement errors (as long as instruments are 
white noise) and simultaneous equation bias (Kumar and Woo, 2010).  Other studies such as Blundell 
and Bond (1998), Arelllano and Bover (1995) and Pattillo et al. (2002) also utilise the system GMM 
methodology. The GMM 3SLS estimator is guaranteed to be more consistent than the traditional 3SLS 
estimator.    
 
The system GMM estimator for dynamic panel data models combines moment conditions for the model 
in first differences with moment conditions for the model in levels (Bun and Windmeijer, 2009). Hence 
the model is estimated using time series in levels and the consistency of the system GMM estimator 
depends on the validity of the instruments.  In a bid to ensure that this research selected valid 
instruments, two specification tests recommended by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998) have been performed. The first test is the Hansen J-test of over-identifying restrictions. This test 
checks the overall validity of the instruments by analysing the sample analogue of the moment 
conditions used in the estimation process. The null hypothesis of this J- test is that the model estimated 
is valid.  This hypothesis is rejected if the J-statistic > Chi square at the 5% level. The results of this test 
are presented at the bottom of each result table.  The second test examines the hypothesis that the error 
terms are not serially correlated. The results presented in Appendix Two confirm that all the error terms 
are not serially correlated at the 5% confidence level.  The aim is to show that the instrumental variables 
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are uncorrelated with the residuals, but correlated with the dependent variables. The HAC – Newey 
West specification of the GMM method is used.  The HAC –Newey West weighting matrix is a 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent estimator. It is therefore robust to heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation. The model is estimated using Eviews 8 econometric software. 
 
The analysis proceeds by estimating the model described in section 3.2 for the whole dataset and the 
various subsets using the System GMM method, whilst ensuring that the final model being estimated 
has valid instruments. It has been ensured that there are as many instruments as there are coefficients to 
be estimated. Given the time series nature of the panel data, lagged values of all the variables have been 
used as instruments, since they are less likely to be influenced by current shocks. All the instruments 
are applied to the estimation at the same time so as to lower the standard errors. The instruments are 
tested and confirmed to be uncorrelated with the error terms. Due to the use of instrumental variables, 
R-squared is no longer bounded between 0 and 1 and has no statistical meaning in this context.  The 
aim here is to achieve accurate estimates of the coefficients of the variables, whilst maintaining valid 
instruments. 
 
3.6 THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The three equations that make up the system have been estimated simultaneously to investigate the debt 
overhang and resource abundance effect on growth. The results of the estimation for the whole panel of 
153 countries are presented in the next section (see Table 1.1), and this is followed by the results of the 
estimation for the sub-panels. 
 
 
3.6.1   THE RESULTS OF THE SIMULTANEOUS EQUATIONS FOR THE 
WHOLE PANEL, 1970-2011. 
 
For the growth equation, all the factors of production are expected to have a positive impact on growth. 
In Eq. (1.2) of the theoretical framework of the model estimated, capital, labour and natural resources 
are the factors of production. In Table 1.1, surprisingly, contrary to a priori expectations, only capital 
inflows had a significant effect on GDP growth, which turned out to be positive. It has been established 
by the pioneering models for the analysis of growth dynamics, such as the Harrod-Domar model (1946) 
and the Chenery and Strout model (1966), that capital accumulation drives economic growth and is also 
responsible for filling the investment and savings gaps. Lagged output is shown to have an inverse 
relationship with current output, confirming convergence. It is also possible that this inverse 
relationship is due to the high possibility that consumers in most countries tend to consume more when 
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more income becomes available, rather than consumption being smoothed out over different time 
periods.  
 
 
Table 1.1:  Simultaneous Equations Results, 1970-2011, All Countries 
 
Variables Growth Equation Debt Equation Capital Inflow Equation 
 coefficient t-statistic p-
value 
Coefficient t-statistic p-
value 
coefficient t-statistic p-
value 
GDP -9.12E-17 -0.88002 0.3789 -0.60462 -2.5752 0.0101 0.021192 3.410167 0.0007 
Debt Service -9.92E-18 -0.88002 0.3789 0.918168 55.4583 0.0000    
External Debt Stock    0.014248 2.053378 0.0401 -1.68E-17 -3.46112 0.0005 
Capital Inflow 7.74E-26 133.2403 0.0000    0.324620 2.299691 0.0215 
Natural Resource 2.91E-18 1.374591 0.1693 -0.001262 -0.38859 0.6976 0.033268 0.133813 0.8936 
Human Capital -1.07E-18 -1.34806 0.1777       
GDP per Capita -1.71E-17 -0.47729 0.6332    0.008863 0.516475 0.6056 
Labour -3.80E-19 -0.22035 0.8256       
Inflation -4.00E-19 -2.07909 0.0377       
Domestic Absorption -1.99E-19 -0.15869 0.8739       
Debt service*resource 1.31E-26 0.375841 0.7071 -0.001285 -0.08327 0.9336 -0.000896 -0.03882 0.9690 
Exchange rate    6.69E-10 2.48325 0.0131 0.175323 2.949191 0.0032 
Terms of Trade    0.191844 0.59043 0.5549    
Fiscal Balance    -0.000144 -5.3607 0.0000    
Credit Constraint    -0.003390 -0.6112 0.5411    
Government Size    -0.000169 -5.4292 0.0000    
Domestic Savings    -1.429500 -3.12038 0.0018    
Real Interest Rate       -0.004201 -0.04319 0.9656 
Openness       -0.083308 -3.20125 0.0014 
Ratio of Capital 
Inflow/GDP 
      0.248687 3.901867 0.0001 
Ratio of Capital 
Inflow/Debt 
      10.60527 6.059042 0.0000 
J-Statistic: 0.10744 
P-value:1.00000 
 
 
The results failed to reveal any significant evidence of the debt-overhang- resource curse on growth in 
the panel.  This study attributes this outcome to the fact that developed and high income countries are 
included in the dataset. These countries have good credit ratings, well developed financial markets and 
can easily access needed capital on the international money market. The size and value of their 
transactions can possibly cast a shadow over the smaller, low income and less developed economies, 
thereby reducing the overall effect of debt service on the panel. It is also as a result of certain countries 
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diversifying resource rents into other sectors of the economy like manufacturing, the service industry 
and technology transfers and therefore resource rents are not the main drivers of economic growth.   
 
The debt service equation, for the whole panel, reveals that the previous year’s debt service has a direct 
significant relationship with current debt service. This is because permanent refinancing of debt service 
is the equilibrium strategy employed by most economies (Cohen and Sachs, 1986).  Lagged GDP 
growth has a significantly inverse relationship with debt service. An increase in the previous year’s 
output, all other things being held constant, results in lower debt requirements the following year and 
thus a decrease in debt service. On the other hand, a decrease in lagged GDP increases the need to 
acquire more debt to keep utility at equilibrium, thus debt service commitments increase. As expected, 
debt servicing increases with the stock of available debt, the fiscal balance worsens and reduces 
domestic savings. 
 
From the capital inflow equation, the coefficients indicate a positive statistical significant relationship 
between capital flow and lagged growth, openness, the ratio of capital to output and the ratio of capital 
to debt. As expected, there exists a negative significant relationship between capital inflow and debt 
due to debt servicing requirements.  
 
Given that the results presented in Table 1.1 fail to show any significant support for the debt overhang-
resources curse hypothesis on the whole panel system, this study therefore deduces that the results for 
the whole panel are inconclusive with regard to the potential debt overhang problem. As in Afxentiou 
(1993),   indebtedness alone cannot account for significantly affected growth.  . It is, however, clear 
that capital inflow, driven by trade and investment, and is the most significant determinant of world 
growth. This is consistent with studies like Fosu (1999), Pattillo et al. (2003) and Schclarek (2004), 
who find that total factor productivity and investment are the main channels through which debt 
overhang operates.  
 
3.6.2 THE RESULTS OF THE SIMULTANEOUS EQUATIONS FOR THE 
HEAVILY INDEBTED POOR COUNTRIES, 1970-2011. 
 
In a bid to evaluate how the level of indebtedness affects the impact of debt and natural resource rents 
on growth, this thesis estimates the system for a subset of countries containing only HIPCs.  The results 
are reported in Table 1.2. HIPCs are among the world’s poorest and most indebted countries.  These 
countries face an unsustainable debt burden, but have qualified to receive debt relief or low-interest 
loans from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank on the successful implementation of 
certain conditionalities and policies.  
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Table 1.2:  Simultaneous Equations, 1970-2011, HIPC Countries 
 
Variables Growth Equation Debt Equation Capital Inflow Equation 
 coefficient t-statistic p-
value 
Coefficient t-statistic p-
value 
coefficient t-statistic p-
value 
GDP    -0.057189 -0.81581 0.4148 10476521 1.65917 0.0974 
Debt Service -2.33E-05 -1.08333 0.2790 -0.037488 -3.22661 0.0013 9537182 1.95119 0.0514 
External Debt Stock    0.042911 2.277571 0.0230    
Capital Inflow 4.10E-25 3.040954 0.0024    0.531994 7.95635 0.0000 
Natural Resource 7.24E-18 0.436622 0.6625 -0.016566 -0.86999 0.3846 9101466 4.06353 0.0001 
Human Capital 7.49E-19 0.206216 0.8367       
GDP per Capita 5.46E-18 1.416049 0.1571       
Labour 3.59E-17 1.211732 0.2260       
Inflation -4.29E-19 -2.89851 0.0038       
Domestic Absorption 1.89E-17 3.334739 0.0009       
Debt service*resource -2.11E-18 -0.64087 0.5218 -0.000969 -0.24775 0.8044 1860261 1.698459 0.0898 
Exchange rate    -0.000102 -1.59833 0.1103    
Terms of Trade    -1.570466 -2.03198 0.0425    
Fiscal Balance    -0.004082 -0.35412 0.7233    
Credit Constraint    -0.017535 -1.59536 0.1110    
Government Size    0.010294 1.68474 0.0924    
Domestic Savings    0.032294 3.549999 0.0004    
Real Interest Rate       -258102.7 -0.21456 0.8302 
Openness       719240.7 0.472744 0.6365 
Ratio of Capital 
Inflow/GDP 
      -0.009834 -2.24387 0.0251 
Ratio of Capital 
Inflow/Debt 
      5.820879 6.414641 0.0000 
J-Statistic: 8.96E+37 
P.Value: 0.9833 
 
 
Debt servicing is often expected to divert benefits from the domestic economy to the foreign economy. 
However, the results from the estimation of the growth equation for HIPCs presented in Table 1.2 did 
not reveal any significant evidence of neither a negative impact of debt service and natural resources 
on growth nor debt overhang. The results from this sub-panel are contrary to the findings of studies 
such as Cunningham (1993), Sawada (1994), Deshpande (1997), Chowdhury (2001) and Presbitero 
(2006), who found a significant negative link between economic growth and debt in HIPCs.  
 
This finding can be attributed to the main characteristic of HIPCs: these countries have received debt 
relief from their creditors.  In addition, on reaching HIPC completion point, these countries must 
implement a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). Quite often this strategy paper requests large 
expenditure on education and health, whilst maintaining macroeconomic stability thus domestic savings 
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are inadequate.  Savings shortfalls can affect the sustainability of growth.  Researchers such as Auty 
(1993) and Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) reveal that resource-rich countries consume their resource 
rents rather than save or reinvest. 
 
Despite the debt relief received, these countries often do not export enough to earn and trade sufficient 
foreign currency on the world foreign exchange and capital markets and hence continue borrowing and 
receiving foreign aid.  These countries continually strive to meet spending quotas on education, training 
and health, in order to reach ‘HIPC Decision Points’. They also receive technical assistance and low-
interest loans from their lenders, in this case mainly the IMF and World Bank; hence the absence of a 
debt overhang effect on resource based growth.  Hansen (2004) argues that debt overhang is a negligible 
issue in HIPCs because they have larger aid inflows than debt inflows. 
 
The results of the estimation of the Debt Equation indicate that debt stock has a direct statistically 
significant relationships with debt service for the panel of HIPCs.  The results also reveal significant 
inverse relationship between terms of trade and debt service. This provides support for the assumption 
regarding the ‘external gap’ made by Chenery and Strout (1966). 
 
For this sub- panel, natural resource rents and debt service have positive significant bearings on capital 
inflow, as shown in the capital inflow equation.  This shows that a countries that successfully service 
their debt, relay positive signal to investors resulting in investment inflows and the natural resource 
extractive industry continues to be an attractive investment destination. 
 
 
3.6.3 A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS OF THE 
SIMULTANEOUS EQUATIONS FOR THE OECD COUNTRIES, AND 
LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, 1970-2011. 
 
The level of economic development indirectly affects output growth. This impact can be transmitted 
via various inputs and policies. To highlight how varying levels of economic development might affect 
the role of debt and resource rents on growth, a subset of OECDs and LDCs has been estimated. 
Members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) are developed 
countries. These countries typically experience high income levels, set global standards in economic 
and development policies enjoy good quality institutions and high levels of the main human 
development indicators. Least Developed Countries (LDCs), on the other hand, typically experience 
low income levels, low human development indicators and low indicators of socio-economic 
development. This comparative analysis not only intends to point out the varying impact of debt and 
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resources on the growth of the two sets of countries, but will also highlight the underlying impact of 
other theories highlighted in the resource curse literature such as human capital, Dutch disease and 
institutional theories. Other underlying factors include income levels and stage of development. The 
results are presented in Table 1.3 and Table 1.4. 
 
Table 1.3:  Simultaneous Equations, 1970-2011, OECD Countries 
 
Variables Growth Equation Debt Equation Capital Inflow Equation 
 Coefficient t-statistic p-
value 
Coefficient t-statistic p-
value 
coefficient t-statistic p-
value 
GDP -2.79E-26 
 
-49.9171 
 
0.0000 0.176419 2.049680 0.0415 -3228544 -1.11592 0.2656 
Debt Service -3.35E-17 -1.97266 0.0497 1.079221 48.74102 0.0000 767593.2 0.996883 0.3198 
External Debt Stock    0.029462 1.500643 0.1348 2279365 2.124861 0.0346 
Capital Inflow 1.21E-25 0.271665 0.7861 -7.66E-10 -1.73343 0.0843 0.316595 14.47819 0.0000 
Natural Resource 1.95E-17 1.412687 0.1590 -0.013568 -0.40264 0.6876 1574796 2.970990 0.0033 
Human Capital 0.019297 1.977750 0.0482       
GDP per Capita -3.56E-17 -0.21646 0.8288       
Labour 4.76E-18 0.200941 0.8409       
Inflation 9.59E-19 0.323224 0.7468       
Domestic Absorption 1.49E-17 1.137520 0.2565       
Debt service*resource -5.42E-27 -0.06572 0.9477       
Exchange rate    -0.006801 -1.63779 0.1028    
Terms of Trade    -1.236117 -1.03127 0.3035    
Fiscal Balance    -0.052560 -1.50235 0.1332    
Credit Constraint    -1.86E-10 -3.87202 0.0001    
Government Size    0.011874 3.646593 0.0003    
Domestic Savings    0.016983 1.762286 0.0782    
Real Interest Rate       1705951 3.234525 0.0014 
Openness       -219228.0 -0.96073 0.3377 
Ratio of Capital 
Inflow/GDP 
      0.767525 3.242616 0.0014 
Ratio of Capital 
Inflow/Debt 
      767593.2 0.996883 0.3198 
J-Statistic: 0.17075 
P-value: 0.91816 
 
 
 
 
Lagged GDP has a negative significant impact on current GDP for the panel of OECDs, whilst it has 
no significant impact on current GDP for LDCs. It is evident that OECDs reinvest output growth to 
further increase production, whilst the contrary is true for LDCs.  It also shows that OECDs are better 
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at ‘smoothing out’ consumption over successive time periods compared to the consumption patterns of 
LDCs. 
 
Debt service has an inverse relationship with output growth in both panels. The recent debt crisis has 
resulted in the public debt of certain OECDs passing annual GDP in 2011, and in some cases it is still 
rising. Elmeskov and Sutherland (2012) explain that external debt servicing can negatively affect the 
growth of OECDs through the rising cost of capital. The highly significant negative impact of debt 
service on LDC growth has its underpinnings in the uncertainty surrounding their growth and repayment 
capabilities. Claessens et al. (1993) and Aizenman and Marion (1999) have shown that increased 
uncertainty affects the supply of international credit available to indebted countries. A study conducted 
by the World Bank (1989) maintains that the debt service payments made by LDCs hinder their growth. 
The results also reveal a clear debt overhang-resource curse impact on growth in LDCs and not for 
OECDs, as shown by the significant negative coefficient on the interactive term in the LDC panel. This 
study concludes that economic growth in LDCs is more sensitive to debt service movements than the 
growth of OECDs; thus, the debt-overhang effect is stronger in LDCs. 
 
Comparing the results from both Table 1.3 and Table 1.4, it is clear that natural resources have a positive 
on growth in both panels, but with the effect of LDC growth being more statistically significant. OECD 
countries have experienced relative success in diversifying production into other sectors of the 
economy, resulting in all-round growth. Their growth is not heavily driven by resource rents. They also 
have better institutions, better corruption indices and better absorption capacities. This is supported by 
the significant direct relationship OECD growth shares with human capital.  This relationship is not 
evident in LDCs but labour in LDCs have a significant positive impact on growth. The growth 
enhancing effect of human capital is well-documented in the literature; for example, Davis (1995), 
Bravo-Ortega and De Gregorio (2005), and Stijns (2006). Mursheed (2003) deduces that rich 
endowment in natural resources becoming a curse is conditional on inappropriate policies being 
practiced.  This implies that, with comparatively better policies being practiced in OECDs, there is no 
resource curse.  
 
From the debt equation, GDP growth has a more significant direct relationship with debt service in 
LDCs compared to OECD countries. Whilst the results indicate a positive significant relationship 
between lagged debt services with current debt service in the panel of OECD countries, but did not 
show any significant relationship in the case of LDCs.  This vice- versa relationship across the different 
subpanels is also true in the case of debt stock.  A significant inverse relationship between OECD debt 
service and credit constraint is revealed.  On the other hand, debt service increases with a fall in fiscal 
balance in the case of LDCs. 
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The results from the capital inflow reveal that natural resource rents have a positive significant bearing 
on capital inflows in both OECDs and LDCs. This shows that natural resources do have the potential to 
enhance growth but it is conditional on other underlying factors given the dynamic nature of economies. 
 
The conclusion therefore is there is evidence of debt overhang in LDCs but not OECDs based on 
historical data. This illustrates that varying levels of development which encompasses level of financial 
and social development, impacts on the final impact that resource endowments and debt have on 
economic growth. 
   
Table 1.4: Results of Simultaneous Equations, 1970-2011, Least Developed Countries 
 
Variables Growth Equation Debt Equation Capital Inflow Equation 
 Coefficient t-statistic p-
value 
coefficient t-statistic p-
value 
coefficient t-statistic p-
value 
GDP -0.591626 -0.81089 0.4176 
 
 
0.093116 2.371666 0.0179 13463057 1.61225 0.1072 
Debt Service -1.08E-17 -14.2011 0.0000 -4.516379 -0.62968 0.5290 30090840 1.808219 0.0708 
External Debt Stock    0.020586 1.988721 0.0470 -2865608 -0.41759 0.6763 
Capital Inflow 5.74E-26 0.330197 0.7413    0.858277 16.42405 0.0000 
Natural Resource 7.10E-19 10.87948 0.0000 -0.000158 -0.02559 0.9796 3556229 2.179233 0.0295 
Human Capital 1.63E-17 0.289237 0.7725       
GDP per Capita 1.49E-15 0.793209 0.4278       
Labour 1.19E-18 5.444836 0.0000       
Inflation -2.92E-20 -2.77508 0.0056       
Domestic Absorption 1.60E-22 0.004906 0.9961       
Debt service*resource -3.06E-21 -79.4005 0.0000 -8.06E-06 -1.83931 0.0661 -1586.022 -0.90848 0.3638 
Exchange rate    -3.68E-05 -1.05177 0.2931    
Terms of Trade    0.361023 1.021875 0.3071    
Fiscal Balance    -0.000148 -2.48097 0.0132    
Credit Constraint    1.84E-11 0.683246 0.4946    
Government Size    -0.011259 -0.86393 0.3878    
Domestic Savings    -0.004068 -0.58943 0.5557    
Real Interest Rate       1402090 0.828435 0.4076 
Openness       -2261435 -2.28564 0.0225 
Ratio of Capital 
Inflow/GDP 
      0.066035 2.082336 0.0375 
Ratio of Capital 
Inflow/Debt 
      577.7344 0.894280 0.3714 
J-Statistic: 0.100443 
P-value: 0.9510 
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3.6.4 A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF RESULTS OF THE 
SIMULTANEOUS EQUATIONS FOR MINERAL RICH COUNTRIES, 
PETROLEUM RICH COUNTRIES AND OPEC MEMBERS, 1970-2011.  
 
This section presents results from testing the hypothesis under review for mineral rich, petroleum rich 
and OPEC member countries. The separation into mineral rich and petroleum rich countries is 
motivated by views that the resource curse is resource specific. At the forefront are studies that have 
illustrated that the more ‘lootable’ a resource is, the greater the possibility of the resource curse. The 
addition of OPEC members is motivated by economic trends over the years. The price of oil has 
fluctuated during this period, but on average has increased steadily. OPEC countries strongly influence 
world oil supply and prices, hence having an advantage over other countries. The comparative analysis 
of the results of the three subpanels presented in Table 1.5, Table 1.6 and Table 1.7 will shed light on 
whether the type of resource or belonging to OPEC can alleviate the possibility of the Debt Overhang-
Resource Curse. 
 
This section details the results for mineral rich countries, petroleum rich countries and countries that 
are members of the Organisation for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPECs). For the purpose of this 
discussion, mineral rich countries are those that have precious minerals and metals of commercial value. 
Petroleum rich covers petroleum, coal and natural gas. The key to this comparison is to highlight 
whether the potential debt-overhang effect of resources is specific to mineral resources, or specific to 
petroleum resources or the advantages of being a member of OPEC. Minerals are generally easier to 
smuggle compared to petroleum and other fuels. This analysis will also point out whether the 
‘lootability’ of the resource contributes to the impact of debt on growth in resource-rich countries. 
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Table 1.5:  Simultaneous Equations, 1970-2011, OPEC Countries 
 
Variables Growth Equation Debt Equation Capital Inflow Equation 
 coefficient t-statistic p-
value 
coefficient t-statistic p-
value 
coefficient t-statistic p-
value 
GDP 0.616928 1.602920 0.1106 -0.381243 -3.12646 0.0020 5090853 2.094615 0.0375 
Debt Service -0.167024 -1.16772 0.2444 0.817111 7.359230 0.0000 -1641702 -3.56537 0.0005 
External Debt Stock    0.053233 2.671909 0.0082 -230381.2 -0.35856 0.7203 
Capital Inflow 7.48E-22 2.579866 0.0106 4.56E-09 1.423159 0.1563 0.138362 3.086226 0.0023 
Natural Resource 2.66E-14 2.783246 0.0059 0.085823 2.836609 0.0050 2.879773 2.382412 0.0182 
Human Capital 0.054443 1.638548 0.1029       
GDP per Capita 0.421707 1.080945 0.2811       
Labour 2.98E-14 2.441791 0.0155       
Inflation 0.001102 0.328056 0.7432       
Domestic Absorption 2.50E-15 0.905660 0.3663       
Debt service*resource 9.22E-08 0.785630 0.4331       
Exchange rate    2.04E-05 1.300224 0.1951    
Terms of Trade    2508.996 3.081698 0.0024    
Fiscal Balance    0.030454 1.168302 0.2441    
Credit Constraint    2.74E-11 1.459565 0.1460    
Government Size    -0.006772 -0.41156 0.6811    
Domestic Savings    0.031608 1.082528 0.2804    
Real Interest Rate       -241519.2 -0.62098 0.5353 
Openness       510052.1 4.166333 0.0000 
Ratio of Capital 
Inflow/GDP 
      -0.024003 -3.48034 0.0006 
Ratio of Capital 
Inflow/Debt 
      3.521709 3.304988 0.0011 
J-Statistic: 0.138692 
P-value: 0.93300 
 
 
Considering the growth equation across the three sub-panels, lagged GDP growth has a positive 
significant effect on current GDP growth for only the petroleum-rich group of countries.  The 
Interagency Task Force on Commodities has reported that petroleum production lags behind world GDP 
growth. This puts demand side pressures on petroleum producing countries, leading to increases in the 
price of petroleum and energy products. This cycle provides some explanation for the highly significant 
positive effect of lagged GDP growth on current GDP growth in petroleum rich countries.  
 
Natural resource rents positively impact on growth in all three sub-panels. It is clear that, from the panel 
results, petroleum rich countries have succeeded in overcoming the ‘Dutch disease’ effect of their 
endowments. According to Ross (2004), the ‘lootability’ which is determined by the type of resource 
is crucial in determining the impact of resources on growth. Ross (2004) explains that ‘lootable’ 
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resources such as diamonds prolong conflict and thus adversely affect growth. This investigation has 
failed to find any evidence of this in the current panel estimation. The results also conflict with the 
Rentier theory of the resource curse. 
 
Debt service has a highly significant inverse relationship with growth in petroleum rich countries and 
this study reveals a similar relationship in the case of mineral rich countries. The estimation however 
did not indicate significant evidence of the debt service –growth relationship in the case of OPECs.  
This can be illustrated by the fact that, as of January 31st 2012, OPEC purchased $43.3 billion, or 20% 
of U.S. government debt (U.S. Treasury Department). The reverse is evident in the case of capital 
inflows. Capital inflows have a significant positive impact on growth in OPECs, but this is not the case 
for petroleum-rich and mineral-rich countries. The debt-overhang-resource curse variable proved to be 
statistically significant in both mineral rich and petroleum rich countries, providing support for the main 
hypothesis of this research.   
 
There is positive significant relationship between current and lagged debt service across the three sub-
panels as evident from the results of the debt equation. The key to growth therefore lies in the 
sustainability of debt. Mineral and petroleum rich countries experience a statistically significant inverse 
relationship between fiscal balance and debt service. This shows that mineral rich and petroleum rich 
countries essentially use debt for deficit financing and filling their foreign exchange gap. The system 
estimates also predicts that the debt stock of mineral rich countries, petroleum rich countries and OPECs 
directly and significantly influences their debt service payments as expected. Minerals and petroleum 
and other fuels are largely traded and influence the terms of trade of both the exporters and importers. 
Evidence from the three sub-panels being compared reveals a significant inverse relationship between 
terms of trade and debt service for petroleum rich countries whilst the relationship is positive in the case 
of OPECs. 
 
Natural resources have strong positive links with capital inflow in petroleum rich countries and OPECs.  
The results of the estimation failed to indicate a significant   relationship between resource rents and 
capital inflows in the case of mineral rich countries. This study believes that Ross’ (1994) ‘lootability’ 
approach applies here. Minerals, especially diamonds, are easy to smuggle and therefore receipts from 
the sale of smuggled diamonds hardly ever contribute to formal revenue or output computations.  
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Table 1.6:  Simultaneous Equations, 1970-2011, Mineral Rich Countries 
 
Variables Growth Equation Debt Equation Capital Inflow Equation 
 coefficient t-statistic p-
value 
coefficient t-statistic p-
value 
coefficient t-statistic p-
value 
GDP -8.80E-26 -0.89697 0.3698 0.239154 0.049920 0.9602 6192424 1.470279 0.1416 
Debt Service -1.66E-17 -18.3786 0.0000 0.961135 45.06060 0.0000 6102000 1.625543 0.1042 
External Debt Stock    0.025274 2.418073 0.0157 6937059 2.390091 0.0169 
Capital Inflow 8.73E-26 0.668646 0.5038       
Natural Resource -9.71E-18 -3.32380 0.0009 -0.008746 -1.67316 0.0944 -793416.6 -1.04636 0.2955 
Human Capital 3.82E-18 2.163622 0.0306       
GDP per Capita 2.91E-18 0.930979 0.3520       
Labour 3.05E-18 0.694290 0.4876       
Inflation 1.42E-14 2.097154 0.0361       
Domestic Absorption -1.08E-13 -2.48459 0.0130       
Debt service*resource -0.041234 -2.30813 0.0211       
Exchange rate    -2.19E-10 -0.54881 0.5832    
Terms of Trade    -0.214270 -0.21427 0.4737    
Fiscal Balance    -0.024914 -2.13512 0.0329    
Credit Constraint    27.23468 0.370477 0.7111    
Government Size    0.007103 1.659456 0.0972    
Domestic Savings          
Real Interest Rate       -1509044 -3.89299 0.0001 
Openness       -82879.60 -2.03858 0.0416 
Ratio of Capital 
Inflow/GDP 
      -1.004298 -2.42242 0.0155 
Ratio of Capital 
Inflow/Debt 
      -8.229463 -3.54810 0.0004 
J-Statistic: 0.021631 
P-value: 0.98924 
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Table 1.7:  Simultaneous Equations, 1970-2011, Petroleum Rich Countries 
 
Variables Growth Equation Debt Equation Capital Inflow Equation 
 coefficient t-statistic p-
value 
coefficient t-statistic p-
value 
coefficient t-statistic p-
value 
GDP 0.778327 2.827958 0.0048 0.076414 1.528435 0.1266 33165.81 0.072743 0.9420 
Debt Service -5.54E-18 -8.14548 0.0000 0.699929 1.814358 0.0698 -3687809 -0.70788 0.4791 
External Debt Stock    0.323209 2.163424 0.0307 1759366 1.116422 0.2644 
Capital Inflow 1.17E-22 1.382021 0.1672    0.647951 6.683114 0.0000 
Natural Resource 6.76E-19 3.584419 0.0003 0.037645 1.319142 0.1873 1.210277 4.524349 0.0000 
Human Capital 6.38E-19 0.414991 0.6782       
GDP per Capita 0.255320 0.858324 0.3909       
Labour 8.42E-14 3.275010 0.0011       
Inflation 1.74E-16 0.275886 0.7827       
Domestic Absorption -1.32E-14 -1.74294 0.0816       
Debt service*resource -3.81E-24 -11.4179 0.0000       
Exchange rate    3.01E-05 0.376527 0.7066    
Terms of Trade    -6.020539 -2.07859 0.0378    
Fiscal Balance    -0.059721 -1.87653 0.0608    
Credit Constraint    -1.08E-12 -0.62247 0.5337    
Government Size    0.007344 2.275283 0.0230    
Domestic Savings    0.017331 2.004819 0.0452    
Real Interest Rate       -321522.2 -0.35776 0.7206 
Openness       96661.20 0.229547 0.8185 
Ratio of Capital 
Inflow/GDP 
      2.695630 4.297502 0.0000 
Ratio of Capital 
Inflow/Debt 
      -2.106661 -1.03047 0.3030 
J-Statistic: 0.020164  
P-value: 0.98996 
 
 
The results presented in Tables 1.5,  Table 1.6 and Table 1.7  show that natural resources promote 
growth in the  sub-sample of countries that is under investigation.  The resource rents are statistically 
significant in all three subsets. The investigation fails to find any evidence of debt overhang in OPEC 
countries, thus belonging to an oligopoly has unique advantages. There is, however, strong evidence of 
debt overhang in both mineral rich and petroleum rich countries.  This provides support for the finding 
of Manzano and Rigobon (2001), who also believe that debt overhang is the driving cause of lagging 
growth in resource-rich countries.  Credit market imperfections and the boom-bust cycle of commodity 
prices, especially minerals and precious metals, increase the volatility of resource revenue, 
consequently negatively affecting economic growth in resource-rich economies. 
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3.6.5. THE RESULTS OF THE SIMULTANEOUS EQUATIONS FOR SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICAN COUNTRIES, 1970-2011. 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa has one of the largest mineral deposits. In almost half of the countries in this region, 
non-renewable natural resources account for over 25 % of total exports. In some of these countries, the 
ratio is over 80% (IMF, 2012). It is, however, home to the highest number of LDCs, low income 
countries, HIPCS, civil conflicts, corrupt regimes and countries ranking very low on the Human 
Development index. Therefore despite its natural endowments, it is still generally lagging behind other 
regions in terms of growth.  In recent times, however, a lot of attention has been paid to the plight of 
the region. Given the debt and banking crises in Europe and the United States, a lot of investment is 
aimed at Africa, where most of the banks emerged relatively unscathed from the recession of the ‘West’. 
Companies in the extractive industry have also increased investment and stepped up production in the 
region. SSAs growth experience within the debt overhang-resource debate is therefore very relevant to 
recent global business and investment trends. 
 
Even though it is discovered that natural resource rents positively affected growth, the relationship was 
found to be not as significant as might be expected.   Studies such as Wood and Mayer (1998) and 
Gylfason (2000) find that Africa’s low ratio of human capital to natural resources is one determining 
factor in its shortfall in economic performance.  The significant, but negative relationship between 
human capital and growth in this panel of SSA countries can explain some of the reduced impact of 
natural resources on growth in the panel results presented in Table 1.8. The characteristics of SSA 
countries also influence the transmission of the impact on resources on growth in the region. Most of 
these countries are low income, highly corrupt, have poor institutions and underdeveloped 
manufacturing sectors, and are highly indebted. These factors limit the growth potential from their 
resource endowments. 
 
Debt service has a statistically significant negative relationship with SSA economic growth.  Servicing 
debt negatively impacts on the region’s growth potential. The estimate of the negative relationship 
between capital inflows and growth in SSA reveal a severe capital flight problem and the human capital 
link, shows evidence of probable ‘brain drain’. A significant manifestation of the debt overhang-
resource curse hypothesis was also disclosed in the SSA panel. Studies such as Scott (1995), Fosu 
(1996, 1999) and Ndung’u (1998) obtained similar results for their sample of SSA countries. This is 
consistent with the conclusions of Iqbal and Kanbur (1997) and Clements et al. (2003) that explain that 
the gains from capital inflows are ‘taxed away’ by existing creditors through debt service payments. 
This research therefore concludes that the debt overhang effect is in part responsible for the lagging 
growth of SSA. 
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Table 1.8 Simultaneous Equations, 1970-2011, Sub-Saharan African Countries 
 
Variables Growth Equation Debt Equation Capital Inflow Equation 
 coefficient t-statistic p-
value 
coefficient t-statistic p-
value 
coefficient t-statistic p-
value 
GDP -8.51E-18 -0.48676 0.6265 0.017679 0.669244 0.5035 22263291 2.710427 0.0068 
Debt Service -1.86E-16 -2.51227 0.0121 0.805323 31.12083 0.0000 -1699735 -2.21915 0.0266 
External Debt Stock    0.030085 3.299602 0.0010 -6069169 -1.70399 0.0886 
Capital Inflow -4.66E-25 -2.33991 0.0194 -1.76E-10 -2.10771 0.0352 0.496845 5.725159 0.0000 
Natural Resource 4.83E-18 1.009801 0.3128 -0.011758 -3.38893 0.0007 1886364 2.182455 0.0293 
Human Capital -1.25E-17 -1.83243 0.0671       
GDP per Capita 4.99E-16 3.127687 0.0018       
Labour 2.53E-18 0.451983 0.6514       
Inflation -1.65E-18 -
4.057785 
0.0001       
Domestic Absorption 5.58E-18 1.817758 0.0693       
Debt service*resource -2.04E-20 -2.49626 0.0127       
Exchange rate    -4.22E-10 -1.92480 0.0545    
Terms of Trade    0.673102 2.836796 0.0046    
Fiscal Balance    -0.014429 -1.66697 0.0958    
Credit Constraint    1.39E-11 0.322293 0.7473    
Government Size    -0.004990 -2.81831 0.0049    
Domestic Savings    -0.005167 -1.10482 0.2694    
Real Interest Rate       -3206605 -1.78343 0.0747 
Openness       -1638260 -6.20164 0.0000 
Ratio of Capital 
Inflow/GDP 
      3.454068 6.122376 0.0000 
Ratio of Capital 
Inflow/Debt 
      -20.76182 -0.22032 0.8257 
J-Statistic: 0.100443  
P-value: 0.9510 
 
 
From the results of the debt equation, in Table 1.8, the system shows that debt stock and lagged debt 
service have significant positive relationships with current debt service payments by SSA countries. 
These countries are in a cycle of borrowing and repaying. When debt reaches unsustainable levels, they 
purse conditionalities imposed by lenders to qualify for debt relief (Krugman, 1988; Basu, 1997). This 
is evident from the fact that of the forty HIPCs, 34 are found in SSA.  Natural resources have a negative 
significant relationship with debt service.   
 
For all the models estimated, the results of the Hansen J-test of over-identifying restrictions (at the 
bottom of each table) fail to reject the null hypothesis, that the model estimated is valid. The second 
diagnostic test examines the hypothesis that the error terms are not serially correlated. The results 
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presented in Appendix Two confirm that all the error terms are not serially correlated at the 5% 
confidence level. 
 
From the results presented, the general conclusion is that there is evidence to support the Debt 
Overhang- Resource Curse hypothesis.   It is however not a universal phenomenon, nor is it inevitable 
consequence of resource abundance. Debt overhang is however a significant determinant in the potential 
resource curse faced by resource-rich economies.  The impact on growth is, however, not isolated; many 
of the underlying factors already tested and proven in the existing resource curse and debt theory do 
have effects on growth via various transmission channels.   
 
In summary, when the whole panel was estimated, there was no support for the Debt Overhang-
Resource Curse hypothesis. Debt stock and debt service, however, share a significant direct relationship 
for that panel. In the case of HIPCs, the Debt Overhang-Resource Curse hypothesis was also rejected. 
The results also reveal a debt overhang effect in LDCs compared to OECDs.  The debt overhang effect 
was also significant in mineral rich economies and petroleum rich economies. The results for the OPECs 
sub-panel showed no support for the debt overhang -resource curse hypothesis, whilst it was supported 
by the results from the SSA estimation.  
On examination of the key relationships described by the debt equation, debt stock showed  a 
significantly positive bearing on debt service for the whole panel, HIPCs, LDCs, Mineral Rich, 
Petroleum Rich, OPECs and SSA. This reveals that most countries are stuck in a permanent cycle of 
borrowing and servicing debt. Capital inflows were among the most significant determinants of growth 
in all the panels.  These results have shown that the simultaneous impact of debt and resource rents on 
growth vary with levels of economic development, levels of indebtedness, the relationship with 
creditors, the type of resource endowment and geographical location. 
As is always the case with quantitative analysis, the results are never unanimous. Due to the lack of 
consistency from empirical studies, Stevens (2003) argues that a case-by-case approach rather than 
some sort of generalisation is the way forward in investigating the resource curse hypothesis. Against 
this background, the second paper of this thesis is a country specific study.  The next set of results will 
be specific to the case of Sierra Leone. However, the methodology will be very rigorous and can be 
applied to other countries. Moreover, robust results are guaranteed, especially for the purpose of the 
greater alignment of policy and empirical results. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DEBT OVERHANG, NATURAL RESOURCES AND 
GROWTH: A TIME SERIES ANALYSIS OF SIERRA 
LEONE’S EXPERIENCE. 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter Three of this thesis, ‘Debt Overhang, Natural Resources and Growth: Panel Data Analysis’, 
the results presented are quite general. Stevens (2003) argues for a case by- case approach rather than 
some sort of generalisation as the way forward in investigating the resource curse hypothesis. Against 
this background and for the purpose of greater alignment of policy to empirical results, in this chapter , 
the analysis  proceeds by testing the same hypothesis for the case of Sierra Leone. 
Why Sierra Leone? Sierra Leone is rich in natural resources and heavily indebted but recently has been 
receiving large growth projections. Sierra Leone experienced an eleven year civil conflict the roots of 
which were widely believed to lie in its endowment of diamonds. Sierra Leone’s mining sector has 
recovered significantly from the war and produced more than 400,000 carats of diamonds in 2010, 
making the country the world’s 10th-largest producer of diamonds (Revenue Governance Index, 2013). 
Prior to reaching HIPC completion point in December 2000, the average growth rate of debt service in 
Sierra was 16%. This increased to 26% between 2007 and 2011 (Public Debt Report, 2011).  The 
discovery and extraction  of iron ore and the expansion of the extractive sector resulted in Sierra Leone’s  
real GDP growth  leaping  from 6% in 2011 to 16.7% in 2012 ( African Economic Outlook, 2013). The 
influx of extractive companies, expansion of the primary industry and the discovery of offshore oil 
reserves in 2009 improves prospects for growth.  
 
The current Finance Minister,  Kaifala Marah, forecasts growth of 15.1% in 2013 and the  International 
Monetary Fund has named Sierra Leone one of the fastest growing economies  in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Bloomberg,2013). In spite of these glowing growth figures, the 2013 Human Development Index 
(HDI) ranks Sierra Leone at 0.336, 180th out of 187 countries. It is clear that economic growth does not 
translate into development in the case of Sierra Leone. However, this research is of the opinion   that 
there is a strong need to evaluate the impact of past trends and highlight areas for improvement. If not, 
when all these resources dwindle, there will be no tangible evidence of development, just a series of 
growth figures in a database.  This chapter can be considered as one of the initial steps to looking back 
with the aim of moving forward.  
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One might be tempted to think that this is simply an extraction of the Sierra Leone series from the panel 
estimated in the previous chapter. However, this estimation is not a mere extraction. It is a modification   
of the model estimated in the first chapter to test the Debt overhang- Resource curse hypothesis in more 
detail for the case of Sierra Leone.  Most of the explanatory variables are the same, but a few new 
variables are included not only to directly test the debt overhang-resource curse hypothesis, but also to 
test the strength of some of the key theories that have been suggested in the theoretical literature to 
explain the potential resource curse in resource rich countries; for example, institutional explanation 
and conflict based curse.  The effects of these theories are simultaneously compared with the debt 
overhang theory to determine the theory that best explains Sierra Leone’s resource-economic growth 
experience.  
This empirical investigation of the nature of the debt –resource growth relationship in Sierra Leone does 
not end with the Generalised Method of Moments System estimation.  In addition to carrying out 
cointegration tests, this thesis like studies such as Afxentiou (1993), Chowdhury (2004) and Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2009), carries out causality analysis between key economic relationships relevant to the 
debt overhang-resource curse debate. This is essentially to highlight long term relationships for policy 
formulation and implementation. 
 
4.2 SIERRA LEONE LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
From the literature review in the first chapter, it is clearly noticeable that, with regards to the debt 
overhang –natural resource debate, there are only a few empirical studies that are focused entirely on 
Sierra Leone. Most of the time, Sierra Leone only features as part of a dataset, in panel or cross-sectional 
studies. It is mostly included in datasets evaluating least developing countries, Sub-Saharan African 
countries, low income countries or Heavily Indebted poor countries. When the empirical literature 
specifically relating to studies of natural resources in Sierra Leone is reviewed, the main theoretical 
explanations for the potential ‘resource curse’ are mainly limited to conflict, inequality and the quality 
of institutions. Ibrahim Kamara, Sierra Leone’s U.N. ambassador, said in July 2000: “We have always 
maintained that the conflict is not about ideology, tribal or regional difference....The root of the conflict 
is and remains diamonds, diamonds and diamonds.”  Sierra Leone’s former Minister of finance, James 
Jonah (2000), also famously said: “The war in Sierra Leone is simply about diamonds.”  
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Resources and Conflict: 
Ross (1999; 2003) is among the researchers who have examined the resource –growth link. His studies 
emphasised the conflict –resource curse link. Ross (1999; 2003) reveal that the key natural resources 
and illegal drugs strongly influenced the onset and duration of civil wars that took place between 1990 
and 2000. His studies also suggested that the high value-to-weight ratio of a resource, and the ease of 
being transported by unskilled workers (loot ability) define the impact a resource will have on the 
prospect for war. Diamonds, one of Sierra Leone’s major exports possess these characteristics, hence 
their emergence as one of the leading causes of the conflict.  In the model estimated by Hodler (2004), 
diamond rich countries like Sierra Leone and Angola experience much higher fighting intensity, weaker 
property rights and much lower incomes. Maconachiea and Binnsb (2007) suggest that diamonds 
fuelled the brutal civil war in Sierra Leone during the 1990s, hence Sierra Leone’s identification with 
‘blood diamonds’.  
 
Resources and Loot ability: 
Ross (1999; 2003) also point out that in non-conflict circumstances, compared to ‘un-lootable’ 
resources, ‘loot able’ resources produce more widespread benefits for local people.  This reaffirms the 
findings of Binns (1981) and Rosen (1974), who found that in the 1970s in Sierra Leone (pre –conflict), 
the perception of a negative impact of diamond mining on farming was, far from the truth. After 
conducting a field based study undertaken between 2002 and 2007, Maconachiea and Binnsb (2007) 
conclude that many of the links between farming and diamond mining in Sierra Leone had actually been 
maintained, despite severe disruption during the war. Renner (2002) reveals that diamond wealth had 
been a source of constant internal friction and that the Revolutionary United Front rebels in Sierra 
Leone, through their control of the diamond fields, purchased arms and sustained their rebellion during 
the 1990s. 
 
Resources and vulnerability: 
Billon (2001) examines the relationship between resources and armed conflicts. The study highlighted 
the fact that resource dependent countries become more vulnerable to exploitation through certain 
business relationships. Taking Sierra Leone as an example, Billon (2001) exposes that rebels in Sierra 
Leone had links with diamond buyers in New York through a network that included private companies, 
domestic and foreign authorities and other middlemen. Despite the international trade in diamonds, 
Chege (2002) points out that Sierra Leone’s economy failed to adequately benefit from diamond 
extraction because many of the diamonds were “conflict diamonds”. For Sierra Leone, the tainted 
diamonds, international crime, and poor governance created a failed state.  Along similar lines, Gylfason 
and Zoega (2002) explain that, in the case of Sierra Leone, the supply of diamonds turned out to be a 
source of conflict and   resulted in rent- seeking behaviour that destroyed the infrastructure and social 
institutions of the country, thereby negatively affecting economic growth. 
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Resources and Exploitation: 
Douglas (1998) examines the exploitation link between resource abundance and growth.  In ‘Fighting 
for Diamonds – Private Military Companies in Sierra Leone’, he gave an account of the licit and illicit 
commercial activities that surrounded diamond extraction in Sierra Leone, highlighting the predatory 
interests of richer and more powerful states. The book revealed that private military companies 
benefited from the civil unrest that started as a result of the fight for diamonds. For example, the 
agreement between Executive Outcomes and the Government of Sierra Leone, diamonds in exchange 
for protection, reached in December 1995 was valued at US $15.9 million.  According to Douglas, it 
was the involvement of such private military companies as Executive Outcomes and Sand Line 
International that raised considerable public interest about the war in Sierra Leone in Britain and South 
Africa. 
 
Collier and Hoefflert (1998) investigate whether civil wars have economic causes. Using Probit and 
Tobit models, they empirically tested the proposition that rebels will conduct a civil war if the perceived 
benefits outweigh the costs of rebellion for a sample of countries which included Sierra Leone.  The 
study revealed that the probability of civil wars increased with an increase in the mining of diamonds.  
Lujala, Gleditsch and Gilmore (2005) analyse the relationship between diamonds and armed conflict 
incidence and found a strong bivariate relationship between diamonds and the inception of civil war. 
The authors also stressed that even though secondary diamonds are positively related to the incidence 
of civil war, the discovery of diamond deposits in a country does not automatically result in civil war.  
Studies such as that of Smillie (2002) and Smillie, Gberie, and Hazleton (2000) point out that diamonds 
are dangerous only after commencement of production. A notable case is Sierra Leone with its blood 
diamonds   Olsson (2006) also analyses the linkages between the production of rough diamonds and 
economic development on a macro and micro level. According to the research, ‘alluvial’ mining is more 
strongly associated with negative externalities than ‘kimberlite’ mining. In Sierra Leone’s case, most 
of the mining pre-conflict was ‘alluvial’. 
 
Resources, Inequality and Grievance: 
Inequality has also been highlighted as one of the causes of the resource curse in Sierra Leone.  
Engerman and Sokoloff (1997; 2000) hypothesised that resource endowments predict the middle class 
share of income which in turn predicts development.   Easterly (2002) argued that the conflicting results 
in the resource- growth literature was because many studies failed to account for the impact of inequality 
and long-run economic development and confirmed the Engerman and  Sokoloff (1997; 2000) 
hypothesis. The paper revealed that, in Sierra Leone,  in spite of the abundant endowment of diamonds 
and other resources, the middle sixty percent of the population received  only 33.7 % of total income 
(close to the lowest in the world),  hence the poor long term economic performance.  According to 
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Conteh-Morgan and Dixon- Fyle (1999), the political elite often conspired with the economic elites of 
the Krio (descendants of freed slaves in Freetown, the Capital City) and the Lebanese (also in Freetown) 
to retain access to commodity rents although chiefs and big traders in the provinces began to share in 
the rents in the 20th century.  Similarly, Gylfason and Zoega (2002) demonstrate how increased 
dependence on natural resources tends to result in less rapid economic growth and greater inequality in 
income distribution   across countries. In the sample, Sierra Leone had the highest Gini coefficient and 
the research revealed that when the distribution of ownership of natural resources was more unequal 
than the distribution of other forms of wealth, the inequality of the distribution of income was directly 
related to the share of natural resources in national income. 
 
Inequality leads to grievance. Using the “medium-N” method, Ross (2003) analyses the causal 
mechanisms surrounding the resource-conflict link in resource rich countries.  He found that in the case 
of Sierra Leone, there was evidence of a grievance-based conflict: Revolutionary United Front rebels 
complained about resource exploitation, railing against “the raping of the countryside to feed the greed 
and caprice of the Freetown elite and their masters abroad” (cited in Richards, 1996). It is noteworthy 
that the grievances exploited by the rebel group concerned the distribution of resource wealth.  
 
Resources and the Quality of Institutions: 
 
A few of the studies highlighting the role of the quality of institutions on the growth impact of resources 
include that by Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006). This study examined a dataset that included Sierra 
Leone and confirmed the hypothesis that institutions are decisive for the resource curse. Their results, 
in contrast to the claims of Sachs and Warner that institutions do not play a role, revealed that natural 
resource- abundant economies tend to grow slower than economies without substantial resources 
because of the poor quality of their institutions.  Studies such as those conducted by Boschini, Pettersson 
and Jesper (2003) and van der Ploeg (2010) survey a range of hypotheses and supporting evidence as 
to why some countries benefit and others lose from the presence of natural resources. In their panel 
studies, among which Sierra Leone featured in the data set, they found that resource booms support rent 
grabbing and civil conflict especially where there are poor quality institutions and high levels of 
corruption. Murshed (2002) and Olsson and Fors (2004) also suggest that ‘Weak institutions’ provide 
some  explanation for the  poor growth experience  of oil-rich states such as Angola, Nigeria, Sudan 
and Venezuela and  diamond rich  states like Sierra Leone, Liberia and Congo. 
 
In a bid to prevent repetition, at this point in this thesis, the review of the debt overhang and growth 
link which has already been carried out in the first empirical study, will not be repeated.  However, it is 
worth noting that in most of the studies, Sierra Leone often features as part of a dataset. This is especially 
the case in datasets made up of heavily indebted countries, developing countries, low income countries 
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or Sub-Saharan African countries. Therefore, the conclusions reached in these studies, in general terms, 
do apply to Sierra Leone. The most significant finding related to this thesis is that debt stock and debt 
overhang are detrimental to economic growth.  To the author’s knowledge, there are hardly any studies 
exploring the debt overhang-resource curse hypothesis specifically for the case of Sierra Leone. 
 
Given the few Sierra Leone specific studies available, there is essentially a wide gap in the literature 
regarding the impact of natural resources and debt on growth in Sierra Leone, and also which 
transmission mechanisms exhibit the strongest impact.  The findings of the second empirical 
investigation will complement the already existing studies and contribute their own quota towards this 
discussion by empirically testing the debt overhang- resource curse hypothesis whilst at the same time 
testing and comparing the conflict, human capital, financial development and institutional explanations 
of the lagging growth experienced by resource rich Sierra Leone. It will also go a step further by 
investigating long term relationships between key economic variables and direction of causality in these 
relationships. 
 
4.3 METHODOLOGY 
The time series analysis of the debt overhang- resource curse hypothesis in Sierra Leone commenced 
with a brief description of the theoretical framework. The model that would be estimated was developed.  
The model was modified to capture the effect the quality of institutions and the political economy have 
on resource led growth in Sierra Leone. The empirical analysis continued with cointegration analysis 
to examine potential long run relationships. Finally Granger causality investigation was done to 
determine the direction of causality between variables where long term relationships were found to 
exist. 
 
4.3.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND THE MODEL 
As explained earlier, this chapter investigates the possible debt-overhang effect of resources in Sierra 
Leone.  The intuition provided by Chenery and Stout (1966) Two-Gap model is also applicable in the 
case of Sierra Leone. Thus, in this time series analysis, the theoretical framework described in Chapter 
Three, section 3.1 is applied.  Equations (1.1), (2.1), (3.1), developed in section 3.2 provide the 
foundation for the model that would be estimated. Since this chapter carries out only a single- country 
analysis compared to the 153-country analysis done in the previous chapter, a system GMM is not 
estimated.  A structural vector autoregressive model is instead estimated utilizing the same theoretical 
framework. The theoretical framework provides the basis for the restrictions placed to ‘identify’ the 
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structure of the VAR.  Given some special characteristics of Sierra Leone, in addition to the explanatory 
variables included in the standard growth model, a few variables that are supported by economic theory 
are included in the model.  These variables were not included in the model estimated for the panel due 
to lack of complete data. A military expenditure variable and a policy variable are incorporated to 
account for the role of political unrest and quality of institutions .Therefore, for the case of Sierra Leone, 
the baseline linear equations are:  
Output Equation: 
௧ܻ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ ௧ܻିଵ ൅ ߙଷܦܵ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙସܥܫ௧ ൅ ߙହܵ௧ ൅ ߙ଺ܵܦܵ௧ 	൅ ߙ଻ܪܥ௧ ൅ ߙ଼ܯܧܺ ௧ܲ ൅ ߙଽܱܲܮ௧ ൅
ߙଵ଴ܧܺܦ௧ ൅ ߝଵ                                  (4.0)  
Where: ௧ܻିଵ is lagged output growth,		ܦܵ௧ is debt service, ܥܫ௧ is capital inflows,	ܵ௧ is natural resources, 
		ܪܥ௧	 is human capital,    ܯܧܺ ௧ܲ military expenditure,   ܲ ܱܮ௧ is policy and ܧܺܦ௧ is external debt stock. 
Debt Equation: 
ܦܵ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ ௧ܻ ൅ ߚଶܦ௧ ൅ ߚଷܧܺܦ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚସܵ௧ ൅ ߚହܧܴ௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܦܵ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ଻ܨܤ௧ ൅ ߚ଼ܥܫ௧ ൅ ߚଽܪܫܲܥ௧ ൅
ߚଵ଴ܵܣ௧ ൅ ߝଶ                               (5.0) 
Where: -  ܨܤ௧ is fiscal balance and  ܪܫܲܥ௧is debt forgiveness,  
Capital inflow equation: 
ܥܫ௧ ൌ ߪ଴ ൅ ߪଵ	ܥܫ௧ିଵ ൅ ߪଶ ௧ܻ ൅ ߪଷܦܵ௧ ൅ ߪସܵ௧ ൅ ߪ଻ܵܣ௧ ൅ ߪ଼ܧܺܦ௧൅	ߝଷ            (6.0) 
 
However, as explained as earlier, the investigation in the case of Sierra Leone would be carried out 
within the VAR framework. Specifically, this thesis utilises the structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) 
methodology, formalized by Sims (1980). This methodology is compatible with the underlying 
economic theories, can account for endogenous relationships, and can summarise the empirical 
relationships without placing too many restrictions on the data.   The VAR framework also eliminates 
the problem of endogeniety.  The examination of the three equations that would be converted to a SVAR 
system reveals that the final system would be large. The large SVAR system such as the one that would 
be estimated in this thesis have been used before. For example, the 11-variable model in Dungey and 
Pagan (2000).  Such larger SVARs, allow for richer interactions and a more parsimonious model with 
more degrees of freedom is likely to be easier to be more stable. Hence the reduced-form SVAR system 
to be estimated for the case of Sierra Leone   is:  
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θ௧ ൌ ߙ௧ܺ௧ ൅ ߚଵθ௧ିଵ ൅	ߚଶ	θ௧ିଶ ൅ δଵ߁௧ିଵ ൅	δଶ	߁௧ିଶ ൅	ߝଵ௧+………..+ߙ௣ܺ௣ ൅ ߚ௣θ௧ି௣ ൅ δ௣߁௧ି௣ ൅
	δ௣	߁௧ି௣ ൅	ߝଵ௣                          (7.0) 
Where θ is a vector  of:  ௧ܻ,	ܦܵ௧,	ܥܫ௧,	;	߁ is a vector of  lags of 	∶ 	 ௧ܻ,	ܦܵ௧,	ܥܫ௧,		ܵ௧, 		ܵܦܵ௧, ܪܥ௧, 	ܯܧܺ ௧ܲ, 
	ܱܲܮ௧, ܧܺܦ௧, ܨܤ௧, ܪܫܲܥ௧ and  ܵܣ௧ . This order of variables is maintained throughout the analysis. ܺ௧	 
is a vector of   deterministic variables:  constant and a dummy  variable. The dummy variable accounts 
for political unrest.  It takes the value of 1 in years of civil unrest and non-democratic rule and the value 
0 otherwise.	ߝ௧ is white noise. 
 
4.3.2 DATA DESCRIPTION AND VARIABLES EXPECTED SIGNS 
 
The analysis uses a time series data set for Sierra Leone between 1970 and 2011. The data was collected 
from several sources. The main source of data for all the variables is  from  the Global Development 
Finance Indicators and World Development Indicators (April, 2012 edition),  the dataset published by 
the World Bank accessed from the Economic and Social Data Service but now incorporated into the 
UK Data Service. Some data is sourced from Statistics Sierra Leone and official national statistics 
published by the Bank of Sierra Leone and the Ministry of Finance. 
 
In addition to the dummy variable, military expenditure is used as a proxy for conflict/non-democratic 
government in Sierra Leone. This study assumes that political stability is directly proportional with the 
level of military expenditure which in turn is directly proportional with growth.  In times of stability, 
less is spent on military expenditure compared to periods of unrest and coup d’états. Several researchers 
, such as  Romer, (1994), Leite and Weidmann, (1999) and Njikam (2008), have pointed out that the 
quality of institutions and policy have  a strong influence on the potential impact of natural resources 
on economic growth. In this chapter, a policy variable as computed by the World Bank is therefore 
included to capture this link and its coefficient is expected to be either positive or negative, depending 
on the quality of the institutions and policies.  All the other variables that were included in the GMM 
system in Chapter Three are still expected to maintain the signs already discussed in section 3.3.   
 
4.3.3   MODEL ESTIMATION 
The overall SVAR model presented in section 4.3.1 is estimated using Eviews 8.  The model estimation 
commenced by giving thought to the times series characteristics of the variables under consideration. 
In the literature on VARs, some econometricians have argued that time series being either stationary or 
non-stationary is mostly irrelevant for VAR modelling. Some argue that studies are allowed to use a 
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levels VAR in any case. Sims et. al. (1990) argue that by “differencing or de-trending a lot of 
information is lost……and we may be interested in the inter-relationships between variables, not the 
coefficients themselves”. This thesis therefore follows the existing literature which typically estimates 
VARs in levels even when the variables are I (1).  By doing the analysis in levels, we allow for implicit 
cointegration relationships in the data, and still have consistent estimates of the parameters (Sims et. 
al., 1990). The residuals of the estimation will also be stationary because of the inclusion of lagged 
levels of the variables in the VAR. In order to avert the possibility of spurious relationships between 
the I(1) variables,  the relationships summarised by the SVAR are  supported by economic theory. 
 
A general SVAR system with three lags is first estimated. It was this study’s plan to estimate a model 
with more lags. However, complete quarterly data for all the variables of interest for Sierra Leone 
between 1970 and 2011 is unavailable.  To determine the optimum number of lags that should be 
included,   the general model was tested using three lag selection criteria: Akaike’s criterion function 
(AIC), Akaike (1973, 1974), Schwarz’s criterion (BIC), Schwarz (1978) and the likelihood ratio (LR) 
test.  The model estimated with two lags, minimises both the AIC and BIC criteria and was therefore 
selected as the parsimonious model to be estimated for Sierra Leone. 
 
In order to convert Equation (7.0) into the model defined by Equations (4.0), Equation (5.0) and 
Equation (6.0), the structural model must be identified. This is done by transforming the residuals from 
the vector autoregression, et, by imposing certain restrictions on contemporaneous relationships as 
supported by economic theory.  It is clear, that twelve short run restrictions are necessary.  The 
restrictions imposed imply the following: 
 
ξଵ௧ ൌ 	Cሺ1ሻ ∗ @u1          (8.0) 
ξଶ௧ 	 ൌ െ	Cሺ2ሻ ∗ ξ1ݐ 	൅ 	Cሺ3ሻ ∗ @u2         (8.1) 
ξଷ௧ 	 ൌ 	Cሺ4ሻ ∗ ξଵ௧ െ 	Cሺ5ሻ ∗ ξ2ݐ 	൅ 	Cሺ6ሻ ∗ @u3       (8.2) 
ξସ௧ 	 ൌ 	Cሺ7ሻ ∗ ξଵ௧ 	െ 	Cሺ8ሻ ∗ ξ2ݐ 	൅ 	Cሺ9ሻ ∗ ξଷ௧ 	൅ 	Cሺ10ሻ ∗ @u4      (8.3) 
ξ5t = -C(11)*	ξଵ௧  + C(12)*	ξଶ௧  - C(13)*	ξଷ௧  + C(14)*	ξସ௧  + C(15)*@u5     (8.4) 
ξ଺௧ 	 ൌ 	െCሺ16ሻ ∗ ξଵ௧ 	െ 	Cሺ17ሻ ∗ ξ2ݐ െ 	Cሺ18ሻ ∗ ξଷ௧ 	െ 	Cሺ19ሻ ∗ ξସ௧ 	൅ 	Cሺ20ሻ ∗ ξହ௧ ൅ 	Cሺ21ሻ ∗ @u6  (8.5) 
ξ଻௧ 	 ൌ 	Cሺ22ሻ ∗ ξଵ௧ 	൅ 	Cሺ23ሻ ∗ ξ2ݐ 	൅ 	Cሺ24ሻ ∗ ξଷ௧ ൅ 	Cሺ25ሻ ∗ ξସ௧ 	൅ 	Cሺ26ሻ ∗ ξହ௧ ൅ 	Cሺ27ሻ ∗ ξ଺௧ 	൅ 	Cሺ28ሻ ∗ @u7
            (8.6) 
ξ଼௧ 	 ൌ 	െCሺ29ሻ ∗ ξଵ௧ 	൅ 	Cሺ30ሻ ∗ ξ2ݐ 	െ 	Cሺ31ሻ ∗ ξଷ௧ 	െ 	Cሺ32ሻ ∗ ξସ௧ 	൅ 	Cሺ33ሻ ∗ ξହ௧ 	൅ 	Cሺ34ሻ ∗ ξ଺௧ 	൅ 	Cሺ35ሻ ∗
ξ଻௧ 	൅ 	Cሺ36ሻ ∗ @u8          (8.7) 
ξଽ௧ 	 ൌ 	Cሺ37ሻ ∗ ξଵ௧ 	െ 	Cሺ38ሻ ∗ ξ2ݐ 	൅ 	Cሺ39ሻ ∗ ξଷ௧ 	൅ 	Cሺ40ሻ ∗ ξସ௧ 	െ 	Cሺ41ሻ ∗ ξହ௧ 	െ 	Cሺ42ሻ ∗ ξ଺௧ 	൅ 	Cሺ43ሻ ∗ ξ଻௧ 	െ
	Cሺ44ሻ ∗ ξ଼௧ 	൅ 	Cሺ45ሻ ∗ @u9         (8.9) 
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ξଵ଴௧ 	 ൌ 	Cሺ46ሻ ∗ ξଵ௧ 	െ 	Cሺ47ሻ ∗ ξ2ݐ ൅ 	Cሺ48ሻ ∗ ξଷ௧ 	൅ 	Cሺ49ሻ ∗ ξସ௧ 	൅ 	Cሺ50ሻ ∗ ξହ௧ െ 	Cሺ51ሻ ∗ ξ଺௧ 	൅ 	Cሺ52ሻ ∗ ξ଻௧ 	൅
െCሺ53ሻ ∗ ξ଼௧ 	െ 	Cሺ54ሻ ∗ ξଽ௧ 	൅ 	Cሺ55ሻ ∗ @u10                               (8.10) 
ξଵଵ௧ 	 ൌ 	Cሺ56ሻ ∗ ξଵ௧ 	൅ 	Cሺ57ሻ ∗ ξ2ݐ 	൅ 	Cሺ58ሻ ∗ ξଷ௧ 	൅ 	Cሺ59ሻ ∗ ξସ௧ 	൅ 	Cሺ60ሻ ∗ ξହ௧ 	൅ 	Cሺ61ሻ ∗ ξ଺௧ 	൅ 	Cሺ62ሻ ∗
ξ଻௧ 	൅ 	Cሺ63ሻ ∗ ξ଼௧ 	൅ 	Cሺ64ሻ ∗ ξଽ௧ 	൅ 	Cሺ65ሻ ∗ ξଵ଴௧ 	൅ 	Cሺ66ሻ ∗ @u11             (8.11) 
ξଵଶ௧ 	 ൌ 	Cሺ67ሻ ∗ ξଵ௧ 	൅ 	Cሺ68ሻ ∗ ξ2ݐ 	൅ 	Cሺ69ሻ ∗ ξଷ௧ 	൅ 	Cሺ70ሻ ∗ ξସ௧ 	൅ 	Cሺ71ሻ ∗ ξହ௧ 	൅ 	Cሺ72ሻ ∗ ξ଺௧ 	൅ 	Cሺ73ሻ ∗
ξ଻௧ 	൅ 	Cሺ74ሻ ∗ ξ଼௧ 	൅ 	Cሺ75ሻ ∗ ξଽ௧ 	൅ 	Cሺ76ሻ ∗ ξଵ଴௧ 	൅ 	Cሺ77ሻ ∗ ξଵଵ௧ 	൅ 	Cሺ78ሻ ∗ @u12          (8.12) 
 
 
 
Where: ξ1t represents ௧ܻ 	 residuals,ξ2t represents 		ܦܵ௧ residuals,ξ3t represents ܥܫ௧ residuals ,ξ4t represents 
	ܵ௧ residuals,ξ5t represents 		ܵܦܵ௧ residuals,ξ6t represents ܪܥ௧ residuals,ξ7t represents 	ܯܧܺ ௧ܲ residuals, 
ξ8t represents 	ܱܲܮ௧ residuals, ξ9t represents ܧܺܦ௧ residuals, ξ10t represents ܨܤ௧ residuals, ξ11t represents 
ܪܫܲܥ௧ residuals, ξ12t represents ܵܣ௧ residuals and ܧہݑ́ݑۂ=1. 
 
The properly identified structural form VAR is thus estimated using ordinary least squares. Inference 
regarding the debt overhang- resource curse impact on economic growth in Sierra Leone is made from 
the impulse response functions and variance decomposition of GDP.  The results are presented in Table 
2.2 and Table 2.3.  
 
SVARs can be quite sensitive to the assumptions used in their estimation especially changes to number 
of lags, Stock and Watson (1996, 2001).  In order to assess the stability of the SVAR, the AR root test 
was done. The estimated VAR is stable (stationary) if all roots have modulus less than one and lie inside 
the unit circle. If the VAR is not stable, certain results (such as impulse response standard errors) are 
not valid.  The residuals of the estimation were also tested for serial autocorrelation. The results 
presented in the Appendix confirms that there is no serial correlation up to lag 3. 
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Table 2.1: Results of the Autoregressive Root Test 
 
Root Modulus
0.879774 - 0.061554i  0.881924
0.879774 + 0.061554i  0.881924
 0.797505 - 0.144455i  0.810482
0.797505 + 0.144455i  0.810482
 0.563885 - 0.553874i  0.790407
0.563885 + 0.553874i  0.790407
 0.286019  0.286019 
-0.044502 - 0.068129i 0.081375 
-0.044502 + 0.068129i  0.081375 
-9.92e-14  9.92E-14 
No root lies outside the unit circle. VAR satisfies the stability condition. 
 
The results in Table 2.1 confirm that the SVAR estimated is stable and estimates are robust. This thesis 
thus proceeds by testing how economic growth in Sierra Leone responds to certain impulses.  Impulse 
responses provide a useful summary of the relationships implied by the large number of estimated 
coefficients in the SVAR. The impulse response analysis is followed by an evaluation of the variance 
decomposition of growth. 
  
 
4.4 THE RESULTS OF STRUCTURAL VECTOR AUTOREGRESSIVE 
MODEL FOR SIERRA LEONE, 1970 to 2011.  
 
The main objective of this SVAR analysis is to test the debt-overhang resource curse hypothesis for the 
case of Sierra Leone.  The first part of this analysis therefore focuses on how GDP responds to the 
impulses, in this case, debt service, capital inflows, natural resource rents, debt-overhang, military 
expenditure, policy, external debt stocks, fiscal balance, debt relief, domestic savings and the conflict 
dummy. The analysis then proceeds by evaluating variance decompositions of GDP and SDS. 
 
 4.4.1 IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS 
 
The impulse-response functions represent the short-run dynamics between GDP each of the other 
endogenous variables in response to all identified structural shocks. These impulse functions trace the 
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effect of a one-time shock to GDP on current and future values of the variable. In Figure 1.0, the 
responses of GDP to the named impulses are summarised. 
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Figure 1.0:  GDP Accumulated Responses to Impulses (Author’s calculations in Eviews 8) 
 
The impulse responses of GDP in Sierra Leone for the period under review derived from the SVAR 
estimation. Figure 1.0  shows  the  accumulated response of GDP to one standard deviation of  debt 
service, capital inflows,  natural resource rents, debt-overhang,  human capital,  military expenditure,  
policy,  external debt stocks, fiscal balance, debt forgiveness and domestic savings over a 15 year 
period.  15 years is long enough for shocks to impact significantly on GDP. 
 
It is clear from Figure 1.0 that GDP responds positively to changes in natural resource rents. From the 
initial response in the first year, GDP continues to grow steadily as the years go by.  This is similar to 
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the results of the LDC, OPEC, Mineral-rich and Petroleum-rich sub-panels estimated in Chapter Three. 
In all those panels, natural resource rents exhibited a positive significant impact on growth.  It is worth 
noting that Sierra Leone is not only an LDC but also a mineral-rich country. 
 
GDP in Sierra Leone responds negatively to one standard deviation change in debt servicing. Figure 
1.0 illustrates a steady decline in GDP after the first six years. This negative relationship between GDP 
growth and debt servicing  was also found in the negative significant impact debt service exhibited on 
GDP growth in the  OECD,LDC, Mineral -rich, Petroleum-rich and SSA sub-panels estimated by GMM 
in Chapter Three.  Cohen and Sachs (1986) explained that debt servicing is an equilibrium strategy 
employed by countries to avoid debt repudiation. Sierra Leone is one of the SSA countries.  
 
Sierra Leone’s GDP between 1970 and 2011 grows steadily with external debt stocks. This positive 
relationship, in this study’s opinion has underpinnings in how GDP is measured.   It is worth noting that 
Debt service in Sierra Leone responds positively to changes in external debt, growing steadily after the 
first five years (see Figure 2.0). A similar significant positive link between external debt stocks and debt 
service was also found  in the results of the GMM estimation for the whole panel of 153 countries, 
HIPCs, LDCs, OPECs, Mineral-rich countries, Petroleum-rich countries and SSAs. 
 
From Figure 2.0,  in response to the a change in the interactive variable (SDS), GDP initially falls then 
rises slightly in the fourth year and then falls steadily after the eighth year.  This provides support for 
the debt-overhang resource-curse hypothesis. The relationship between GDP and this debt-overhang 
resource-curse variable was also significantly negative in the LDC, Mineral -rich, Petroleum –rich and 
SSA sub-panels. 
 
When one analyses the interaction of natural resource rents, GDP, external debt stocks and debt 
servicing, it is clear that despite the positive response of GDP to natural resource rents and external debt 
stocks, GDP still has a negative response to debt servicing and the interactive variable. It is interactions 
such as these that the simultaneous estimation of the equations in the GMM system in Chapter Three 
also estimate. This provides further justification of the methodology given the dynamic nature of the 
economy.  
 
It has been suggested that natural resources provide both reason and opportunity for conflict (Collier 
and Hoeffler, 2000; Acemoglu et al. 2001; Stevens, 2003; Ross, 2004; Lujala, Gleditsch, and Gilmore, 
2005). It has been explained in section 4.3.2 that in this study, military expenditure is assumed to 
increase with the likelihood of conflict or political instability. The results of the SVAR estimation for 
Sierra Leone indicate a steady decline in GDP to shocks in military expenditure. This sanctions that 
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conflict and political instability adversely affect GDP growth in Sierra Leone thus confirming the 
conflict theory of the resource curse. 
 
Researchers like Krueger et. al. (1992), Torvik, (2002), Brollo (2010), Acemogul et al. (2002) and Juel 
and Ross (2011) provided the Institutional quality theory of the resource curse. They explained that 
differences between successful and unsuccessful resource rich countries lie in the quality of their 
institutions.  The results presented in Figure 1.0 reveal a negative relationship between policy and 
growth in Sierra Leone.  This finding indicates that the quality of institutions in Sierra Leone is poor. 
This finding is as a result of the high level of corruption and poor accountability in Sierra Leone.  
 
In the resource curse literature, when production is concentrated on resource extraction, it is assumed 
to crowd out the development of human capital leading to reduced growth. This is evident in the 
negative reponse of GDP to a shock on human capital in Sierra Leone.  Studies such as Wood and 
Mayer (1998), Stijns (2006) and Bravo-Ortega and de Gregorio (2007) have explained that it is the 
stock of human capital available rather than resource abundance that is the main determinant of a 
country’s growth potential.   Sachs and Warner (1995) and Gylfason, et al. (1999)   indicated that 
exporting natural resources reduces employment in the traded sector, impeding ‘learning by doing’ and 
eventually restricting economic growth.    This response of growth to a human capital impulse in Sierra 
Leone validates these studies and provides support for the Human Capital Theory of the resource curse. 
 
To the author’s surprise, even though Sierra Leone is a HIPC, the Sierra Leone results contrast with that 
of the HIPC panel presented in section 3.6.2.   Figure 1.0 shows that GDP rises slowly but steadily with 
a one standard deviation change in debt relief.  It is also due to the fact that aid inflows played an 
important role in complementing government revenue.  This is the result that was also expected for the 
HIPC panel but failed to materialise. This contradictory result is based on the fact that, in order to 
qualify for debt relief, the countries must meet certain criteria set out by the IMF and World Bank. The 
amount of debt relief and additional conditionalities set are country specific. These conflicting findings 
strengthen the case for country specific studies for greater policy alignment.  
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Figure 2.0:  Accumulated Response of Debt Service to External Debt Stock (Author’s Calculations 
in Eviews 8) 
 
The results of the SVAR model estimation provide strong support for the debt overhang- resource curse 
hypothesis in Sierra Leone thus accepting the debt overhang- resource curse hypothesis and supporting 
Manzano and Rigobon (2001). Manzano and Rigobon (2001) explained that countries borrow with their 
natural resources as collateral and when the commodity prices fall, some struggle to repay debts, hence, 
the debt overhang resource curse hypothesis.   It also complements both the ‘Quality of Institutions’ 
theory and the ‘Conflict’ theory of the resource curse in the review of the literature in Chapter Two.  
The positive effects of the resource endowment in Sierra Leone are netted out by the adverse effects of 
external debt and poor institutional quality. Collier and Goderis (2007) reached a similar conclusion.  
On this basis, this research   concludes that, for the case of Sierra Leone, there is evidence of a debt 
overhang –resource curse. Sierra Leone’s past has also been marred by civil conflict, coup d’états and 
high levels of corruption.  The country has been stable since the official end of the war in 2002, has 
successfully elected a democratic regime and measures to curb corruption, especially in public offices, 
have been put in place.  It is fair to say that these are steps in the right direction, as studies such as Lane 
and Tornell, (1996), Torvik (2002) and (Auty, 2007) have stressed that political stability, democracy 
and low corruption prevents the potential resource curse.   
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4.4.2 VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION 
 
Variance decomposition represents the contribution of each shock to the variability in each endogenous 
variable.  Given the main research question, the variance decomposition analysis concentrates on GDP 
and the interactive variable (SDS).   Table 2.2   and Table 2.3 illustrate the percentage contribution of 
each shock to the variance in GDP and SDS over a fifteen year period respectively. 
 
The results from Table 2.2 indicate that GDP explains most of the variation in itself. Its share in the 
variation however decreases from year to year.   From year 3, the debt overhang- resource curse variable 
explains most of the variation in GDP. The bulk of the remainder of the variation is explained by debt 
service, external debt, capital inflows and policy.   The share of capital inflows increases significantly 
from the eleventh year. This confirms that filling the external gap by either borrowing and / or attracting 
foreign investment or the policies implemented to manage the economy are significant determinants of 
GDP growth in Sierra Leone. 
 
Table 2.2:   Variance Decomposition of GDP in Sierra Leone, 1970-2011 
 
Period GDP DSV CAPFLOW NATRES SDS HCAP MILEXP POLICY EXDEBT FIS HIPC DOM 
1 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 74.22 5.85 0.88 0.00 4.51 0.48 2.37 0.56 6.11 4.20 0.70 0.13 
3 60.86 8.81 0.49 0.47 15.46 0.52 1.33 4.95 3.47 2.91 0.23 0.50 
4 52.82 7.23 7.31 0.79 16.39 0.72 1.09 4.37 6.37 2.52 0.30 0.09 
5 51.48 8.35 0.61 7.73 15.62 0.78 1.31 4.76 6.09 2.94 0.25 0.08 
6 47.33 7.78 0.85 7.35 16.05 1.85 3.28 6.42 5.51 3.04 0.36 0.18 
7 47.01 7.79 1.64 6.91 15.92 1.82 3.32 6.21 5.65 3.09 0.54 0.10 
8 44.22 7.45 1.56 7.20 17.15 1.85 3.15 7.28 5.51 4.28 0.26 0.10 
9 43.41 7.45 2.54 7.14 17.03 1.84 3.33 7.16 5.53 4.24 0.25 0.10 
10 41.95 7.37 1.87 7.93 16.94 1.73 3.19 7.01 5.58 5.11 1.21 0.10 
11 38.04 7.52 9.33 4.99 19.01 6.10 3.11 7.58 2.28 1.65 0.25 0.08 
12 35.26 7.42 10.69 4.50 19.55 6.52 3.24 7.17 3.81 1.48 0.24 0.08 
13 31.68 6.87 12.19 3.81 20.73 7.52 3.19 7.25 5.16 1.27 0.21 0.07 
14 28.32 6.28 14.13 3.25 21.27 8.35 3.49 7.16 6.28 1.13 0.21 0.06 
15 25.35 5.78 16.53 2.86 20.90 9.16 3.54 6.82 7.79 0.96 0.19 0.06 
 Cholesky Ordering: GDP DSV CAPFLOW NATRES SDS HCAP MILEXP POLICY EXDEBT FIS HIPC DOM   
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GDP and Debt servicing accounts for most of the variation in SDS as seen in Table 2.3.  Their share 
however gradually decline over the years. On the other hand, the share of the variance in SDS explained 
by natural resource rents gradually increases. This confirms the debt overhang –resource curse 
hypothesis in the long run.  As natural resource rents increase, resource abundant countries borrow 
more, against the future resource revenue, leading to greater debt servicing requirements.  As debt 
servicing increases, the share of SDS explained by debt forgiveness (the HIPC variable) increases.  This 
is because the country is undergoing certain poverty reduction programs with its key creditors, 
especially the International Monetary fund, most of the loans are concessional loans, and the country 
has also qualified for debt relief under the HIPC Initiative 
 
 
Table 2.3:   Variance Decomposition of   Debt Overhang-Resource Curse Variable (SDS) in Sierra 
Leone, 1970-2011 
 
Period GDP DSV CAPFLOW NATRES SDS HCAP MILEXP POLICY EXDEBT FIS HIPC DOM 
1  81.550  17.899  0.05  0.18  0.31  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
2  61.81  17.55  1.07  0.10  2.62  0.16  15.2  0.12  0.58  0.37  0.04  0.25 
3  51.55  17.01  4.73  1.11  4.07  0.75  16.10  0.18  0.56  3.32  0.31  0.24 
4  54.78  13.06  4.29  2.36  3.57  0.50  14.27  1.58  2.27  2.35  0.72  0.21 
5  49.56  11.33  3.76  4.19  9.52  1.21  11.01  4.68  1.72  2.21  0.58  0.16 
6  44.80  10.18  5.26  4.06  9.93  1.65  11.24  4.16  5.75  2.06  0.72  0.15 
7  37.45  10.49  11.42  4.48  8.36  4.20  9.81  3.53  7.17  2.28  0.60  0.14 
8  29.39  8.889  20.56  4.36  6.56  6.44  7.70  3.05  10.04  2.28  0.55  0.12 
9  24.09  7.467  25.44  5.38  5.41  5.85  7.00  2.71  14.08  1.89  0.52  0.09 
10  21.14  6.333  28.91  6.84  5.06  6.41  6.69  2.30  13.94  1.80  0.44  0.09 
12 7.81 16.7867 4.967 34.87 8.36 4.85 7.94 5.71 1.82 12.52 1.70 0.37 
13 8.61 14.01 4.20 37.92 7.40 5.36 7.70 5.18 1.53 14.61 1.61 0.34 
14 9.41 11.14 3.77 39.62 6.37 5.47 7.90 4.85 1.22 17.74 1.53 0.28 
15 10.36 8.94 3.45 40.92 6.27 4.99 8.53 4.68 0.97 19.48 1.45 0.22 
12 7.812 16.78 4.96 34.87 8.36 4.85 7.94 5.71 1.82 12.52 1.70 0.37 
 Cholesky Ordering: GDP DSV CAPFLOW NATRES SDS HCAP MILEXP POLICY EXDEBT FIS HIPC DOM   
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Thirlwall (1978) explained that, traditionally, the role of foreign borrowing is to supplement domestic 
saving. This is true for Sierra Leone as exhibited by the really small percentage of SDS variation 
explained by domestic savings. This clearly shows evidence of inadequate domestic saving. This clearly 
shows that Sierra Leone is in that stage of its development wherein it still needs to borrow to fill the 
foreign exchange gap explained by Chenery and Stout’s Two Gap model. Low levels of domestic 
savings, means low levels of domestic borrowing and lending shedding light on the underdevelopment 
of Sierra Leone’s financial market and the widening informal money market. The country, however, 
has access to the international money market and capital inflows account for varying percentages of the 
variance in SDS.  
 
The SVAR estimated for Sierra Leone was identified by imposing short run restrictions on the residuals 
of the endogenous variables. The investigation of the debt overhang-resource curse hypothesis 
continues by examining the long run relationships between the main variables.  There has been a surge 
in resource extraction in Sierra Leone. The discovery of rumoured commercially viable oil deposits has 
paved the way for greater resource extraction over the coming years.  Deaton and Miller (1995) argue 
that vector autoregressive models cannot account for the long term impact of resource endowments.  
The possibility of short run positive effects being offset by long run effects outside the horizon of VAR 
models thus exists. In this light, it was important to examine the nature of the long run relationships 
between certain key variables and the direction of causality running between them. This has severe 
implications on policy formulation, governance and investment negotiations. This study, therefore, 
carried out cointegration tests (Engle-Granger and Johansen). For pairs of variables where a long run 
cointegration relationship was confirmed by both tests, a test for causality was applied. The results of 
the cointegration and causality tests are presented in Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 respectively.  
 
 
4.4.3 THE UNIT ROOT TEST 
The first step to cointegration analysis is an evaluation of the stationarity of the variables This study 
therefore proceeds with the debt overhang-resource investigation for Sierra Leone by carrying out unit 
root tests given the time series nature of the data.  The tests reveal whether all the variables are 
individually stationary. The Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips–Perron (PP) test were 
used to test for stationarity. In testing for stationarity, graphs of the time series were first examined to 
determine whether the test should be done with an intercept, or trend or with both. The results of the 
ADF test were confirmed by the PP test. The results for both tests are shown in Table 2.4. 
 
From the results of the tests reported in Table 2.4, Debt Service, Human Capital, and Debt Forgiveness 
are shown to be stationary at levels, that is, I (0).  Domestic savings, External debt,  Gross Domestic 
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Product, Fiscal Balance, Capital inflows, Natural Resources,  Policy ,  Military Expenditure and  Debt 
overhang are integrated of order one, I(1).   
 
Table 2.4:  Time Series Unit Root Test Results 
 
Variables ADF Test 
Statistic 
Critical 
values at 
5% 
*Probabilities 
of ADF- Test 
Order of 
Integration 
Phillips-
Peron 
statistic 
Critical 
values at 
5% 
**Probabilities 
of PP test 
Order of 
Integration 
GDP -7.507903 -1.9498 0.0000 I(1) -8.958418 -2.938987 0.0000 I(1) 
DSV -3.016791 -2.9369 0.0418 I(0) -2.698549 -1.949319 0.0082 I(0) 
CAPFLOW -6.071922 -2.9389 0.0000 I(1) -6.015410 -1.949609 0.0040 I(1) 
NATRES -7.256443 -2.9389 0.0000 I(1) -8.987215 -2.938987 0.0000 I(1) 
SDS -7.228546 -3.52975 0.0000 I(1) -9.366689 -3.529758 0.0000 I(1) 
HCAP -3.093705 -2.9369 0.0315 I(0) -3.156881 -2.936942 0.0030 I(0) 
MILEXP -8.493788 -2.9389 0.0000 I(1) -8.269752 -2.938987 0.0000 I(1) 
POLICY -6.899401 -2.9389 0.0000 I(1) -6.899401 -2.938987 0.0000 I(1) 
EXTDEBT -5.424069 -1.9496 0.0000 I(1) -5.366899 -2.938987 0.0001 I(1) 
FIS -5.982386 -2.9411 0.0000 I(1) -8.486796 -2.938987 0.0000 I(1) 
HIPC -5.005896 -2.9369 0.0002 I(0) -5.012452 -2.936942 0.0002 I(0) 
DOM -4.8315 -2.9411 0.0003 1(1) -3.147690 -1.949609 0.0024 I(1) 
* Probabilities are MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values 
 
 
 
4.4.4 COIINTEGRATION TESTS FOR SIERRA LEONE, 1970-2011 AND 
RESULTS 
The Engle-Granger test, tests the null hypothesis: Series are not cointegrated. The probability values 
are derived from the MacKinnon (1996) response surface simulation results. All the relationships are 
evaluated at the 5% conventional level. The Johansen VAR-based cointegration test, tests the null 
hypothesis: No cointegration. The critical values reported for this test are MacKinnon-Haug- Michelis 
(1999) p-values, so they differ slightly from those reported in Johansen and Juselius (1990). From 
Monte Carlo experiments comparing the trace statistics and Eigen value from the Johansen 
cointegration, some researchers, including Toda (1994) and Lâutkepohl (2000), have shown that, even 
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though trace tests seem to have distorted sizes, their power is superior. This study, therefore, uses trace 
statistics to conduct inference from the results of the Johansen cointegration test.  
 
TABLE 2.5:  RESULTS OF COINTEGRATION TESTS 
Variables Engle-Granger Test Johansen Test 
 tau-Statistic P values Reject 
Null? 
Y/N 
λ-Trace 
Statistic 
P values Reject 
Null? 
Y/N 
GDP AND EXTERNAL DEBT -4.014380 0.0154 Y 18.48129 0.0172 Y 
GDP AND MILITARY EXPENDITURE -3.977738 0.0168 Y 16.34499 0.0372 Y 
GDP AND CAPITAL FLOW --4.080418 0.0132 Y 16.95955 0.0299 Y 
GDP AND POLICY -4.065121 0.0137 Y 18.39095 0.0178 Y 
GDP AND NATURAL RESOURCES -4.026163 0.0150 Y 18.22014 0.0190 Y 
GDP AND DEBT OVERHANG -3.361049 0.0479 Y 6.776648 0.0092 Y 
NATURAL RESOURCES, CAPITAL FLOW -3.474398 0.0525 Y 12.88142 0.2485 N 
NATURAL RESOURCES AND EXTERNAL DEBT -2.861887 0.1698 N 13.14557 0.1096 N 
NATURAL RESOURCES AND POLICY -2.869076 0.1677 N 12.11076 0.3009 N 
NATURAL RESOURCES AND MILITARY 
EXPENDITURE 
-2.853403 0.1722 Y 20.08504 0.0095 Y 
NATURAL RESOURCES AND DEBT OVERHANG -3.261259 0.0808 N 7.183070 0.3258 N 
 
The results of the  both cointegration tests, reveal that long term  cointegration relationships exist 
between GDP and natural resources, GDP and external debt , GDP and military expenditure,  GDP and 
policy,  GDP and capital flow and between  GDP and debt overhang .  It is also evident that natural 
resources have a long run relationship with military expenditure, external debt, capital inflows, policy 
and debt overhang.  
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4.4.5 GRANGER CAUSALITY TEST IN SIERRA LEONE, 1970-2011 AND 
RESULTS 
 
Cointegration means Granger causality in at least one direction. The Granger causality test seeks to 
examine how much of the present can be explained by past values (Granger, 1969). In the Granger-
sense therefore, a time series x is a cause of y if it is useful in forecasting y. More precisely, variable X 
is said to Granger-cause another variable, Y, if the current value of Y (yt ) is conditional on the past 
values of X (xt-1, x t-2, ... , x0 ) , thus the history of X is likely to help predict Y (Konya, 2004). It is 
important to not to think of causality in the common use of the term.  “Granger cause” does not infer 
‘is the effect of’ or ‘the result of’. It measures precedence and information content.    
 
The results in Table 2.6 show that the past values of natural resource rent and GDP explain each other’s 
growth.  Similarly, there is bi-directional causality between natural resources and military expenditure.  
This is essentially significant for conflict prevention, but also to prevent exploitation by security firms, 
as explained by Douglas (1998). Two-way causal relationships also exist between natural resources and 
debt overhang, GDP and capital inflow, GDP and Policy. Past values of GDP can explain current trends 
in military expenditure and debt overhang in Sierra Leone. This is shown by the uni-directional causality 
running from GDP to External Debt and GDP to Debt Overhang. 
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TABLE 2.6:  RESULTS OF PAIRWISE GRANGER CAUSALITY TEST 
Variables Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Probability Conclusion 
NAT RES AND GDP NATRES does not  Granger cause GDP 0.86659 0.5178 Bi-directional causality between 
NATRES and GDP 
GDP does not Granger cause  NATRES 0.89135 0.5024 
NATRES AND MILEXP NATRES does not Granger cause MILEXP 1.40245 0.2589 Bi-directional causality between 
NATRES AND MILEXP 
MILEXP does not Granger cause NATRES 0.53625 0.7468 
NATRES AND EXDEBT NATRES does not  Granger cause EXDEBT 0.91032 0.4120 Bi-directional causality between 
NATRES AND EXDEBT 
EXDEBT does not  Granger cause NATRES 0.19121 0.8268 
NATRES AND CAPFLOW NATRES does not  Granger cause CAPFLOW 0.54381 0.5855 Bi-directional causality between 
NATRES AND CAPFLOW 
CAPFLOW does not  Granger cause NATRES 1.79834 0.1810 
NATRES AND POLICY NATRES does not  Granger cause POLICY 0.16443 0.8490 Bi-directional causality between 
NATRES AND POLICY 
POLICY does not  Granger cause NATRES 0.12031 0.8870 
NATRES AND DEBT 
OVERHANG 
NATRES does not  Granger cause DEBT 
OVERHANG 
0.02024 0.9800 Bi-directional causality between 
NATRES AND DEBT OVERHANG 
DEBT OVERHANG does not  Granger cause 
NATRES 
0.30629 0.7382 
GDP AND EXDEBT GDP does not  Granger cause EXDEBT 0.18370 0.9660 Uni-directional causality from GDP to 
EXDEBT 
EXDEBT does not  Granger cause GDP 4.84519 0.0033 
GDP AND MILEXP GDP does not Granger cause MILEXP 0.97299 0.4541 Uni-directional causality from GDP to 
MILEXP 
MILEXP does not Granger cause GDP 3.28559 0.0212 
GDP AND CAPFLOW GDP does not Granger cause CAPFLOW 1.41545 0.2544 Bi-directional causality between GDP 
and CAPFLOW 
CAPFLOW does not  Granger cause GDP 1.25979 0.3133 
GDP AND POLICY GDP does not Granger cause POLICY 1.72572 0.1670 Bi-directional causality between GDP 
and Policy 
POLICY does not Granger cause GDP 1.24223 0.3206 
GDP  AND DEBT OVERHANG GDP does not  Granger cause DEBT 
OVERHANG 
1.35489 0.2716 Uni-directional causality from GDP to 
DEBT OVERHANG 
DEBT OVERHANG  does not Granger cause 
GDP 
3.01672 0.0622 
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4.4.5   CONCLUSION 
 
A structural vector autoregressive model was specified based on the theoretical framework developed 
in Chapter Three.  The SVAR model was augmented with variables to capture the effect of the quality 
of institutions (policy variable), the political economy (military expenditure variable) and a conflict 
dummy. This augmented model improves on the original model developed in Chapter Three because it 
captures a wider scope of the resource –growth dynamics. This model was not estimated in Chapter 
Three, mainly because, in addition to data availability limitations, in the opinion of this research, a case 
–by-case analysis better captures the quality of institutions and political stability on resource led growth.   
 
Results of the SVAR estimation confirm the debt overhang –resource curse hypothesis in Sierra Leone. 
It also highlights the fact that, based on historical data, resources have positive effect on growth in 
Sierra Leone but this positive effect is wiped out by the negative impact of debt overhang. Other 
significant theories that help explain Sierra Leone’s lagging growth are the quality of institutions theory, 
the human capital theory and the conflict theory.  
 
The cointegration tests confirm that natural resources have a long term relationship with growth, 
external debt, capital inflow, policy, debt overhang and military expenditure. Therefore, resource rents 
are intertwined with many aspects of the Sierra Leonean economy. Growth also has long rum 
relationships with external debt, military expenditure, policy, capital flow and debt overhang. The 
Granger causality test revealed bi-directional causality between natural resources and growth, but uni-
directional causality running from growth to debt overhang. This confirms that the need for acquiring 
debt arises from shortfalls in domestic output and income.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DEBT OVERHANG, NATURAL RESOURCES AND GROWTH 
IN SIERRA LEONE: A PERCEPTIONS AND DOCUMENTS 
ANALYSIS 
 
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, ‘Debt Overhang, Natural Resources and Growth: A Time Series Analysis of 
Sierra Leone’s Experience’, the results of the SVAR estimation provided strong support for the debt 
overhang- resource curse hypothesis in Sierra Leone. They further reinforced the ‘Quality of Institutions’ 
and the ‘Conflict’ theories  of the resource curse leading to the conclusion that, for the case of Sierra 
Leone, resource extraction contributes to its growth underperformance to date. The model estimated was 
based on short term restrictions, prompting cointegration tests to establish long run relationships. The 
tests revealed  long term  co-integrating  relationships between natural resources and GDP,  natural 
resources and military expenditure, natural resources and capital inflows, natural resources and policy 
and natural resources and debt overhang. It is also evident that GDP has long run relationships with 
external debt, military expenditure, capital inflow,   policy and GDP and debt overhang. It is evident that 
natural resource extraction has a long term relationship with economic growth and that long term 
relationships exist between GDP growth and many variables. GDP growth, the main estimate for 
economic growth, does not automatically translate into economic development, reduced inequality and 
improved standard of living. This has severe implications for policy formulation, governance and 
investment negotiations.  
It is against this background that this chapter of this thesis seeks to go further than the purely quantitative 
model estimations in the two previous chapters. The findings and conclusion reached from the results of 
the estimations in Chapter Three and Chapter Four are based on mostly historical data. The mixed method 
analysis that will be done in this chapter  will  be based on more recent data, mainly current the 
perceptions of Sierra Leoneans regarding the relationship between the country’s natural resources, debt, 
growth and development. This chapter goes beyond economic growth to encompass development. 
Development entails how the positive effects of economic growth ‘trickle down’ to the masses and result 
in all round improvement of the standard of living and reduced poverty. 
One key motivation is the fact that GDP measures do not often capture ‘welfare’. This research, like most 
development economists, believes that even though GDP is a good measure of economic growth, it is not 
entirely adequate in measuring economic development. This chapter of this thesis will also supplement 
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the findings of the second paper by bringing some ‘real life’ resonance to them. Given that conclusions 
drawn from purely quantitative studies utilising secondary data are often quite general, this research 
believes it is necessary to investigate whether the story told by the empirical estimation matches the real 
life experiences and perceptions of Sierra Leoneans. This examination will, therefore, use a mix of 
quantitative and qualitative approaches to provide a more close-up view of the relationship shared by 
natural resources, debt overhang, economic growth and economic development in Sierra Leone.  
This chapter  will examine the impact of resource extraction  and external debt on standards of living, 
health, education, social amenities, labour relations, corporate social responsibility, wages, migration 
patterns, government spending ,community initiatives, the environment and economic development as a 
whole,  both at community level and national level, by measuring the experiences  and perceptions of  
Sierra Leoneans  and comparing how, together with government mining legislation and operations of 
mining companies, they  explain the impact of  natural resources  and debt on current development in 
Sierra Leone. Development hereafter is taken to encompass economic growth, improved standard of 
living and alleviation of poverty.  
Sierra Leone is well known for the exportation of diamonds. To the knowledge of the author, most studies 
related to the natural resource – growth/development link in Sierra Leone, activities related to mining of 
diamonds are the main constructs. Diamonds still contribute to growth in Sierra Leone and are still very 
much relevant. Post-conflict diamond mining in Sierra Leone is now mostly ‘kimberlite’ mining. 
Olsson’s (2006) analysis of the linkages between the production of rough diamonds and economic 
development on a macro and micro level revealed that ‘alluvial’ mining is more strongly associated with 
negative externalities than ‘kimberlite’ mining. In October 2000, in accordance with United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1306 of July 5, 2000, Sierra Leone initiated a diamond certification scheme. 
On November 5, 2002, the scheme, known as the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), 
designed to stem the flow of conflict diamonds to international markets, was also adopted by Sierra Leone 
alongside the introduction of the Government Gold and Diamond Office.  Apart from diamonds, most of 
Sierra Leone’s recent extractive activities are connected to the mining of iron ore, rutile and bauxite. This 
paper, therefore, concentrates on the activities surrounding the mining of these minerals and the impact 
on development in Sierra Leone. 
According to the Sierra Leone’s Millennium Development Goals Report 2010, the country is 
experiencing an estimated incidence of poverty at 60 %and has moved 12 points upwards on the HDI 
(IMF, 2011). Notwithstanding, there has been a surge in the number of foreign firms operating in the 
extractive industry in Sierra Leone since the official end of the  ten year civil conflict and, with the fragile 
economies of the west, more companies are turning to Africa for investment opportunities. The IMF 
forecasted Sierra Leone's GDP to grow by 34% in 2012, with two iron ore projects leading the way 
(Financial Times, 2012). There are very limited post-conflict academic studies investigating post-conflict 
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extractive activities outside the diamond mining arena in Sierra Leone and purely quantitative resource-
economic growth studies, such a, Ross (1999), Collier and Hoeffler (1998) and Easterly (2002), are often 
limited by purely historic secondary data.  More often than not, there are differences between the numbers 
and actual life experiences, specifically on the welfare platform.  According to Barber B. Conable, 
President of the World Bank in 1990, "quality of life must be measured institutionally and politically, as 
well as in material ways" (Conable, 1990). There is this gap in the literature on Sierra Leone’s natural 
resource –development experience. This in-depth study of current trends would help to properly 
understand the multiplier effects the extractive activities of the firms, the Government and the indigenous 
people of Sierra Leone have on the country’s development. 
This chapter uses integrative logic to address these gaps using a convergent parallel mixed methods 
research design, as in Townsend, Floersch and Findling (2010).  The  analysis is made up of  simple 
questionnaire data analysis using Microsoft Excel,  structural equation models estimated using SMART 
PLS1 and documentary analysis of key mining agreements, Government of Sierra Leone legislation, 
company  reports,  newspaper articles, a few interviews and  the researcher’s observation of life in and 
out of  the mining communities. From the analysis of the perceptions of Sierra Leoneans, natural 
resources do not currently lead to growth and development. Whilst the activities of mining companies 
have a positive but insignificant impact on development, the role of the government is paramount in 
ensuring resource rents benefit the country in terms of poverty reduction and standard of living 
improvement. There is also a lack of awareness of the country’s debt servicing commitments. 
In the next section of this chapter, the theoretical framework for this portion of the research is presented. 
This is followed by the specification and estimation of the structural equation model followed by the 
presentation of the results of the estimation.   An analysis of the mining agreements, company reports 
and newspaper articles related to the companies used in the dataset follows.  The quantitative results are 
then triangulated with the findings from the document analysis, interviews and observation.  The 
conclusion is presented in the final section of the chapter 
 
5.1 METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION 
As was explained in the introduction, the three empirical studies contained of this thesis are united under 
the debt overhang –resource curse theme. Hence, the theoretical framework used in this chapter is also 
the same as that used in the previous chapters. Given the nature of the survey data collected, a structural 
equation model was specified and this was estimated using partial least squares. The quality of the model 
was then evaluated before the results were discussed. 
                                                            
1 SMARTPLS  Version 2.0 
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5.1.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Rossiter (2002) explained that the validity of indicators and variables should have theoretic rationale. 
From the theoretical framework utilised in the first and second empirical studies, the following 
relationships were specified: 
 Economic growth:  
௧ܻ ൌ ݂൫ܥܫ௧, ܮ௧, ܵ௧,ܦܵ௧, ܼ௧൯                                                                       (1.0) 
Where ݕ௧	 is output,	ܥܫ௧ is capital inflow  ܦܵ௧ is   debt service,  ܮ௧ is the total labour force , ܵ௧,   is a vector 
of natural resource measures, and  ܼ௧  is a vector of carefully selected growth control  variables 
The debt service relationship is: 
ܦܵ௧ ൌ ݂൫ ௧ܻ, ܦ௧	, ܵ௧,ܧܴ௧, ௧ܸ൯                                                (2.0) 
Where ܦܵ௧  is debt service, ܦ௧ is the stock of debt, ܧܴ௧  is the exchange rate   and   ௧ܸ a vector of debt 
sensitive control variables. 
ܥܫ௧ ൌ ݂൫ ௧ܻ, ܦ௧ܵ௧,	, ܺ௧൯                                    (3.0) 
Where ܥܫ௧ is capital inflow, and ܺ௧ is a vector of capital inflow controls variables. 
The final econometric model estimated revealed  that  the Human Capital Theory of the resource curse, 
the Institutional Theory’,  the ‘Dutch Disease’ Theory’,  the Conflict Theory’ and the Debt Overhang 
Theory explained the  lagging growth experienced by Sierra Leone, despite its abundant natural resources. 
This provided the theoretical framework for questions included in the questionnaires, the interviews and 
the model estimated in this paper. 
 
In “mainstream” economic theories, at the cost of gross simplification, the whole corpus of development 
economics is an integration of the theory of growth; hence, GDP growth used to measure economic 
growth is often taken to mean economic development. The concern here, as with other development 
economists such as Chipman and Moore (1971), Nordhaus and Tobin (1972), Morris (1979), Dasgupta 
and Weale (1992), Anand and Sen (1994) and Sen (1999), is the adequacy of GDP as a measure of well–
being. Natural resource extraction is not only expected to contribute positively to economic growth in the 
strict sense of the word, but also to improve the wellbeing of the people in the economy where the 
resource deposits are located.  Many of the assumptions made by growth models do not hold in reality. 
Examining Sierra Leone, the country is still developing, markets are incomplete, information is limited 
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and structural changes are still taking place. This thesis does not intend to question the traditional growth 
models, but will build on them to provide theoretical analyses which go beyond the simple use of 
aggregate production functions. 
 
Todaro and Smith (2006) argued that, in addition to all the main topics of “traditional economics”, 
development economics “must deal also with the economic, social, political and institutional 
mechanisms, both public and private, necessary to bring about rapid …and large scale improvements in 
levels of living .” Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi’s (2009) report on the Measurement of Economic 
Performance and Social Progress identified the key dimensions that should be taken into account when 
measuring development and wellbeing.  According to this report, these dimensions should, at least in 
principle, be considered simultaneously: Material living standards (income, consumption and wealth);  
Health;  Education;  Personal activities, including work,  Political voice and governance; Social 
connections and relationships;  Environment (present and future conditions); and  Insecurity, of an 
economic as well as a physical nature. 
 
5.1.2 THE MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
The notion here is to develop a conceptual  model that combines measures of  economic variables, with 
underpinning located in the  ‘human capital’, ‘institutional’, ‘Dutch Disease’ ,‘conflict ’ and  ‘debt 
overhang’ theories of the resource curse,  and measures to capture social dimensions, such as health, 
environment and standard of living.  This study assumes that, in Sierra Leone, given its endowment of 
natural resources, the development expected as a result of the activities in the extractive industry is driven 
by activities of the household, the extractive firm and the government.  Consequently the following 
hypotheses would be tested:  
Hypothesis 1:  Government’s activities, including debt servicing, lead to development in Sierra Leone. 
Hypothesis 2: Mining firms positively contribute to development in Sierra Leone. 
Hypothesis 3:  Households’ productive activities result in development in Sierra Leone. 
 
It is also assumed that Sierra Leoneans form expectations about the activities of both the Government 
and firms.  The use of expectations in economic theory is not new as the theory of rational expectations 
was first proposed by John F. Muth in the early 1960s and many other economists, such as A. C. Pigou, 
John Maynard Keynes and John Hick, allocated people’s expectations about the future a central role in 
the determination of the business cycle. In general, the expectations theory implies that the outcome of 
economic situations partly depends on what people expect to happen.  
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For the purposes of this study, it is assumed that the expectations formed about the activities of the 
Government and mining companies influence their contribution to economic development.   Therefore, 
Hypothesis 4:  Expectations of Sierra Leoneans positively affect how the Government, mining firms and 
households contribute to development. 
 
This study also assumes that the activities of the household, firm and government to be multidimensional 
constructs. It considers them to have structural relations with much more observable separate constructs, 
called latent variables, supported by economic theory.  Thus, to estimate the network of causal 
relationships among the activities of households, firms in the extractive industry, the Government and 
development in Sierra Leone, this research proposes a Structural Equation Model (SEM) that  is based 
on the  ‘human capital’, ‘institutional’, ‘Dutch Disease’ ,‘conflict ’ and  ‘debt overhang’ theories of the 
resource curse, economic development notions and expectations theory. Structural equation models  
include a number of statistical methodologies meant to estimate a network of causal relationships, defined 
according to a theoretical model, linking two or more latent complex concepts, each measured through a 
number of observable indicators” (Esposito Vinzi, et. al., 2010).   
 
The SEM allows the construction of latent variables which are not measured directly, but are estimated 
in the model from several indicators, each of which is predicted to 'tap into' the latent variables. Although 
this approach is similar to multiple regression, it can simultaneously test a series of dependent 
relationships while also simultaneously analysing multiple dependent variables (Joreskog, et al., 1999).  
Compared to multiple regression, it has a less restrictive assumption of measurement error as it is based 
on the assumption that each explanatory and dependent variable is associated with measurement error 
(Bollen, 1989).  The structural model shows potential causal dependencies between endogenous and 
exogenous variables.  In this chapter, a structural equation model is developed so as to estimate these 
networks of causal relations simultaneously. This method  has become a quasi-standard in  research, for 
example  Bagozzi (1994),  Hulland (1999), Babin, et al. (2008) ,  Terzi,  Trezzini and  Moroni (2012),   
as it allows authors to test complete theories and concepts (Rigdon, 1998).   
 
The theoretical framework in section 5.1.1 provides the foundation for the constructs of the model. The 
constructs of the study are conceptually related to each other by the structural model shown in Figure 3.0.  
From Figure 3.0, it is seen that expectations impact on the activities of the Government, firm and 
household which in turn impact on development. The Government’s activities also impact the activities 
of the firm and the household.  The activities of the firm also impact on the household. The ease of 
triangulating quantitative and qualitative findings is ensured by analysing the qualitative data collected 
within the same theoretical framework. 
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The triangulation of both quantitative and qualitative finings would result in well-rounded findings 
regarding the role of natural resources in economic development in Sierra Lone. This would enable this 
thesis to test the following:  
Hypothesis 5:  There is empirical and documentary evidence of natural resources-led economic 
development in Sierra Leone.  
 
 
Figure 3.0:  The Conceptual Structural Model 
The theoretical concepts underlying the model have been highlighted and the causal relations between 
the constructs have been illustrated using a structural equations model. The model to be estimated 
showing the relationships with the latent variables and their respective indicators is specified in the next 
section. 
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5.1.3 MODEL SPECIFICATION 
The complete model consists of an outer measurement model relating observed or manifest variables to 
their latent variables and an inner structural model relating some endogenous latent variables to other 
latent variables (Tenenhaus, et al., 2005). The inner model is essentially the conceptual model illustrated 
in Figure 3.0. It shows the causal relationships between the Government, the firm, the household, 
expectations and economic development (latent variables) in Sierra Leone.  The outer measurement 
model relates a number of indicators to their latent variables.  Baumgartner and Homburg (1996) stated 
that every latent variable should be measured by more than one indicator to ensure meaningful results.  
In the proposed model, every latent variable is measured by more than one indicator.  The choice of 
indicator is based on growth theory, the various theories that have emerged in the resource curse literature 
and the expectations theory. The direction of path relationships of the measurement model and the 
causality between each latent variable and its indicators are described by the reflective model being 
specified. The direction of causality is from the construct to the indicators.  Variations in a latent variable 
are expected to be manifested in changes in all of its indicators.  
 
Firstly, considering the Government latent variable, standard growth theory and the Institutional Theory 
of the resource curse form the basis for the choice of indicators. This study assumes that the capital 
accumulation needed to drive aggregate demand can be stimulated by government expenditure. 
Government expenditure in this study comprises of government expenditure on wages, debt servicing, 
national savings, agriculture, health, education and infrastructure. Other studies that have used a measure 
of government expenditure to investigate the role of government in economic growth and development 
include Landau (1983), Loizides and Vamoukas (2005) and Jiranyaku (2013).  The questions asked in 
the survey regarding government expenditure were specifically confined to the spending of resource 
rents.  Hence, the responses solicited are expected to shed light on the Debt Overhang Theory and the 
Rentier State Theory.  
 
According to the Institutional Theory of the resource curse, the quality of institutions affects their growth 
enhancing potential. In most studies, corruption is one of the indices used to estimate the quality of 
institutions; for example, Tornell and Lane (1999), Leite and Weidmann (1999) and Murshed (2003). In 
this chapter, therefore, government expenditure and corruption are indicators of government activity.   
 
Output from labour, a factor of production in standard growth theory, is expected to contribute positively 
to growth and development.  There is, however, both a demand side and supply side to the labour market.  
In the model, the firm demands labour and the household supplies labour.  This demand-supply 
relationship of labour relating to the extractive industry is the basis of the ‘Dutch Disease’ explanation of 
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the resource curse (Sachs and Warner, 1999; Corden and Neary, 1982; Torvik, 2001).  Technology 
accumulation and transfer has been shown in growth theory to lead to economic growth. This capability 
is enhanced by human capital development, often proxied by educational attainment (Wood and Mayer, 
1998; Gylfason, 2000; Wright and Czelusta, 2004). In the proposed model, the firm supplies the 
technology by teaching and the household accumulates the technology by learning. It has also been 
explained in the literature that extractive activities divert labour away from agriculture and affect wildlife 
and the environment. (Krautkraemer, 1985; Partha, 1996).Manifest variables for wildlife, farming and 
the environment are incorporated as indicators for the firm’s latent variable. One prominent topic in 
managing organisations is the issue of corporate social responsibility (CSR).  Firms are expected to 
contribute to the socio-economic fabric of society through their corporate social responsibility provisions 
(Warhurst and, Mitchell, 2000, Jenkins, and Yakovleva, 2006; Hamann, 2003). A measure of CSR is one 
of the indicators relating to a firm.  
 
The household is the primary unit of the economy.  Income level in many studies has been used as a 
measure of growth and development (Hatwick, 1990; Deininger and Squire, 1996; Leamer, Maul and 
Rodriguez, 1999). For the purposes of this research, household income, before and after the 
commencement of extractive activities by mining firms,  is an indicator for the household latent variable.  
Level of education and willingness to learn are used as proxies for human capital and absorptive capacity 
for technological transfer, hence accounting for the Human Capital Theory and technology transfer 
explanations of the resource curse.  Unemployment is used to estimate the utilisation of labour.  It is 
evident from the development debate that inequality is a deterrent to development.  A measure of 
inequality is added to the indicators for the household latent variable.  The ‘conflict’ explanation for the 
resource curse (Collier and Hoeffler, 2000; Ross, 2004; Miguel, et al., 2004) is also accounted for by this 
model. 
 
All the chosen indicators reflect the same underlying construct and have been chosen to be highly 
correlated.  An increase in the latent variable would cause an increase in all its manifest variables. The 
causal links among the network of relationships already explained are expected to provide an estimate of 
the impact of the Government, firm and household on development. In this case, development is indicated 
by development in the strict use of the word; standard of living and inequality.  These causal linkages are 
illustrated by the model specified in Figure 4.0. 
 
The selected indicators are expected to have high impact and the confirmation of their impact on 
economic growth and development is suggested by theory.  Too many indicators may lead to excessive 
power for the goodness-of-fit tests (MacCallum, Browne and Sugawara, 1996) which, in turn, may 
significantly limit the usefulness of estimation results. 
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Figure 4.0 : The PLS Path Model 
 
By estimating the model specified and triangulating the estimation results with findings from mining 
agreements, company reports, newspaper articles and interviews, this study seeks to test the following 
hypotheses illustrated in Figure 5.0. 
 
H1:  Government’s activities, including debt servicing, lead to development in Sierra Leone. 
H 2: Mining firms positively contribute to development in Sierra Leone. 
H3:  Households’ productive activities result in development in Sierra Leone. 
H4:  Expectations of Sierra Leoneans positively affect how the Government, mining firms and households 
contribute to development. 
H5. There is empirical and documentary evidence of natural resources-led economic development in 
Sierra Leone.  
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Figure 5.0: The PLS Path Model Hypotheses 
 
It follows from the discussion of the model specification that H1 is connected to the Quality of Institutions 
Theory, Debt Overhang Theory and also the  Rentier State Theory. H2 has roots in the Human Capital 
Theory, Technology Transfer Theory, and ‘Dutch Disease’ Theory. H3 is underlined by the Human 
Capital Theory, Conflict Theory, Technology Transfer   Theory and Welfare Theory.  H4 is inspired by 
the Rational Expectations Theory.   The expected signs of the paths between the latent variables are 
shown in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1: Expected Signs of Path Coefficients 
Path  Expected Sign of  Path Coefficient  
Expectations -> Government + 
Expectations -> Firm + 
Expectations -> Household + 
Government-> Firm + 
Government-> Household + 
Government-> Development +/- 
Firm-> Household + 
Firm-> Development +/- 
Household-> Development +/- 
 
 
5.1.4 DATA 
 
The main source of data for the quantitative investigation is from a survey conducted through the 
administering of questionnaires.  Brief, semi- structured interviews with twenty random individuals 
exploring concerns of the effect of the resource extraction boom in Sierra Leone on key development 
indicators were conducted. This assisted in developing a well-rounded questionnaire that captured the 
sentiments of the local populace in both the private and public sector. The first draft of the questionnaire 
was used for a pilot survey of fifty randomly selected individuals. A few adjustments were made 
regarding number of questions and ease of answering. The responses to the pilot questionnaire do not 
form part of the final data used in the estimation. 
 
The final semi- structured questionnaire was administered to locals and staff living in the communities 
where the activities of four companies in the resource extracting industry were concentrated and a random 
selection of individuals living outside these communities (the Control Group) to elicit qualitative and 
quantitative responses. The four communities are: Makeni (African Mineral Ltd), Lunsar (London 
Mining Ltd –Marampa Mine), Rutile (Sierra Rutile Ltd) and Gondama (Sierra Minerals Holding Ltd).  
The control sample was randomly selected from the population living in the capital city, Freetown. The 
communities chosen are the locations of the extractive activities of the four largest mining companies in 
the country. Even though Sierra Leone is well known for its diamonds, this piece of research investigates 
only the impact of companies extracting rutile, iron ore and bauxite.  It is the activities of these companies 
that have been driving post-conflict GDP growth and continue to heavily influence economic growth 
forecasts.   
 
Given the nature of this research, the data contained both factual and opinion based information. The 
questionnaire covered perceptions of the impact of resource extraction on standard of living, health, 
education, social amenities,   labour relations, community initiatives, the environment, corporate social 
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responsibility, incomes, corruption, debt, incomes, expectations and economic development as a whole.  
In most cases, the questions were asked in ‘krio’, the local dialect. The self-designed questionnaire had a 
mix of 5-point Likert-scale   type questions, multiple choice responses and open ended questions.  The 
responses to the 5-point Likert-scale type questions were used in estimating the model specified in 
Section 5.1.3. The remaining responses were analysed and triangulated with the other qualitative data. 
Table 3.2 describes the variables and indicators of the model presented in Figure 5.0. The total number 
of questionnaire responses collected is 1,339: Sierra Mineral Holdings Limited, 288 respondents; African 
Minerals (Sierra Leone) Limited, 202 respondents; London Mining (Sierra Leone) Limited, 277 
respondents; Sierra Rutile Limited, 272 respondents; and the Control Group, 261 respondents.  According 
to Reinartz, et al. (2009), 100 observations can be sufficient to achieve acceptable levels of statistical 
power given a certain quality of the measurement model. This study, therefore, has sufficient observations 
to guarantee the quality of the measurement model. 
Key individuals were selected for the semi- structured interviews.  Selection was based on professional 
capacity and knowledge regarding the resource sector, the economy and e Sierra Leonean society as a 
whole.  To foster greater confidence and clearer truth, the interviewees were guaranteed to be kept 
anonymous as some of them held public office. The interviewees comprised individuals in management 
in the four companies, a Town Chief (traditional Leader), a women’s movement leader, a Member of 
Parliament,   member of staff from the National Revenue Authority, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry 
of Mines and the Ministry of Labour, and a youth leader. Most interviews were conducted in English; for 
those conducted in ‘krio’, the observations and discussions were then translated into English. The 
responses of most of the interviewees were collected using recording equipment and transcribed a few 
hours later.  However, a few declined to be recorded, therefore responses were recorded manually.  
Factual information was sourced from document analysis and the researcher’s observations. Copies of 
the Mining Agreements signed by the four companies with the Government of Sierra Leone were sourced 
from the House of Parliament Library. Quarterly and Annual Company Reports are publicly available on 
the company websites. Government Statistics regarding mining revenues were collected from the 
National Revenue Authority and the Ministry of Finance.  Newspaper articles related to the activities of 
the four companies were collected from the most widely circulated newspapers in the country between 
January 2000 and September 2013 as well as  a few foreign outlets focusing on mining related news. 
Findings from a five- month rotational observation of life in mining communities were incorporated into 
the analysis. 
Summary statistics for all the survey data are presented in Appendix Six. 
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Table 3.2 :  Constructs and Measurement Items ( Questionnaire) 
 
Latent Variable Indicator Item 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t 
CORRUPT Mining  activties lead to increased corruption in Government 
GAGRIC The Government spends enough on Agriculture 
GEXT The Government spends enough on repaying external debt 
GHEW The Government spends enough on health,education and water 
GINS The Government spends enough on Infrastructure 
GNAT The Government spends enough on national savings 
GSAL The Government spends enough on salaries 
GSELF The Government spends a lot on self-enrichment 
GEXP The Government spends mining revenue on the right things 
H
ou
se
ho
ld
 
EDU I attained a certain level of education 
CONFLICT Dissatisfaction with the effect of mining companies will lead to conflict 
POSTY Household income  increased since mining activities started 
PREY Pre-mining household income was adequate for comfortable  survival 
S/L LEARN Sierra Leoneans are willing to learn from expatriates 
UNEMP More Sierra Leoneans need to  find  work 
Fi
rm
 
EXPART Expatriates are willing to teach Sierra Leoneans new technology 
CSR Mining companies exercise adequate corporate social responsibility 
E & POLL Mining  affects the environment and increases pollution 
S/L EMP Mining companies employ enough Sierra Leoneans 
W& FARM Mining activities  affect wildlife and reduce farming 
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
DEV Natural Resources lead to development 
INEQUALITY Natural Resource reduce  inequality in incomes 
STAND Natural Resources improve standards of living 
Ex
pe
ct
at
io
n 
GOVERNMENT 
EXPECT 
 
I expect the Government to do more regarding the  development and welfare  
of  Sierra Leoneans 
FIRM EXPECT I expect the mining companies to do more regarding the development and welfare 
 of  Sierra Leoneans 
 
 
3.1.5 MODEL ESTIMATION 
 
The structural equation model specified in Section 5.1.2 and shown in Figure 5.0  was estimated using  
the Partial Least Squares (PLS) path-modelling algorithm;  hence it is a partial least squares path model. 
PLS is an iterative algorithm that simultaneously solves the blocks of the measurement model and 
estimates the path coefficients in the structural model (Henseler, 2010). PLS understands the latent 
variables of the structural model as weighted sums of their respective indicators and predicts values for 
the latent variables using multiple regressions (Chin, 1998b; Chin and Newsted, 1999; Fornell and 
Bookstein, 1982; Fornell and Cha, 1994). Unlike covariance-based structural equation modelling 
(CBSEM), PLS has less restrictive distributional assumptions and does not require the data to be normally 
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distributed   (Fornell and Bookstein, 1982; Bagozzi and Yi, 1994; Fornell and Cha, 1994).   The 
SMARTPLS Version 2.0 software was employed for estimating the model as it can estimate both the 
measurement model and the structural model simultaneously (Ringle, et al, 2005).   The item scales are 
comparable, so the model estimation was performed using the original data, as in Chatelin, et al. (2002). 
 
As a first step to the estimation of the model, the possibility of common method bias (CMB) was tested. 
Common method bias arises when the covariance caused by the measurement approach rather than the 
measured trait causes measured relationships between two constructs to either inflate or attenuate 
compared to the true value (Williams & Brown, 1994; Burton-Jones, 2009). This is possible in cases 
where the variables are collected using the same survey instrument, in this case, a questionnaire.   
 
The most commonly used statistical method for examining the extent to which common method variance 
is present in the data is Harman's single factor test (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). In this technique, 
exploratory factor analysis is applied to evaluate the amount of variance in observed variables that can 
be explained by a single factor.  If either a single strong factor emerges or the first factor loads 
significantly on all items, common method variance is most likely present in the data (Podsakoff and 
Organ, 1986).   Kemery and Dunlap (1986), however, pointed out that Harman’s single factor test has 
some limitations as there are no clear guidelines available as to when this technique indicates a 
problematic amount of method variance, and that it does nothing to actually control the method variance. 
This led to the Marker Variable Approach (Lindell and Whitney, 2001; Malhotra, Kim and Patil, 2006; 
Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee and Podsakoff, 2003; Chin, et al. 2012).  This technique, which is similar to 
Harman’s single factor test, includes an a priori defined marker variable that should be theoretically 
unrelated to the study’s variables and then calculates the correlation between this variable and the study 
variables. The correlation is assumed to solely result from method variance and can be partialed out from 
other correlations in the study.  
  
Most marker variable approaches,   for example the Measured Latent Variable Marker (MLVM) proposed 
by Chin, et al. (2012), can only be used before data collection. Since, for this study, the data had already 
been collected, the Confirmatory Factor Analysis Marker (CFA) by Williams, Hartman and Cavazotte 
(2010) was used to test for common method bias. The CFA marker differs from the previously described 
techniques by using a directly measured method factor rather than building a proxy based on the 
substantive items in the model.  As in the previously mentioned methods, the indicators of the method 
factor are theoretically unrelated to any of the constructs of interest and preferably not correlated, except 
for the correlation caused by sharing the same method. (Richardson et al., 2009). Thus, the common 
method variance is controlled for in the inner model rather than partialing it out during the outer 
estimation. Conceptually, this means that the calculated values from the outer estimation for the latent 
constructs are a result of the true relationships between the constructs (Williams, et al., 2010).  Somewhat 
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similar approaches, although only for diagnostic purposes, have been previously adopted in recent PLS 
papers; for example, Shutao Dong, et al. (2009) and Pavlou, et al. (2007).   
Once the absence of common method variance had been confirmed, the PLS algorithm was applied. The 
model was not re-specified at any stage. Anderson and Gerbing (1988) argued that re-specifications 
should be based on theory and content considerations in order to avoid exploiting sampling error to 
achieve satisfactory goodness of fit. Brannick (1995) argued that re-specifications should not be done at 
all.  In the current research, the model estimated is based on the theoretical framework presented in section 
5.1.1. Therefore, all indicators, both significant and insignificant, in the measurement model are kept 
because they are conceptually justified (Jarvis, et al., 2003).   
 
Separate models are estimated for each community (sub-sample) and then a ‘Total Sample’ model is 
estimated for the total sample. The PLS algorithm not only calculates path coefficients, but also enables 
quality pointers for both the structural and measurement model to be reported. Separate models were 
estimated for each community and the control sample was selected from the capital city, to account for 
location differences and the contributions of the individual companies’ extractive activities to growth in 
Sierra Leone.  Each of these companies has signed different mining agreements with the Government of 
Sierra Leone and each has unique business structures.  
 
To test whether the path coefficients differ significantly from zero, that is, statistically significant, t-
values were calculated using bootstrapping procedure. Contrary to the default setting of 100 cases and 
100 samples in SMARTPLS, this piece of research, according to Chin’s (1998) recommendations, carried 
out the bootstrapping procedure to evaluate the statistical significance of each path coefficient and get 
more stable results.   The predictive relevance of the model was tested by Blindfolding. Omission 
Distance of 7 was used. Cross-validated communality and cross-validated redundancy measures were 
analysed to evaluate how well the model predicted the effect of the endogenous variables on the key 
dependent variable, development. The already stated hypotheses were tested and the results are presented 
in the next section.  
 
5.2 THE EMPIRICAL   RESULTS 
 
The primary concern has been to define a structural equation model connecting the activities of the 
Government, the firm and the household, including consumer expectations, to development in Sierra 
Leone. The responses gathered from the questionnaires gave measures of the indicators for the firm, the 
Government and household.  Perceptions of the contribution of mining activities to income inequality, 
standard of living and economic development were used as indicators for development. 
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To help with common method bias, the respondents were assured of the anonymity and confidentiality 
of the study and that they should answer as honestly as possible. Chang, van Witteloostuijn and Eden 
(2010) pointed out that measuring the dependent variable in different ways helps avoid potential CMB 
with independent variables that were operationalized as perception- based measures. The dependent 
variable in this study was measured in three different ways. The empirical Williams, et al. (2010) CFA 
Marker test for common method bias was used to test for common method bias. The marker variable was 
indicated by demographic factors: gender, marital status and migration status. These indicators are 
theoretically unrelated to any of the constructs of interest and, therefore, any potential correlation would 
be caused by sharing the same data collection method. The results for all the models failed to show any 
presence of common method bias.  
 
The PLS model was analysed and interpreted in two stages.  The measurement model was first evaluated 
through an assessment of the validity and reliability of the construct measures in the model. This 
guaranteed that only reliable and valid construct measures were used (Hulland, 1999). In the second stage, 
the structural model was evaluated by analysing the path coefficients between the constructs.  Path 
coefficients are indicators of the model’s predictive ability. Thus, accordingly, the results of the 
measurement model are discussed followed by those of the structural model. The main results concerning 
the path model showing path coefficients and their significance levels for each sub-sample are represented 
in Table 3.7 and Table 3.8. 
 
 -The Outer Measurement Model 
In PLS, individual initial factor reliability is assessed by examining the loadings of respective factors on 
their respective latent constructs. The higher loadings imply that there is more shared variance between 
the construct and its indicators than error variance (Hulland, 1999).   Studies such as Bentler and Chou 
(1987) and Hulland (1999) recommended that standardised indicator loadings be greater than or equal to 
0.70.  In this study, all constructs were maintained regardless of loadings as the aim was to avoid re-
specifications that were not based on theory and content considerations (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988).  
The estimated reflective loadings and their accompanying significance levels for the sub-samples 
estimated are reported in Table 3.3.   The loadings for the ‘Total Sample’ model are shown in Table 3.4. 
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-Factor Loadings 
Table 3.3:  Sub-Sample Models’ Factor loadings 
 EDU CONFLICT CORRUPT CSR DEV E & POLL EXPART EXPECT GEXP 
A
fr
ic
an
  
M
in
er
al
s  
Lt
d 
0.7282*  0.8108*   0.9711* 
 
1.1911* 0.7396* 
 
0.8412*  1.3121* 
 
0.7168*     0.5571*   
Lo
nd
on
  
M
in
in
g 
Lt
d 
0.9546* 
 
0.8814* 
 
0.9717* 0.9363* 
  
0.9127* 
 
0.8913* 
 
0.9072* 
 
0.8580* 
 
0.9730* 
Si
er
ra
  
M
in
er
al
s  
H
ol
di
n g
 0.9151* 
 
0.9407* 
 
0.9383* 
 
0.9392*  
 
0.8680* 
 
0.9527* 
 
0.9444* 
 
0.9284* 
 
0.8520* 
 
Si
er
ra
  
R
ut
ile
 L
td
 
0.9323* 
 
0.9120* 
 
0.9830* 
 
0.9152* 
 
0.8718* 
 
0.8665* 
 
0.9189* 
 
0.9444* 
 
0.9804* 
 
C
on
tro
l G
ro
up
 0.9486* 
 
0.9684* 
 
0.9425* 
 
0.9447* 
 
0.9690** 
 
0.9016* 
 
0.8597* 
 
0.9466* 
 
0.8849* 
 
 
 STAND UNEMP POSTY S/L EMP S/L LEARN PREY W&FARM  
A
fr
ic
an
 
 M
in
er
al
s  
Lt
d 
1.1533* 
 
 0.7137* 
  
0.7531* 
 
0.9567* 
 
 
   0.6584* 
 
       0.8406* 
 
0.8325*  
Lo
nd
on
 
 M
in
in
g 
 L
td
 0.9507* 
 
0.5158* 
 
0.5719* 
 
0.9185* 
 
0.8522* 
 
0.7387* 
 
0.8549* 
 
Si
er
ra
  
M
in
er
al
  H
ol
di
n g
s 0.9099* 
 
0.9031* 
 
0.6979* 
 
0.9775* 
 
0.8014* 
 
  0.8442* 
 
0.9564* 
 
Si
er
ra
 R
ut
ile
  
Lt
d 
0.8274* 
 
0.7014* 
 
0.7396* 
 
0.9046* 
 
0.9467* 
 
0.6803* 
 
0.7669* 
 
C
on
tro
l G
ro
up
 
0.8064* 
 
0.8665* 
 
0.6299* 
 
0.9751* 
 
0.9368* 
 
0.9513* 
 
0.9517* 
 
*: Significant at 1% level 
**: Not statistically significant 
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For the African Minerals Ltd model, S/L Learn had a factor loading of 0.6584 that was significant at the 
1% level. All the other factors loadings are greater than the recommended 0.7 and are all statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  For the London Mining model, even though unemployment (UNEMP) and 
post mining income (POSTY) had statistically significant loadings they only exhibited factor loadings of 
0.5158 and 0.5719 respectively.  All the factors for the Sierra Mineral Holdings model had factor loadings 
greater than 0.70 and were all statistically significant.  Apart from pre-mining income (PREY) with a 
loading of 0.6803, all the other factors loadings for the Sierra Rutile model were statistically significant 
and greater than 0.70.  The factor loadings from the Control Group model revealed that only POSTY had 
a factor loading lower than 0.70.  
 
Table 3.4:  Total Sample Model Factor loadings 
 EDU CONFLICT CORRUPT CSR DEV E & POLL EXPART EXPECT GAGRIC GSAL GEXT 
To
ta
l S
am
pl
e 
0.8800* 0.8975* 0.4621* 0.8554* 0.5530* 0.7411* 0.8814* 1.0000* 0.9770* 0.9669* 0.9592* 
           
STAND UNEMP POSTY S/L EMP S/L LEARN PREY W&FARM GHEW GINS GSELF GNAT 
0.9637* 0.5542* 0.7900* 0.9124* 0.7264* 0.8181* 0.8132* 0.9614* 0.9451* 0.7373* 0.9761* 
           
 
From Table 3.4, all the indicators of the Total Sample model loaded significantly their various constructs. 
These factor loadings indicate that the indicators selected by this study play significant roles in defining 
each construct, making each indicator representative of the corresponding construct it is intended to 
measure. This evidence of factorial validity is equivalent to confirmatory factor analysis as in Gefen and 
Straub (2005). 
 
 -Reliability Assessment 
Internal Consistency: The analysis continued by assessing the Internal Consistency of the models 
estimated. The traditional criterion for Internal Consistency is Cronbach’s α (Cronbach, 1951), which 
provides an estimate for the reliability based on the indicator inter correlations (Bagozzi and Yi, 1988). 
George and Mallery (2003) provided that Cronbach’s α that is less than 0.6 is ‘questionable’, greater than 
0.7 is ‘acceptable’, greater than 0.8 is ‘good’ and greater than 0.9 is ‘excellent’.  From Table 3.5, it is 
clear that all the indicators for the various models estimated had ‘acceptable’ to ‘excellent’ Cronbach’s α 
; except for the London Mining model where the indicators on Expectations have a Cronbach’s α of 
0.6842; the Sierra Rutile model where development indicators have a Cronbach’s α of 0.5069; and the 
indicators of development in the Total Sample model which have a Cronbach’s α of 0.6172.  It is 
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noticeable  that one of the Cronbach’s α reported, Sierra Rutile model development indicators, exhibits  
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.5069; the Cronbach’s α criterion alone is insufficient in concluding the reliability 
of each indicator.  
 
Although the Cronbach’s α is the most common measure of reliability, it has limitations. For example, 
the Cronbach’s α  wrongly assumes that all items contribute equally to reliability (Bollen, 1989). 
Therefore, in this study t, in addition to Cronbach’s α (1951), the reliability of each indicator was assessed 
through Fornell and Larcker’s (1981) measure of composite reliability. This measure is preferred over 
Cronbach’s α because it offers a better estimate of the variance shared by the respective indicators (Hair, 
et al., 2006). The results indicate that the composite factor reliability coefficients of the constructs ranged 
from 0.7256 to 0.9815 (see Table Seventeen), which meets the standard of 0.70 suggested by Fornell and 
Larcker (1981).  Nunnally and Bernstein (1994) pointed out that, despite the choice of reliability 
coefficient, an internal consistency reliability value above 0.7 in early stages of research and values above 
0.8 or 0.9 in more advanced stages of research are regarded as satisfactory, whereas a value below 0.6 
indicates a lack of reliability. The reliability of the indicators of this study is therefore confirmed. 
 
-Validity 
Once the reliability of the various indicators had been assessed, the research proceeded by evaluating the 
validity of the constructs.  Both the convergent and discriminant validity were considered.   Convergent 
validity refers to the degree of agreement in a set of indicators that represent the same underlying 
construct, which can be demonstrated through their uni-dimensionality, (Camines and Zeller, 1979). 
Fornell and Larcker (1981) suggested using the average variance extracted (AVE) as a criterion of 
convergent validity.  An AVE value of at least 0.5 indicates sufficient convergent validity, meaning that, 
on average, a latent variable is able to explain more than half of the variance of its indicators (Fornell and 
Larcker 1981; Bagozzi and Yi, 1988; Goetz, Liehr-Gobbers and Krafft, 2009). The AVE of all the 
constructs reported in Table 3.5 are greater than 0.5, hence convergent validity is confirmed. 
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Table 3.5 : Reliability Assessment 
 
Sample Variables Cronbach’s α Composite Reliability  AVE R2 
African 
Minerals Ltd 
AML 0.942481 0.956192 0.813773 0.941725 
AML Community 0.792524 0.856713 0.510163 0.931061 
Development 0.795868 0.907382 0.830467 0.927698 
Expectations 0.9136 0.9586 0.9205  0.0000 
Government 0.942343 0.971978 0.945484 0.527129 
London Mining Development 0.795868 0.907382 0.830467 0.927698 
Expectations 0.68420 0.8634 0.7596  0.0000 
Government 0.942343 0.971978 0.945484 0.459229 
LM Community 0.854307 0.894075 0.595191 0.931061 
LM 0.942481 0.956192 0.813773 0.941725 
Sierra Rutile
Limited 
Development 0.5069 0.7696 0.705220 0.896441 
Expectations 0.8200 0.8848 0.6945  0.0000 
Government 0.962516 0.981580 0.963827 0.039000 
Sierra Rutile
Community 
0.884720 0.913383 0.640835 0.897196 
Sierra Rutile 0.926853 0.945560 0.777323 0.756489 
Sierra Minerals
Holding Ltd 
Development 0.7190 0.7256 0.6945 0.891037 
Expectations 0.8662  0.7460 0.7408  0.0000 
Government 0.764321 0.891648 0.804753 0.516375 
SMHL  0.972364 0.978448 0.900829 0.924467 
SMHL Community 0.928049 0.947267 0.784307 0.951035 
Control Group Control 0.958977 0.968471 0.860246 0.926821 
Control Community 0.944184 0.958013 0.794674 0.954983 
Development 0.7546 0.8367  0.930872 0.964590 
Expectations 0.8897 0.9477 0.9006  0.0000 
Government 0.875272 0.941292 0.889096 0.696218 
Total Sample Development 0.6172 0.750367 0.617284 0.841345 
Government 0.955805 0.967111 0.792693  0.4348 
Household 0.871205 0.904774 0.618005 0.895549 
Firm 0.899009 0.924296 0.710432 0.535311 
Expectation 0.8115  0.9139 0.8414 0.0000 
 
  
Discriminant validity shows the degree to which any construct is different from the other constructs in 
the model (Carmines and Zeller, 1979).  In Fornell and Larcker’s (1981) test for discriminant validity,   
pair-wise correlations between factors obtained were compared with the variance extracted estimates for 
the constructs making up each possible pair. In this thesis, discriminant validity was done by comparing 
the square of the correlations among the latent variables with the AVE of each construct (Chin, 1998; 
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Hajli et al., 2013). The AVE for each construct is greater than its shared variance with any other construct; 
therefore discriminant validity is supported (Chin, 1998; Hulland, 1999; Tenenhaus et al., 2005; 
Majchrzak et al., 2005; Gregoire and Fisher 2006).   
 
General Model Evaluation:  
 
The PLS model was then evaluated through observation of the R-squared calculation for dependent latent 
variables (Chin, 1998; Cohen, 1988).R2 measures a dependent construct’s percent variation that is 
explained by the model (Wixom and Watson, 2001).The R2 for each dependent construct in the model is 
shown in Table 3.5 . This shows how well the model explains the hypothesized relationships.  The R2 
ranged from 42% to 96% for all the dependent constructs except that of the Government construct in the 
Sierra Rutile model, wherein it was only 3%. This is interpreted as ‘the residents of the Rutile community 
do not have much knowledge of government activities related to natural resource extraction in Sierra 
Leone’.  
 
There are conflicting views on evaluating the structural model using Goodness-of-Fit.  Studies such as 
that conducted by Tenenhaus, et al. (2005) evaluated the PLS structural model by Goodness-of-Fit (GoF). 
However, in a very recent study by Henseler and Sarstedt (2013), simulation shows that the GoF and the 
relative Goodness-of-Fit index (GoFrel) are not suitable for model validation. Therefore in this study, the 
communality and redundancy for the indicators that show Goodness-of-Fit are not reported.  
 
 -The Inner Structural Model 
The quality of the outer model has been evaluated and the results presented.  This study now presents the 
analysis of the inner structural model. In the PLS method, the structural model and hypothesis were tested 
by computing path coefficients.  Contrary to Covariance Based Structural Equation Modelling, PLS path 
modelling does not report fit indices like Tucker-Lewis Fit Indices (TFI), Root Mean Square Error 
Approximation (RMSEA) or Comparative Fit Indices (CFI). This is because PLS does not make any 
distributional assumptions for parameter estimation and, as such, does not require the data to be normally 
distributed. In evaluating the inner model, cross -validated redundancy and cross- validated communality 
indices were assessed.  
 
The cross-validated redundancy index represented by the Stone-Geiser Q2-statistic measures the quality 
of the structural model for each endogenous block, taking into account the measurement model.  
Redundancy is the “capacity of the model to predict its manifest variables from the indirectly connected 
latent variables” (Chantelin, Vinzi and Tenenhaus, 2002).  A Stone-Geiser Q2-statistic less than zero 
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means that the model lacks predictive relevance (Stone, 1974; Geiser, 1975; Fornell and Cha, 1994; 
Tenenhaus, et al., 2005).  
 
The cross-validated communality index measures the quality of the measurement model for each block. 
The index represented by the q2 statistic measures the predictive relevance of the model by reproducing 
the observed values by the model itself.  A q2 statistic greater than zero means the model has predictive 
relevance, (Fornell and Cha, 1994).  It is evident from the results presented in Table 3.6 that all the Q2 
and q2 values are greater than zero, providing proof of the model estimated having achieved predictive 
relevance. 
Table 3.6: Predictive Relevance of the PLS Model 
Sample Construct Cross Validated
Communality(q2) 
Cross Validated 
Redundancy(Q2) 
A
fr
ic
an
  
M
in
er
al
s  
 L
td
 Firm 0.7923 0.6899 
Household 0.5425 0.5345 
Government 0.8087 0.7137 
Expectations 0.9919 0.4334 
Lo
nd
on
  
M
in
in
g 
  L
td
 
Firm 0.7663 0.6830 
Household 0.5602 0.5035 
Government 0.8094 0.7928 
Expectations 0.7550 0.7113 
Si
er
ra
  
R
ut
ile
   
Lt
d 
Firm 0.7608 0.4802 
Household 0.6252 0.5259 
Government 0.8331 0.4260 
Expectations 0.5159 0.5411 
Si
er
ra
  
M
in
er
al
s 
 H
ol
di
ng
s 
Firm 0.8684 0.7533 
Household 0.7387 0.7541 
Government 0.5401 0.4131 
Expectations 0.7827 0.6139 
C
on
tro
l G
ro
up
 Firm 0.7844 0.7739 
Household 0.7481 0.7643 
Government 0.6702 0.7463 
Expectations 0.9006 0.895 
To
ta
l S
am
pl
e 
Firm 0.7100 0.5338 
Household 0.6180 0.5591 
Government 0.7924 0.5393 
Expectations 0.8448 0.845 
 
The analysis has proven that the quality of the outer measurement model and inner structural model of 
the PLS model presented in Figure 5.2   passed quantitative scrutiny and its prediction of the relationships 
among the latent variables are valid. This study now evaluates the path coefficients, similar to regression 
coefficients.  The   hypothesized path coefficients, along with their bootstrap values, T-statistics and P-
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values, are reported in Table 3.7 (mining company communities sub-sample) and Table 3.8 (Control 
Group and Total Sample). 
 
Table 3.7:  Path Coefficients of PLS Model (Sub-samples) 
 
Sample Variables Coefficient Standard Deviation T-statics P-value 
A
fr
ic
an
 M
in
er
al
s L
td
 
Expectations -> Government 0.677664 0.013347 54.522 0.0000 
Expectations -> Firm 0.424569 0.008294 67.4454 0.0000 
Expectations -> Household 0.446269 0.052294 10.9033 0.0000 
Government-> Firm 0.610831 0.008985 56.0708 0.0000 
Government-> Household -0.318716 0.043974 -3.9411 0.0001 
Government-> Development -0.859424 0.026923 -32.1031 0.0000 
Firm-> Household 0.841339 0.085159 6.4561 0.0000 
Firm-> Development -0.222766 0.052123 -4.7623 0.0000 
Household-> Development 0.391119 0.033276 12.3919 0.0000 
Lo
nd
on
 M
in
in
g 
Expectations -> Government 0.9160 0.0047 193.7098 0.0000 
Expectations -> Firm 0.7688 0.0250 30.7698 0.0000 
Expectations -> Household 0.3613 0.0335 10.7728 0.0000 
Government-> Firm 0.2101 0.0263 7.9766 0.0000 
Government-> Household -0.6455 0.0294 -21.9893 0.0000 
Government-> Development 0.8602 0.0267 32.1701 0.0000 
Firm-> Household 1.1639 0.0390 29.8645 0.0000 
Firm-> Development -0.2527 0.0511 -4.9432 0.0000 
Household-> Development 0.4204 0.0327 12.8508 0.0000 
Si
er
ra
 R
ut
ile
 L
im
ite
d 
Expectations -> Government 0.1975 0.0336 5.8693 0.0000 
Expectations -> Firm -0.3488 0.0163 -21.3336 0.0000 
Expectations -> Household 0.0675 0.0148 4.5743 0.0000 
Government-> Firm 0.8686 0.0163 53.3894 0.0000 
Government-> Household -0.0645 0.0402 -1.6044 0.1089 
Government-> Development 0.0820 0.0350 2.3452 0.0192 
Firm-> Household 1.0092 0.0325 31.0719 0.0000 
Firm-> Development 0.6368 0.0946 6.7326 0.0000 
Household-> Development 0.2533 0.0848 2.9864 0.0029 
Si
er
ra
 M
in
er
al
s H
ol
di
ng
 L
td
 
Expectations -> Government 0.7773 0.0237 28.8661 0.0000 
Expectations -> Firm 0.2526 0.0293 24.8491 0.0000 
Expectations -> Household 0.1699 0.0272 14.7592 0.0000 
Government-> Firm 0.0871 0.0364 7.8211 0.0000 
Government-> Household 0.0937 0.0207 12.1365 0.0000 
Government-> Development -4.3771 0.0309 -9.6969 0.0000 
Firm-> Household 0.4811 0.0432 9.1354 0.0000 
Firm-> Development 35.3579 0.0460 16.1010 0.0000 
Household-> Development 17.2062 0.0486 9.0431 0.0000 
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Table 3.8: Path Coefficients of PLS Model (Control Group and Total Sample) 
 
Sample Variables Coefficient Standard Deviation T-statics P-value 
C
on
tro
l G
ro
up
 
Expectations -> Government 0.9186  0.0061 150.8182 0.0000 
Expectations -> Firm 0.0881 0.0253 3.4801 0.0005 
Expectations -> Household 0.4387 0.0214 20.4541 0.0000 
Government-> Firm 0.8767 0.0244 35.8623 0.0000 
Government-> Household 0.2855 0.0238 11.9991 0.0000 
Government-> Development -0.1815 0.0311 -5.8449 0.0000 
Firm-> Household 0.2891 0.0195 14.7898 0.0000 
Firm-> Development -0.4388 0.0287 -15.3049 0.0000 
Household-> Development -0.7342 0.0371 -19.8020 0.0000 
To
ta
l S
am
pl
e 
Expectations -> Government 0.6594  0.0272 24.2187 0.0000 
Expectations -> Firm 0.7020 0.0253 27.7279 0.0000 
Expectations -> Household 0.2403 0.0341 7.0403 0.0000 
Government-> Firm 0.2721 0.0297 9.1550 0.0000 
Government-> Household 0.6710 0.0173 38.7520 0.0000 
Government-> Development -0.5266 0.0522 -10.0795 0.0000 
Firm-> Household 0.1225  0.0322 3.8016 0.0002 
Firm-> Development 0.0591 0.0325 1.8162 0.0696 
Household-> Development 0.3604 0.0593 6.0825 0.0000 
        
                  
                  
Hypothesis One:  Government’s activities, including debt servicing, lead to development in Sierra 
Leone: -   First, considering the results of the African Mineral model, government activities have a 
significant negative impact on development in Sierra Leone. It will be recalled that servicing external 
debt is one of the government activities estimated in this model. Hence, this significant negative impact 
of government activities provides some confirmation for the debt overhang –resource curse hypothesis.  
It is also worth noting that, even though government activities have a significant negative impact on 
households, there is evidence of a positive impact on the firm.  Similar results were revealed by the 
London Mining model. However, contrary to the African Mineral model, government exhibited a positive 
impact on development. This is also true for the Rutile model. The positive impact of government on 
development and the firm in the Rutile model is, however, not as statistically significant as in the London 
Mining model.  The degree of change brought about as a result of government activities is much less. 
The results in Table 3.7 show that the London Mining community has the highest level of the perception 
or experience of the Government’s development enhancing activities.  
 
The path coefficients of the Government’s impact on development, household and firm for the Sierra 
Mineral Holdings, Control models and Total Sample models, revealed similar directional relationships. 
It is shown that, in absolute terms, the negative impact of the Government on development is greater at 
125 
 
the Sierra Mineral Holdings level (4.3771), which is greater than in the African Minerals model 
(0.859424) which is, in turn, greater than in the Control Group (0.1815). This shows that the negative 
impact of the Government on development is felt more by individuals living and working in mining areas 
than outside these areas. This research is of the opinion that this is because these individuals experience 
the daily effects of mining directly in all aspects of their lives and therefore have greater expectations of 
the Government.  The Total Sample model confirmed a significant negative impact of the Government 
on development in Sierra Leone. It should be recalled that, in the models estimated in this study, 
corruption, self-enrichment and government spending on infrastructure, external debt and welfare are the 
indicators of government activities. Therefore, based on the opinion of the Sierra Leoneans sampled, at 
the national level, the Government’s activities do not lead to development. The Quality of Institutions 
Theory, Debt Overhang Theory and Rentier State Theory explain why Sierra Leone’s resource related 
less than expected development.  Hypothesis One  is accordingly rejected at the national level. 
 
Hypothesis Two. Mining firms positively contribute to development in Sierra Leone:   The estimated 
path coefficients reveal a significant negative impact of African Minerals Ltd and London Mining on 
development and a positive impact of Sierra Rutile Ltd and Sierra Mineral Holdings.  Despite these mixed 
effects, the Total Sample model confirmed a positive but statistically insignificant effect of firms on 
development at the 5% level. Comparison of firm contribution to development at community level to 
national level reveals that the impact at national level is merely 0.0591. The positive perceptions of the 
firms’ contribution at community level is mostly expressed by individuals employed by or doing business 
with these companies or having families employed by these companies who have benefited directly from 
their’ activities. This leads this study to conclude that the closer one is to the activities of the mining 
companies’ ‘inner circle’, the greater the benefit. This is supported by the minimal but positive impact at 
household level reported for all the models. These findings also provide support for the Human Capital 
Theory, Technology Transfer Theory, and ‘Dutch Disease’ Theory of the resource curse in Sierra Leone. 
 
Hypothesis Three. Households’ productive activities of result in development in Sierra Leone. :The 
households in all the mining communities contributed positively, but in varying degrees, to development 
in Sierra Leone. For the Control Group model, where the households were outside the mining 
communities the impact was found to be significantly negative. This further confirms the ‘inner circle’ 
explanation from Hypothesis Three. On the whole, from the Total Sample model it shows that households 
contribute positively to development in Sierra Leone, pointing to the importance of  Human Capital 
Theory, Conflict Theory, Technology Transfer   Theory and Welfare Theory in explaining Sierra Leone’s 
resource related development. The greater the willingness and capability of Sierra Leoneans to learn and 
develop their skills, the greater the positive lead on development.  These results confirm Hypothesis 
Three. 
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Hypothesis Four. Expectations of Sierra Leoneans affect how the Government, mining firms and 
households contribute to development:  For all the models, expectations formed about the household and 
the Government are expected to influence their activities in such a way that the final result is a positive 
impact on development.  Expectations formed about the firm are also expected to result in significant 
positive development effects, except for the case of Sierra Rutile Limited where the expectations are 
shown to be negative. Among the four companies under review, Sierra Rutile Ltd has been operational 
in Sierra Leone the longest. Therefore, individuals of the Rutile community have greater expectations of 
the company compared to expectations of the indigenes in the other mining areas about the companies 
operating in their communities. However, given their experiences over the years, the people of Rutile 
have rather lost faith in the company, hence their negative expectations. The results of the Total Sample 
model thus provide support for the Rational Expectations Theory’.  
  
On the whole, from the model estimated, the activities of the household, firm and the Government explain 
84% of the variation in development in Sierra Leone. Standard of Living and Development perception 
have significant factor loadings on development in Sierra Leone. It is worth noting that, in absolute terms, 
the impact of Government on development outweighs the impact of the household, which in turn 
outweighs the impact of the firm.  This confirms the Government as the central planner whose policy 
decisions are crucial to ensuring that natural resource extraction leads to development in Sierra Leone. 
 
The total view of the sample on the impact of natural resource extraction in Sierra Leone is illustrated in 
Figure 6.0 and Figure 7.0. In Figure 6.0 , the respondents for the statement: ‘Natural Resources Improve 
Standards of Living’ had to choose from ‘Prosperous’, ‘Good’, ‘Average’, ‘Poor’ and ‘Very Poor’. The 
result of their responses for the statement: ‘Natural Resources lead to development’ is shown in Figure 
6.0. From Figure 6.0, it is clear that, for all the respondents living in the mining communities, most 
perceive their standard of living to be very poor.  Most of the respondents in the Control Group, however, 
perceived themselves to have a good standard of living. This disparity is not only due to the vast gap 
between the life style  and income of indigenes  and corporate employees of mining firms, but also  a 
result of how ‘growth’ has mainly been limited to the capital city. Notwithstanding, the view that, in the 
case of Sierra Leone, resources do not lead to development is widely supported (see Figure 7.0).  
 
Compared to the results of the SVAR estimation carried out in Chapter Four, the results of this chapter 
also confirmed the debt overhang- resource curse hypothesis for Sierra Leone. From Table 3.2, 
government activity is measured by government expenditure on debt servicing, infrastructure, health, 
education, water supply, salaries and corruption. The significant negative impact of the Government on 
development in Sierra Leone therefore accounts for debt overhang, inadequate expenditure on and poor 
management of infrastructure, poor social amenities and poor quality of institutions. 
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Figure 6.0:     Comparison of Standard of Living Perceptions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.0 :  Comparison of Resource-led Development Perception 
 
 
Hypothesis Five. There is empirical and documentary evidence of natural resources- led economic 
development in Sierra Leone.  This hypothesis will be tested in three stages in the next section of this 
thesis.  Mining agreements, company reports and newspaper articles will be compared with the 
quantitative results already presented in this section. 
 
In conclusion, the results from the estimation of the structural equation model illustrate that at the national 
level, government activities lead to a significant negative impact on development in Sierra Leone. This 
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confirms the debt overhang- resource curse hypothesis for Sierra Leone. It also revealed, however, that 
government activities have positive significant effects on mining firms and households.  When the 
analysis was done at company community level, the effect of government activities on development was 
shown to vary across the communities where the four companies operate and outside these communities 
in the capital city. There were significant negative bearings on development of government activities in 
the African Minerals Ltd community, the Sierra Mineral Holdings community, the Sierra Rutile 
community and the capital city.  On the other hand, the effect was significantly positive in the London 
Mining Ltd community. 
The differing effects of the various mining companies on development and households’ welfare reveal 
that the closer one is to the activities of the mining companies’ ‘inner circle’, the greater the benefit from 
the companies’ extractive activities.  The people with the highest likelihood to gain from the companies' 
activities are those who are employed by or doing business with these companies, or have families 
employed by these companies.  The Quality of Institutions and Conflict Theory, Human capital Theory, 
and the Rentier State Theory complement the Debt Overhang Theory in explaining the lagging growth 
experienced by Sierra Leone.  
 
5.4 ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTS 
The data description section 5.1.4 of this chapter showed that, for the purposes of this study, the four 
mining communities that constitute most of the sample size were the operational locations of African 
Minerals Ltd (AML), Sierra Rutile Ltd (SRL), London Mining Limited (LML) and Sierra Mineral 
Holdings Ltd (SMHL). In this analysis of documents, firstly the agreements each of these companies 
signed with the Government of Sierra Leone will be analysed, followed by an examination of the 
company reports  and, finally, media reports related to the activities of the four companies. 
 
5.4 .1   ANALYSIS OF MINING AGREEMENTS 
 -Background of the Companies: 
Sierra Rutile Ltd (SRL): The Company’s exploration activities and development started in 1962 through 
a company called Sherbro Minerals.  In 1971, Nord Resources and Armco Steel acquired the assets of 
Sherbro Minerals and founded Sierra Rutile Ltd (SRL).  The SRL mine is located on the world’s highest 
grade rutile deposit, covering an area of 580 square kilometres in the southwest of Sierra Leone. The bulk 
of the deposits occur in the Imperi Hills, Gbangbama Hills and the Sembehun and Kasila Rocks areas. 
The company became the largest producer of rutile in the world in 1993, but in  1995 operations were 
interrupted by the civil war in Sierra Leone. The conflict officially ended in 2000 and the company’s 
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assets were acquired by Titanium Fields Resources Ltd in 2001.   Titanium Resources Group (TRG) 
acquired the assets from Titanium Fields Resources Ltd   in 2005 and shipments of rutile re-commenced 
in 2006.  In July 2008, TRG sold its Sierra Leonean bauxite subsidiary, Global Aluminium, to Vimetco 
N.V and TRG changed its name to Sierra Rutile Ltd in 2011. Currently, the company has an initial JORC-
compliant resource of over 600 million tonnes and operates a self-sufficient mining site that includes its 
own port, power station,   water supply system and local airport.  
London Mining Ltd (LML): London Mining was founded in 2005 but acquired its license to start iron 
ore exploration in Sierra Leone in 2006.  The company started production at its Marampa mine, based in 
the town of Lunsar, Port Loko District, in Sierra Leone in December 2011. It has other mine operations 
in Wadi Sawawin, Saudi Arabia, Isua and Greenland and investments in Columbia.  Nevertheless, this 
study, only considers its operations in Sierra Leone.  The Marampa mine was operated by the Sierra 
Leone Development Company and William Baird between 1933 and 1975.  Low iron ore prices forced 
its closure in the 1960s. Failing markets and the civil war prevented redevelopment of the mine until 
London Mining acquired the mining licence in 2006.  The mine has a resource of over 1 billion tonnes of 
iron ore. 
Sierra Mineral Holdings Ltd (SMHL): Bauxite mining in Sierra Leone was started in the 1960s by 
Sieromco, a subsidiary of Alusuisse. However, operations were halted in January, 1995 due to civil unrest 
in the country. On the return of peace in 2001, TRG acquired the assets of Sieromco and was granted an 
exploration license and mining operations formally commenced in November 2005.  Vimetco Group 
bought the company from TRG in July 2008.  The company has its main deposits at Gbonge, Gondama, 
Jenega, Konta and Wunde with port facilities at Nitti. The Sierra Mineral Holdings Ltd mine is currently 
the only bauxite mine in Sierra Leone and has a resource base of approximately 31 million tonnes of 
bauxite. 
African Minerals Ltd (AML): African Minerals Ltd has been active in Sierra Leone since 1996 following 
the discovery of the Tonkolili iron ore deposit.  The Tonkolili deposit is located in the Sula Mountain 
range and comprises of four deposits: Simbili, Marampon, Numbara and Kasafoni. The company 
maintained its corporate office in Freetown from mid-1997 through 2002 during the civil war.  The mine 
is fully operational and is being developed in phases. The operational infrastructure includes integrated 
mine, port and rail facilities. 
This study now proceeds by giving a summary analysis of the most recent mining agreements these four 
companies have signed with the Government of Sierra Leone. The analysis will cover issues relating to 
ownership and company registration, initial terms of the agreements, leases and licenses, financial 
agreements, non-tax revenue, employment and immigration, corporate social responsibility, reporting 
and dispute resolution. Botswana is one of the leading examples of resource rich economies that have 
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escaped the ‘resource curse’.  A few comparisons would be made with Botswana mining legislation to 
highlight potential changes that would be advantageous to the Sierra Leonean economy. 
 
- Ownership and Company Registration: 
African Minerals Ltd is wholly owned by African Minerals Ltd and is incorporated in Bermuda. Sierra 
Rutile Ltd is 100% self- owned and incorporated under the laws of the British Virgin Islands. The 
Government of Sierra Leone had a 47% equity stake in the company but repealed ownership in May 2012 
through a cash settlement of historical Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE) taxes with approximately $10,000,000 
to be paid according to the ‘Additional Royalty’ payment plan.  The Government, however, has the right 
to nominate two directors to the Board of Sierra Rutile Ltd. London Mining (SL) is wholly owned by 
London Mining PLC and incorporated in England and Wales. Sierra Mineral Holdings Ltd is owned by 
Vimetco N.V. Aluminium Group.  
It is noticeable that the Government of Sierra Leone currently does not have an equity stake in any of the 
companies. It is common knowledge in corporate finance that the aim of company directors and managers 
is to seek the interest of their shareholders.  This research is of the opinion that if the Government has a 
stake in any large company operating in the resource extraction industry, it is bound to enjoy more 
benefits, financial and otherwise.  Comparing the ownership of companies to that of one of the largest 
mining companies in Botswana, Debswana Mining Company, which produces about 70% of Botswana's 
export earnings, a different structure is observed. In this company, the Botswana Government and  De 
Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd each hold a 50% share and have equal representation on the board of the 
company. This current shareholding is more equal compared to the original shareholding of De Beers of 
85% and the Botswana government of 15% when the company was incorporated in 1969. 
Some of the reviewed mining companies are incorporated in tax havens such as Bermuda and the British 
Virgin Islands. This gives these companies corporate income tax advantages. In addition to the tax deals   
with the Sierra Leonean Government which this study would reveal, these companies stand to benefit 
from the very liberal ownership arrangements. 
  -Initial Terms of the Agreements: 
The mining agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and African Minerals Ltd was signed      
to mine iron ore and associated minerals for twenty-five years with the option of renewing the lease for 
a further fifteen years. The revised 2009 London Mining agreement was signed in 2012 and has the same 
duration and option for renewal as in the AML contract.   The original pre-conflict Sierra Rutile 1989 
agreement   was revised and the new agreement was signed in 2002. The company’s lease covers the 
mining of titanium and  associated  minerals for a period of  thirty-three  years and the lease can be 
extended   for a further fifteen  years on application to the Government.  The Sierra Mineral Holdings 
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Ltd 2005 agreement for the mining of bauxite was updated in 2012 and is initially for a period of twenty 
years and can be renewed in accordance with applicable law. It is made clear in the agreements that if 
other precious minerals are recovered, for example diamonds, they should be delivered to the Ministry 
of Mines and Minerals.  The company that discovers other precious minerals would have first right to 
apply for an exploration license in connection with the precious mineral find. In addition to the mining 
leases, all the companies applied and paid for mining licenses.   According to the ‘Dan Watch Report’2, 
2011, in 2010, mining leases and licenses accounted for 19% ($4.4 million) of government revenue from 
mining. 
One noticeable fact is that the terms for qualification for the renewal of leases are not clearly spelt out in 
the agreements except for the case of SMHL, which has periodic review clauses and renewal is 
conditional on applicable law. In all the other cases, it seems that renewal is guaranteed upon the company 
applying to the Government. This ‘grey’ area does not help in regulating the activities of these companies.  
These agreements have also received opposition by some civil society groups in Sierra Leone, such as 
The National Advocacy Coalition on Extractives (NACE), on the basis that certain aspects contravene 
already existing Government legislature, especially the Mines and Minerals Act and the Income Tax act.  
As the analysis continues, this study provides support for such groups, especially in the financial aspects 
of these agreements.  
 -Company Rights: 
The agreements made clear provision for the mining companies to have the right to terminate, transfer or 
surrender the leases.  AML is allowed to terminate, transfer or surrender its lease upon giving ninety days 
written notice to the Government.  Sierra Rutile Ltd has the right to terminate the agreement after giving 
six months’ notice to the Government. Even though the company is allowed to transfer or surrender its 
lease, the notice period required is not specified in its agreement with the Government. This is also the 
case for Sierra Mineral Holdings Ltd. The right to terminate, transfer or surrender is clearly stated, but 
the notice period is not specified.  London Mining is required to give a year’s termination notice and a 
three month surrender notice to the Government of Sierra Leone.  It is clear that these agreements lack 
uniformity on the notice period required to terminate, transfer or surrender the agreements. The basis on 
which termination, transfers or surrender can be done is also not clearly pointed out.  With regards to the 
Government’s right to revoke a company’s license or lease, it is conditional on the company being in 
arrears for any sums of money due to the Government beyond six months or the company entering 
liquidation or the company being in breach of any terms of the signed agreements3. This study is of the 
                                                            
2 “Not Sharing the Loot”, published in October 2011, by the Danish Development Organisation – DanWatch, in 
association with Sierra Leone’s civil society group – Network Movement for Justice and Development (NMJD). 
3 Section 52 and 53 of the Mines and Minerals Act , 2009  
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opinion that, apart from financial issues, without effective monitoring any other basis on which the 
Government can terminate or suspend the agreements would be difficult to identify should it arise. 
All the companies are indemnified against claims for outside activities related to the mining industry and 
covered by the Mines and Minerals Act.   They also have the right to construct the infrastructure needed 
to carry out mining operations within and without the mining area and relocate locals where necessary. 
They are also given the right to use water from natural sources, divert and return non-poisonous spoils to 
rivers and streams as long as they provide alternative sources of water for the locals.  This research does 
not dispute that these rights are needed to aid the operations, but they seem to lack key regulatory points, 
especially for construction carried out outside the mining area. The agreements do not make any mention 
of provisions for future roads, land rights or town planning.  There are also great differences in the quality 
of infrastructure, water supply and services provided by the companies for their own use and those 
provided for the local communities, further increasing the level of inequality in standards of living 
between locals and corporate employees. 
 -Financials:  
 According to the agreements, accounting records,   tax assessments and all financial amounts are 
expressed in United States dollars.  All the companies are allowed to freely receive and hold funds at any 
financial institution in any country of their choice. They are also exempted from paying commission on 
foreign funds remitted into Sierra Leone.  
 -Royalty Payments:  
Royalty payable by the mining companies to the Government is calculated as a percentage of the 
calculated value of the mineral being sold4 within 45 days after the end of each month’s shipment. AML 
pays royalty at the rate of   3% of the market value of iron ore being exported. SMHL also pays 3% of 
initial assessment of the value of bauxite being sold. This rate of 3% is the rate required by the Mines and 
Minerals Act, 2009.  Sierra Rutile’s rate of royalty in 1989 was 3.5% and this increased to 4% in 2006.  
The agreement also shows that the company should pay additional royalty of $1,667,000 for each of the 
years 2010 to 2014 and $1,665,000 for the year 2015. It should be noted that Sierra Rutile made interest 
free advance royalty payments (Royalty Credit) of $1,000,000 in 1990 and $1,040,000 in 1991 to offset 
any royalties payable by the company until exhausted.  However, as per an agreement with the 
Government in 2003, SRL’s royalty rate was reduced from 3.5 % to 0.5% until 2014, which is contrary 
to Sierra Leone’s mining legislation. London Mining pays royalty at the rate of 3%.  It is  also has a 
‘Performance bond’  of $1million  in  the form of  a letter of credit by a reputable Sierra Leonean  financial 
                                                            
4 In some cases, the price is calculated as ‘Net sales price determined in an Arms-Length Transaction’ 
(SMHL); ‘Market Value of mineral  determined in an Arms-Length Transaction’ (London Mining);  
‘Market Value’ (AML); ‘Gross Sales Price ,free alongside  the Sierra Leone port of shipment’(Sierra 
Rutile). 
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institution  valid for an initial twelve months or longer if, by  April 2012, the company  fails to produce 
100,000 tonnes and fails to re-open the Marampa mine.  A second letter of credit of $1 million, valid till 
2015, is payable if the company fails to produce at least 200,000 tonnes of iron ore from Phase Two of 
its operations. In cases where the final price receivable exceeds the initial price on which royalty 
calculations were made, the difference in royalty would be paid as ‘Additional Royalty’. 
Royalty is tax deductible for all the companies. It is again clear that some of these companies have 
successfully negotiated terms not wholly compliant with the provisions made by the Mining and Minerals 
Act, 2009, which is a bad precedent.   The evaluation of monitoring and reporting mechanisms in relation 
to company imports also highlights the problems faced by the Government in accurately calculating 
royalty payments due.  Royalty payments are expected to be one of the largest sources of mining revenue 
for the Government and these calculation issues are worrisome, giving rise to potential loss of income.  
 -Corporate Income Tax and Fiscal Taxes payable:  
 
AML pays corporation tax at the rate of 25 % per annum. SMHL pays at the rate of 30%.  SMHL’s 
agreement with the Government also states that in the event that applicable law (Income Tax Act) 
increases the corporate income tax rate, the company shall pay 30% or applicable law rate, whichever is 
lower.  This ‘lower tax’ provision is also found in the London Mining agreement. For the first three years, 
the agreement states that London Mining should pay corporation tax of 6%; 25% between years 4 and 10 
and from year 11, and thereafter the company shall pay tax applicable to companies in the Income Tax 
Act, but not exceeding 30%. In the Sierra Rutile agreement, it is agreed that Sierra Rutile shall pay 
corporation tax of 37.5% per annum, but this amount should not be less than 3.5% of the amount of the 
company’s annual turnover. However, as per an   agreement reached with the Government in 2003, the 
company’s payment of corporation tax is withheld until 2014.  Corporate income tax rates that have been 
agreed upon are not in adherence with the applicable tax rate for mining companies in Sierra Leone, 
which is 37.5% subject to additional tax on profits. The clause ‘the company shall pay income tax at the 
rate applicable by law but not exceeding 30%’ is counterproductive, as the corporation income tax by 
applicable law in Sierra Leone clearly exceeds 30%. On the re-commencement of income tax payments 
in 2014, if the changes to the current agreements are not made, from the companies being reviewed, 
Sierra Rutile would be the only mining company paying the corporate income tax rate for mining 
companies stipulated by the laws of Sierra Leone.  According to the ‘Dan Watch’ report in 2010, 
corporate income tax collected in 2010 was just $2.4 million. Minor taxes for AML, as per its contract 
with the Government, should not exceed $25,000 in any financial year or $100,000 over a 5year period.  
Sierra Rutile and London Mining’s minor taxes are not to exceed $100,000 per annum or $250,000 over 
a 5year period.  Minor taxes for SMHL shall not exceed $500,000 over any 5 year period.  
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All the companies pay immigration fees for their expatriate staff.  SRL, LML and SMHL pay payroll 
taxes at the applicable rate. AML, however, pays payroll taxes not more than $100 for ECOWAS staff 
and $3000 for expatriates.  All four companies pay PAYE taxes and make contributions to the national 
social security insurance trust (NASSIT) in respect of Sierra Leonean workers, but not for their expatriate 
staff. Apart from this mandatory contribution, to this study’s knowledge, the companies do not provide 
any retirement benefit plan for their indigenous employees.  In the case of Botswana, in addition to the 
mandatory social security payments, Debswana has a pension scheme for its employees.  
 
 -Withholding Taxes:  
Withholding tax obliges the payer to withhold a certain percentage of payments made as taxes to the 
Government. AML withholds 5% on dividend payments and management fees. However, the company 
and nominated contractors shall not be liable to withhold taxes on payments to subcontractors as specified 
under Section 117 of the Income Tax Act 2000.  Sierra Rutile was exempted from withholding tax 
payments on management fees before 2005, dividends before 2005 and interest before 2011. After the 
allowance periods, the firm withholds tax not greater than 10% on all dividend, interest and management 
fees payments.  During the first six years of operations, London Mining withholds 5% on dividends, 
interest, management fees and payments on contracts to non-resident 3rd parties. Between years 6 and 
year 10, the company withholds 10% on these sets of payments and, from year 11 onwards, the full 
withholding tax under income tax law is applied. In the case of all independent 3rd party long term 
contracts, with a minimum value of $500,000, withholding tax is 5%   for the initial duration of the 
respective contract and full applicable rate is applied thereafter. Payments to local contractors attract 5% 
withholding tax.  Withholding tax arrangements with SMHL is not clearly specified in the upgraded 
agreement, but, according to this study’s research, the company withholds 3% of payments to local 
contractors. 
It is evident that in the case of withholding tax too, there is no uniform rate applied by all the companies 
under review. These continuous ‘tailor made’ financial agreements ,  often in contrast to applicable law, 
set bad precedence as other companies seeking to enter the Sierra Leonean extractive industry would 
come with the aim of negotiating deals rather than abiding with existing applicable legislation. 
According to the Income Tax Act, the  rates  of withholding taxes applicable  to the mining sector are 
15% on interest , 10% on dividends , 10% on rents (e.g. on machinery) , 5% on payments to resident 
contractors  and 10% on payments to non-resident contractors . All the companies under review are, at 
some point during the term of the agreements, in violation of the provisions of the Income Tax Act.  
Withholding tax on payments to non-resident contractors is the largest source of government income 
from mining companies.  In 2010 alone, withholding tax on payments to non-resident contractors 
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accounted for 33% of total mines’ revenue. This study can only imagine the contribution to revenue if all 
the companies were abiding by income tax legislation. 
 
 -Mining and Surface Rent:   
AML has two mining licenses and pays $500,000 per block annually for each license. SRL, as per the 
1989 agreement, pays $400 per year as mining rent. The updated agreement has made provision for a 5% 
annual increase of this amount to be payable to the State.  London mining pays $500,000 annually and 
this amount is subject to adjustment, but not by more than 5% per annum. SMHL pays the annual amount 
by applicable law.  Mining rent is treated as allowable expense for accounting purpose.   
Surface rent is paid for prospective damage to crops.  The amount of surface rent to be paid annually by 
AML to land owners is not specified in the agreement. In the LM agreement, the payments to be made 
by the company are  in accordance with the Mines and Minerals Act.  Surface rent payable by SMHL 
shall be determined by the Minister of Mines and Mineral Resources on advice of the minerals advisory 
board. Sierra Rutile’s surface rent payment before 2003   was $4/ acre per annum and increased in 2003 
to $10/acre per annum. This rate increases by 3% every year thereafter. The rates of surface rent need to 
be uniform across companies and should be clearly stated in the agreements and bounded by legislation.  
Discretionary determinations increase the probability of corruption.  With respect to land compensation, 
the legislation itself needs to be amended. The 1996 Minerals Act states that fair and reasonable 
compensation should be paid at the present market value of the land and this   fails to account for the 
boosted value of the land under mining. ‘It is not enough to give “fair market value” for their land and 
then expect rural, uneducated farmers to begin life anew’, (World Bank, 2008).5 
 -Non Tax Revenue: 
This category of revenue covers customs and import duties, import inspection fees, port harbour dues and 
stevedoring charges, fuel and lubricant taxes and road user charges.  
 -Duty and Tax Exemptions:  
For the duration of its agreement with the Government, AML and its subcontractors are exempted from 
import duties, taxes in respect of mining machinery, plant, equipment and mining consumables.  In the 
case of Sierra Rutile, for the duration of its agreement levies, duties and fees payable by the company in 
respect of imports of mining equipment, plant and mining consumables will be 5%. The   maximum 
customs and excise duties payable on other Sierra Rutile imports for 1997 to 2003 was 8% of Cost, 
                                                            
5  A report commissioned by the World Bank: ‘Sierra Leone Mining Sector Reform: A Strategic Environmental and Social 
Assessment’. 
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Insurance and Freight (CIF) price. This increased to 10% between 2004 and 2005 and is currently 12% 
of CIF price.  
 
London Mining is exempted from paying Goods and Services Tax (GST) for the duration of its agreement 
with the Government of Sierra Leone.  The company is liable to pay customs levies and duties for mining 
machinery and consumables at the rate of 1% of invoice value from 2011 to 2018, 2.5% between 2019 
and 2020 and thereafter according to the Customs Act of Sierra Leone. In respect of other company 
imports, LML should pay customs duties at 20% of the prevailing rate between 2011 and 2015 and 
thereafter at the prevailing rate determined by the Customs Act.  Sierra Mineral Holdings is also exempted 
from paying GST on all imported capital goods, fuel and lubricants and pays only 5% of the value of 
imported cargo for the duration of their agreement.  
 
AML is, for the duration of its contract, exempted from paying import inspection fees, port harbour dues, 
stevedoring charges and road user charges and all its imports of fuel and lubricants are both duty and 
GST free. AML is only liable to pay safety fees, pilotages fees and charges at ports owned by the Sierra 
Leone Ports Authority.  
All the other companies pay some level of customs duty. SMHL pays customs charges of 5% of the 
invoiced value of the imported item. It is, however, noted in the agreement that such an amount must not 
be in excess of charges applicable under ECOWAS Trade liberalisation Scheme (TLS).  SRL also pays 
customs duties at 5% of invoiced value of imports and 1.5% of CIF of the imported goods as inspection 
fees.  In the case of LML, on imports of capital items such as equipment and machinery, between 2001 
and 2018 the agreement stipulates that the company pays 1% of invoiced value of the consignment as 
customs duties.  From 2019 to 2020, the rate will increase to 2.5% and the applicable customs tariff will 
be paid on imports after 2020.  On other items, excluding fuel and health and safety equipment, from 
2011 to 2015 LML shall pay only 20% of the prevailing rate and thereafter the applicable customs rate. 
SMHL is expected to pay freight levy of $0.45 per metric ton of bauxite exported. The obligation to pay 
freight levy may be transferred from the company to customers to the extent allowed by the Maritime 
Act.  Sierra Rutile pays freight levy at $1 per ton of rutile and zircon, $0.25 per ton of ilmenite and $1.20 
per ton of other goods.  
The various agreements state that if items on which duties were paid are not re-exported or totally 
consumed within three years, the companies shall pay the Government the customs import duties on the 
then fair market value within forty-five days. There are, however, no monitoring mechanisms to decipher 
cases in which imports are not totally consumed within three years. Therefore, the state could be missing 
out on much needed revenue. In the case of Botswana, duty free concessions are only granted on 
machinery and equipment for the purpose of manufacturing and raw materials imported for the sole 
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reason of producing goods that would be exported, resulting in export revenue and strengthening the 
country’s manufacturing industry.  
All the companies can import the whole of their fuel requirements except petrol and kerosene, which they 
must purchase in Sierra Leone. It has already been stated that AML is exempted from all fuel and lubricant 
taxes as well as road user charges for the duration of its contract.  Sierra Rutile taxes on fuel imports are 
8% of CIF from 1997 to 2003, 10% of CIF from 2004 to 2005 and 12% of CIF thereafter.  LML pays the 
applicable customs tariff on its fuel and lubricant imports, but is exempted from road users fuel levy. 
This study is of the opinion that the duration of most of these exemptions is too long, especially in the 
case of AML. If the Government views these exemptions as a last resort to attract these companies, which 
is definitely not the case, it is more practical to give reduced tariffs, not exemptions, to help only in 
‘setting up’ years. On the other hand, if the large amount of capital that these companies invest in Sierra 
Leone is taken into consideration, duty exemptions in ‘setting up years’ is reasonable. However, this 
research thinks that Goods and Services Tax (GST) exemptions are going a bit overboard. These 
concessions should also be uniform across the board and made part of the legislation.  All the imports are 
to be used in Sierra Leone and, therefore, such consignments must not be GST free. 
 
 -Capital Expenditure Allowances: 
All the companies under review are given capital expenditure allowances which are income tax 
deductible.  Qualifying expenditure includes expenditure on all mining machinery, plant, construction 
equipment, capital expenditure haul roads, and capital expenditure on assets related to the development 
of community infrastructure.  For all the companies, in the first year, 40% of the cost of qualifying capital 
expenditure is deductible.  20% of the cost is deductible in each additional year until the whole cost is 
allowed. 
This research believes that, given that capital expenditure on community development projects such as 
the construction or improvement of schools, hospitals, roads and training, is also tax deductible; the 
construction of such infrastructure could be written into the contracts so that the companies themselves 
fund such undertakings and reduce the possibility of corruption and misappropriation of funds by local 
officials. 
It is noticeable that all the companies have succeeded in negotiating various self-beneficial rates for 
themselves, which are, in almost all cases, against the provisions of Sierra Leone customs legislation. In 
Botswana, capital allowances per year are not as high as in Sierra Leone. Botswana’s mining legislation 
specifies capital allowance of 25% for buildings in the first year and 2.5% annual allowance thereafter.  
For buildings used in the industrial business, only 2.5 % of cost is allowed yearly. The country’s Mining 
Act allows for not more than 25% capital allowance for machinery and equipment and 10% for plant and 
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machinery with long life.  In comparison with Sierra Leone, it is noticed that much lower capital 
allowances are allowed per annum, resulting in more chargeable income being available. 
The study understands the need for duty discounts, but giving such reduced rates, in most cases for the 
duration of the mining agreements, results in significant loss of revenue for the state.   Reduced rates for 
setting- up equipment is reasonable, not exceeding two to five years depending on the scale of the 
company’s planned activities. 
 -Tax Deductibles:  
 In addition to the already mentioned tax deductible payments, such as royalties, losses and certain capital 
expenditures, the companies being evaluated in this study also benefit from other tax deductible expenses. 
This research views some of these tax deductibles as the Government ‘selling the economy’ for less than 
it is worth. Yes, certain allowances are necessary to attract foreign investment, but getting the balance 
right is what seems to be the problem in Sierra Leone. In the case of AML, for example, expenditure on 
environmental protection and restoration, tertiary and technical training of fulltime Sierra Leonean 
employees, donations and contributions to the Community Development Fund being tax deductible can 
be viewed as necessary and growth promoting. On the other hand, this study views the ‘no limit 
expenditure on air tickets for breaks’ being tax deductible as crossing the line.  SMHL is allowed to 
deduct expenditure for celebrating company milestones. This is kind of absurd.  Office expenses not 
exceeding 5% of turnover and marketing commissions and fees can be tax deductible for Sierra Rutile.  
There needs to be careful re-evaluation of the type of expenses that should be tax deductible and make 
economic sense, especially those not provided for in the legislation (lease and surface rent payments).  
 
Comparing Sierra Leone with Botswana, companies need to meet special conditions to be eligible for tax 
relief. In the case of Botswana, private expenditure is not tax deductible.  Companies applying for tax 
relief are assessed on the number of Botswana citizens employed;   provisions made for the eventual 
replacement of expatriates with Botswana citizens, especially in management positions; activities 
stimulating development in other sectors of the economy, mainly industrial or commercial; and the 
potential of reducing the prices of Botswana’s consumer goods. Hence, being a mining company should 
not automatically guarantee duty free status. 
 
 -Treatment of Losses: 
Mining companies enjoy certain allowances regarding the treatment of losses for tax purposes. AML is 
allowed to carry forward losses for up to ten years and there is no limitation on the amount of losses that 
can be used to offset chargeable income. According to the Sierra Rutile agreement, the company can 
make a claim requiring that the amount of any loss incurred by the company during the nine financial 
years prior to December 1999 be offset against profits. Losses thereafter  shall also  carried forward as 
far as can be and deducted  or offset against profits  or other revenue on which the company is charged  
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tax in subsequent years. London Mining’s  loss  that would be tax payable  between year  1 and 10  will 
not be  less than  15% of the income tax that would be due if no losses were carried forward. After year 
10, London Mining’s losses would be treated as specified under income tax law.   
It is not clearly stated in all the agreements that the Government may appoint an independent firm to 
verify losses.  Giving ‘no limitation’ on the amount of losses that can be used to offset chargeable income 
to companies such as AML is rather like giving the company a free ride to tax exemption. Currently, 
these treatments of losses are in contravention of applicable law. However, the agreements make the 
following provision: ‘if at any time the Income Tax Act allows for a greater utilization of tax losses, the 
company shall be entitled to take advantage’.  There is definitely a clear problem of applying legislation 
when it comes to mining companies, painting the picture of them receiving preferential treatment to the 
detriment of the Government’s revenue collection efforts. 
 
 -Employment and Immigration:  
Expatriate staffs of all the companies are given the right   to enter, reside and depart from Sierra Leone. 
The Government has also agreed to facilitate multiple entry visas for business purposes. Until quite 
recently not much immigration monitoring had been done with regards to renewing work permits and 
checking whether individuals whose work permits have expired or no longer work for the mining 
companies to which their permits are tied have left the country.  The mining agreements clearly give 
employment priority to Sierra Leoneans for both skilled and unskilled labour. The companies also should 
not import unskilled labour. All the companies are expected to train Sierra Leoneans, both on the job and 
externally, to gradually replace non-executive expatriates with qualified Sierra Leoneans as they become 
available. 
Little monitoring of changes in the amount of Sierra Leoneans being employed and trained has been done 
in the past. Recent changes to the agreements signed by London Mining and SMHL now require these 
companies to submit bi-annual human resource reports to the Director of Mines, clearing showing the 
characteristics of their work force and status of training programs.   These reports, however, are also to 
be shared with the Labour Ministry, Ministry of Education and Department of Immigration. On the other 
hand, the Sierra Leonean work force was and still is relatively unprepared for the professional and 
technical needs of the mining industry; most of the literate individuals lack technical skills.  The need for 
technical training institutes, apprenticeships and greater technology transfer cannot be over emphasised. 
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Developmental Contributions: 
 -Domestic market promotion: 
All the agreements under review stipulate that the companies give preference to equipment, supplies and 
equipment made in Sierra Leone.  The London Mining agreement also specifically requires the company 
to originate all of its procurement through banking institutions in Sierra Leone. SMHL’s contract requires 
the company to pursue local industry development, such as the production of bricks, ceramics and roofing 
tiles from the products of its mining operations in Sierra Leone. There are hardly any encouraging reports 
related to the successful implantation of these requirements.  Manufacturing of equipment and supplies 
for the mining trade in Sierra Leone is negligible. Manufacturing, therefore, needs to be actively promoted 
for the country to gain from the provisions made for domestic market promotion. Sierra Leonean 
companies do provide some services, such as customs clearing and logistics services, however there are 
still foreign companies providing such services, undercutting indigenous firms. The use of Sierra Leonean 
financial institutions also needs to be stressed. 
 
 -Environmental Social Protection and Impact Mitigation Fund and Agricultural 
Development Fund (ADF): 
These funds are managed and controlled by officials of the Ministry of Mineral Resources and the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food Security (MAFFS).  To access the funds, communities write 
project proposals which they forward to the funding committees through the Paramount Chiefs of their 
respective Chiefdoms.  Sierra Rutile only started making contributions to the ADF fund in 2003. The 
Sierra Rutile agreement requires the company to pay $75,000 or 0.1% of ‘gross sale along ship side’ 
value of exports, whichever is greater. The company is also restoring mined-out areas.  However, NACE 
reported that there is no evidence of any significant rehabilitation in the rutile mining area at all.   London 
Mining and SMHL are required to prepare and submit to the Environmental Protection Agency a 
reclamation and rehabilitation master plan for mined-out areas. Again, there is not much publicly 
available information on the current status of such rehabilitation plans.  Hence the need for greater 
transparency and flow of information.  
 
 
 -Corporate Social Responsibility:   
All the companies contribute to a certain level in community development projects. Most of their 
activities are centred on the provision of scholarships, allowing locals to access their health facilities, 
small donations to hospitals and the construction of water wells. Details of annual projects are recorded 
in company reports and summaries are readily available in local newspaper reports.  In the contracts 
signed by London Mining and SMHL, they are required to contribute at least 1% of net sales revenue 
each year to the Community Development Fund.  However, no such clear requirements are included in 
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the agreements of AML and Sierra Rutile. It should be noted that the contributions to the Community 
Development Fund are treated as additional royalty and thus tax deductible.   
It has been explained before that transparency and inadequate information exchange limits the capability 
of the Government and the civil society to monitor how projects funded by the Community Development 
Fund are being implemented. There also needs to be uniformity among the contributions these companies 
make to the fund. CSR is voluntary, however, given the level of development  of many areas in Sierra 
Leone and how centralised the administration of  Government funds  is, writing  some of the much needed 
socio-economic contributions  into the mining contracts can help  ensure  tangible  contributions to the 
country’s development.  
 
- Reporting and Dispute resolution: 
The companies under review are required to provide reports to the Government of Sierra Leone. One of 
the key reports is the report of company exports.  This report should state the quantity of the mineral 
mined,   the grade, the tonnage exported, price, sales payments received, names and designations of 
consignees and a copy of the export entries certificate signed by the comptroller of customs and excise.  
This research’s point of contention is that the Government does not always have representatives at the 
point of export. Therefore, calculations of royalty are based solely on reports which the companies’ 
appointed inspection company provides. It is required that the reports be presented to the Director of 
Mines. This research recommends that copies be also lodged with the Ministry of Finance, the National 
Revenue Authority, Ministry of Trade and Industry and the National Minerals Agency.  SMHL is 
required, as per terms of its contract, to provide annual audited and unaudited financial statements to the 
Government.  However, this is not included in the agreements of the other companies.  
The Ministry of Finance and Economic Develop and AML will jointly review the companies’ fiscal 
packages every five years.  The joint review of London Mining’s fiscal package will commence in 2020.   
It is not clear whether Sierra Rutile and SMHL will also be subject to joint reviews.  No explanation is 
provided for the deferment of London Mining’s review to 2020. This study is of the opinion that at this 
‘infant’ stage of Sierra Leone’s extractive sector, annual reviews are required to help with better 
monitoring, policy formulation and implementation. 
In the case that any dispute arises between any of the companies and the Government, the agreements 
encourage in house dispute negotiations. However, in cases where the dispute settlement is not reached 
within three months, arbitrators shall be appointed. 
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At this stage of the qualitative analysis, it cannot be accurately determined whether H5 is accepted or 
rejected. This is because the agreements mainly show what is expected to be done on the part of the 
Government and the mining firms.  Company reports and newspaper articles, which will be evaluated in 
the next section, will show what has been done and will better help to determine whether there is support 
for H5. The examination of the mining agreements between the four companies under review and the 
Government of Sierra Leone has, however, highlighted the key expectations of the parties.  There is clear 
evidence that some of the articles of the agreements fail to meet the requirements of related legislation.  
Some allowances seem to portray the Government as ‘too eager to please’,  thus reducing the potential 
long term benefit to the country, especially in financial terms given mounting external debt.  According 
to the ‘Dan Watch’ report, Sierra Leone’s natural resources can potentially generate approximately $600 
million per annum, but, as at 2010, annual government mining revenue was less than $25 million, which 
is surprising because the prices of the minerals exported from the country have, on average, increased 
over the last five years yet the companies get away with paying little or no taxes. 
 
5.4.2 ANALYSIS OF COMPANY REPORTS:  
Sierra Rutile Limited (SRL): 
 
SRL publishes all of the reports which the company wishes to be made public on the company’s website.  
The various reports published between 2005 and 2012 provide the data used in this part of the analysis. 
SRL’s reports mainly provide information regarding the changes at the top level management of the 
company, ownership structure, updates of its operations, financial information and CSR activities. 
 -Changes in Management 
The company provides updates relating to changes at top management. This often relates to the 
appointments and resignations of non- executive directors and top management staff and appointments 
to the Board of Directors.  This is mainly for the benefit for shareholders and investors. Top quality 
management often instils confidence in the markets. Currently, a Sierra Leonean, Mr John Sisay, is the 
company’s C.E.O and the Government still has representatives on the Board of Directors. 
 -Ownership and shares 
In August 2005, the company (then TRG) listed shares on the AIM market6 of the London Stock 
Exchange under the symbol: AIM: TXR.L.  The Group had raised US$74 million (£41 million) before 
                                                            
6 Formerly Alternative Investment Market 
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expenses and, at the Placing Price; the company had a market capitalisation of US$158 million (£88 
million). 
Throughout the years, the amount of new shares placed, the price per share, capital raised and purpose of   
each placement is announced. In May 2007, the company placed new common shares to raise capital for 
upgrading the power house at the Sierra Rutile mine and the expansion of Sierra Rutile’s dry plant 
capacity. The company raised $25 million in November 2009 to fund Dredge D3, upgrade Dredge D1 
wet processing plant and upgrade the company’s land plant via a placing of 151,200,000 new shares at 
10 pence.  Whenever share options are granted or exercised, especially those by non-executive 
chairpersons or directors, the company also makes it public knowledge.  
It has been shown in the company’s agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone that the Government 
gave up its ownership in the company in exchange for cash settlements payable as additional royalty. 
According to the company report published on May 8, 2007, as at April 27, 2007, shareholders holding 
more than 3% of the company’s total voting share capital were: Leopard Titanium Ltd, 38.6 %; Morstan 
Nominees Ltd, 18.2%; N.Y. Nominees Ltd, 10.5 %; and Videos Nominees Ltd, 4.3%.   This shareholding 
changed over the years and as at December 31, 2012, the following shareholders had an interest in 3% or 
more of the voting capital: Pala Minerals Ltd, 54.41%; M&G Investment Management Ltd, 19.66%; 
JPMorgan Asset Management Ltd, 8.88%; Neon Liberty Capital Management LLC, 6.45%; Investec 
Asset Management, 5.10%.  This shows that 94.5% of the company’s shares with voting rights are foreign 
held.  The Government has no ownership or voting rights. 
The company’s acquisitions and sales activities are also reported. In December 2005, TRG acquired the 
Rotifunk mineral sands prospect in Sierra Leone from Gondwana Investments S.A. for $120 000 cash, 
payable on completion.  Global Aluminium Ltd was sold to Vimetco N.V. for a total cash consideration 
of US$40 million in July 2008.  If the Government had had a significant shareholding in the company, it 
would have been bound to benefit from such transactions and the multiplier effect of such gains would 
have been translated into development and welfare projects. 
 
 -Financial Announcements 
The financials of the company reported in the Titanium Resources Group Ltd Annual Report, issues 2005 
to 2012, reveal the changing financial status of the company. Due to limited production in 2005, the 
company’s 2005 annual report revealed losses of $13.7 million, which shareholders expected, and cash 
reserves of US$79.7 million at the end of the year. In 2006, compared to sales of $337,000 in 2005, the 
company recorded sales of US$51.3 million. These increased sales and a tax credit of $35.9 million 
resulted in a post-tax profit of $34 million.  Sales increased to $67.8 million in 2006.  Even though 2008 
sales fell to $49.4 million, revenue from the sale of the bauxite mine to Vimetco for $40.5 million in cash 
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resulted in a profit of $26.6 million. The company’s 2010 sales of $41.1 million was an 11.7% increase  
on  its 2009 sales  and $9.2 million cash was generated from operating activities compared to $1.8 million 
in 2009.  2010 was so successful that the company issued a pre-closing trading update revealing that rutile 
prices increased sharply during 2010, resulting in contract sales prices at between 19% and 25% above 
2010 average prices. Notwithstanding, the company experienced an increase in costs due to increased 
production levels, the outsourcing of security, the implementation of GST in Sierra Leone  and the  
capsize of Dredge D2.  2012 saw a 226% increase in revenue from 2011 and a profit of $83.5 million 
with current assets of US$92.2 million at December 31, 2012. 
It is clear that the financial health of the company has improved from year to year and is projected to 
continue growing. This should translate into increased revenue for the Government, especially in the form 
of royalties and corporation tax.  If the Government had also retained its equity share in the company, 
dividend payments would have accrued. However, with a host of tax deductibles and exemptions, tax 
revenue is considerably less than expected and inadequate monitoring of production and sales does not 
ensure accurate royalty payments.  
Apart from the taxes and royalties due to the Government, Sierra Rutile has several other financial 
arrangements with the state.  The Government of Sierra Leone, through the European Union (EU), offered 
a loan of £24.75 million to the company, the last tranche of which was received in 2005. In 2008, a two 
year moratorium of interest payments on the EU loan was negotiated with the Government. During the 
course of 2010, a   dispute arose between the Government and SRL over non- payment of certain interest 
payments on this loan.  In October 2010, the company announced that it had reached an agreement in 
principle to resolve the dispute. Under the terms of the agreement, the Government will invest £13.6 
million of the SRL Loan into approximately 113.7 million new ordinary shares, upon which the 
Government will own 22.8% of Sierra Rutile’s enlarged issued share capital. This arrangement will 
reduce the outstanding debt and accrued interest by 42.2 % to £18.7 million.  
This research, however, finds it shocking that, in December 2010, Sierra Rutile published a report 
explaining that the Government of Sierra Leone had withdrawn its request for the payment by SRL of all 
accrued interest, plus the accrued balance and capital interest owing on the loan.  The report also revealed 
that, whilst discussions with the Government regarding a potential debt-for-equity swap were ongoing, 
the Board was also considering a number of other options to reduce the company’s outstanding debt level.  
In 2011, it became clear that the negotiations had ended with a payment plan being agreed upon rather 
than the debt –for-equity swap.   In March 2011, the Government received a payment of $18.3 million 
from the firm and amount outstanding was agreed to be paid over the next four years. 
The company’s decision to choose cash settlement over the debt-for-equity swap reiterates this study’s 
view that the Government has more to gain as a shareholder. In this research’s opinion, the acceptance 
of these terms by the Government shows short sightedness on their part, especially in light of potential 
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greater income streams that would help alleviate poverty in the country.  The financial short-sightedness 
is confirmed by the trading of previously owned Government shares in Sierra Rutile for cash and pre-
payment of PAYE taxes. 
 
  -Operational Updates 
Sierra Rutile does not limit its reports to financial related information only. The company keeps the 
public, mainly for the sake of current and potential investors, informed of updates regarding operational 
updates, production performance, sales and infrastructural developments occurring at the mining site.  
Key  updates include the announcement of the mines proven and probable reserves of 278 million tonnes 
of ore grading 1.43% and further resources of 185 million tonnes of ore grading at 1.12% recoverable 
rutile in 2005; the progress on  Dredge D2, Dredge D3, power house conversion to Heavy Fuel Oil, feed 
preparation and dry plant upgrade projects in 2006;  the   low cost power plant commissioned in 2008, 
thus  improving efficiency by 25%; and the significant reduction in the Gangama Dry Mining project 
capital costs by over 17%,  announced  in  August 2013.    
Quarterly production results and projections are always reported.  The effects of changes in foreign 
exchange rates and commodity prices are also often reported. In February 2011, the company announced 
that the JORC-compliant Mineral Resource review process for Sierra Rutile Ltd revealed a mineral 
resource estimate of approximately 600 million tonnes, confirming Sierra Rutile’s standing as one of the 
largest natural rutile deposits in the world.  
In July 2008, Dredge D2 at the Sierra Rutile mine capsized and two persons were reported missing 
following the accident.  In the October 2008 company report, it was revealed that this event negatively 
impacted on company revenues, three non-executive directors resigned and discussions with the 
company’s insurers in relation to claims resulting from the capsizing of Dredge D2 are ongoing. Trading 
in the company's shares on AIM was suspended until the extent of the impact of the incident on the 
Company was fully assessed. Trading recommenced in January 2009.  
There was a large public outcry regarding employee safety after the dredge collapsed. In response, the 
Chief Executive, Len Comerford, explained: "We are focusing on the safety and condition of our 
employees and other workers who were on the dredge and directing our emergency efforts in response to 
the situation and to the provision of appropriate medical care for the injured." The company also 
announced that it would establish environmental monitoring in relation to the incident.  
 -Corporate Social Responsibility Announcements 
 Since the collapse of the dredge at the company’s mining site, there has been a notable increase in Sierra 
Rutile’s efforts in   publicising their activities relating to their corporate social responsibility.  In the case 
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of Sierra Leone, this is how the general populace can often directly feel the benefits of a company 
operating in the country.  As the company spreads its good corporate image abroad through company 
reports and presentations, the local media is also always present at donation ceremonies and often invited 
to similar goodwill events. 
Among the key CSR-related announcements are the company’s efforts in improving human capital and 
availability of employment. In the Sierra Rutile 2010 Report, the enrolment of the first students in the 
Sierra Rutile Technical Institute, created to teach relevant technical and engineering skills to young 
people in the communities around the mine site, was announced. The 2012 report revealed that, as at 
December 2012, the institute had twelve staff and over three hundred students enrolled .This institute has 
the goal of improving the long-term employment prospects for the people living around the Sierra Rutile 
community.   SRL also reported that its workforce is 95% Sierra Leone nationals and the company is 
significantly recruiting from the universities in Sierra Leone.  The company stressed plans for increasing 
recruitment of local Sierra Leoneans and lowering its reliance on expatriate workers.  
The Sierra Rutile 2009, 2010 and 2011 reports have stressed  the progress of the tree planting  on former 
mine works as part of the Darwin Initiative and the company’s own projects.  In 2010, it was reported 
that SRL rehabilitated 55 acres of sand tailings and 6 acres of dry mined areas and has plans to develop 
agribusiness opportunities for local communities.  In 2012, 141.1 hectares of disturbed land was said to 
have been rehabilitated and the aquaculture project for the rehabilitation of mined-out dredge ponds 
continued in 2012. Despite the 2010 plans of developing agribusiness opportunities for indigenes, the 
Sierra Rutile Report 2012 still only shows the plans of exploring the agricultural opportunities, but 
information on the implementation of those plans is yet to be conveyed. 
SRL annual reports for the various years provide updates on the company’s health initiatives.  The Sierra 
Rutile Clinic mainly treats employees and their families. The company also runs additional weekly clinics 
to provide basic and emergency public healthcare for the locals in the community. The company also 
gives updates on its malaria and typhoid eradication intervention programme and its partnership with 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), the Mine Workers Union and the National AIDS Secretariat 
of Sierra Leone to address the prevention of HIV/AIDS.  
The Sierra Rutile Foundation was set up in 2006 to finance sustainable community development 
initiatives. After consultations with representatives from chiefdoms, the foundation and the company 
itself have, over the years, undertaken some infrastructural construction projects. Examples of such 
projects include the rehabilitation of old water wells and the construction of new ones with hand pumps; 
the construction of a resource centre and a radio station in the Imperri chiefdom;  the construction of 
sanitation facilities( latrines)  for the Jong, Upper and Lower Banta chiefdoms; construction of a bridge 
in Bagruwa Chiefdom; rehabilitation of the village court administrative building in Lower Banta 
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Chiefdom;  installation of  a radio station in Imperi Chiefdom; and  the rehabilitation of police station in 
Imperi Chiefdom. 
In conclusion, with respect to SRL’s company reports, the company is very transparent to its shareholders 
and investors about financial information and information that could impact on the company’s' share 
trading values.  If such transparency could exist between the company and the Government of Sierra 
Leone, the contributions to economic growth and development would far exceed current levels.  
 
Sierra Mineral Holdings Limited (SMHL): 
 
This thesis considers the operations of Sierra Mineral Holdings Ltd commencing after its purchase from 
SRL by   Vimetco N.V in July 2008.  In the financial year ended December 31, 2007, SML recorded a 
gross profit of US$2.4 million. Hence, Vimetco N.V acquired a profitable company.  SMHL also 
publishes company reports on its website. However, only company reports up to 2010 are publicly 
available at the time of the writing of this thesis. 
 -Ownership 
SMHL, just like SRL, is listed on the London Stock Exchange and posts operational updates on its 
website for investors.  The acquisition of the company in July 2008 for US$40 million was reported.  The 
company reports that its bauxite mine has a resource base of approximately 31 million tonnes of bauxite. 
It initiated the operation of its bauxite mines without the support of a contractor, but they had been re-
equipped with modern plant, machinery and equipment for the full technological cycle.  
 -Operational Updates 
In the first nine months of 2009, SMHL registered bauxite production of 514,000 tons. In the same period 
of 2010, the company reported bauxite production of 814,000 tons.  2010 sales of bauxite (net of 
moisture) were reported to be 963,000 tons, of which 924,000 tons were sent to Alum Tulcea, Vimetco’s 
alumina refinery in Romania.  The Sierra Leone mine, therefore, supplies the necessary raw material for 
aluminium production in Romania by the parent company.  In 2011, the company reported that over 1.3 
million tons of bauxite was produced.   It currently produces around 1.2 million tons per annum for 
export.  
 -Financial Updates 
SMHL also publishes summary financial statistics.   In 2010, SMHL reported losses and did not pay 
corporate income tax to the Government.   The company increased production and profitability in 2011 
and made payments of corporate income tax. However, the liable income tax was reduced by the various 
deductibles the Government has allowed the company. Royalties were the largest payment from the 
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company to the state, hence the importance of accurate monitoring and reporting of export volumes and 
value. For 2010, SMHL reported sales   of $ 30 million and 3% royalty amounting to $ 908,196 was paid 
to the Government.  
  
-CSR Updates 
The company reported that, as at 2010, it employs 350 people and had also established the SMHL 
Foundation for financing sustainable community development initiatives in the five bauxite mining 
chiefdoms. The company has not provided any updated information with regards to its post 2010 
activities. However, in the next section of this research, this study includes an evaluation of post 2010 
activities reported by the local media. There is increased demand for aluminium on the international 
markets   and aluminium prices are on the increase, therefore greater financial returns to both the company 
and the Government are expected. 
 
African Minerals Limited (AML): 
AML, like the already discussed companies, is listed on the AIM of the London Stock Exchange.  The 
Company is currently focused on the development and mining of ‘The Tonkolili Iron Ore Deposit’, one 
of the largest magnetite deposits in the world, and the mine is expected to last well over sixty years.  
Among the companies reviewed in this study, it is the only pre-conflict company that maintained its 
corporate office in Freetown, from mid-1997 through 2002, during the civil strife. The company makes 
regular announcements regarding changes in top management, changes in shareholdings, financial 
activities, operational updates, and social contributions.    
 
 -Management Changes 
Over the years, appointments of Non-Executive Directors, Chief Financial Officer, Independent Non-
Executive Directors and the CEO were announced on the company’s website. In addition, any 
appointments that strengthen the company’s human resources are also reported.  In February 2010, AML 
reported that the JORC review revealed a JORC compliant mineral resource estimate of 10.5 billion tons 
with the completion of 110,000m of drilling. The estimate was updated to 12.8 billion tons in December 
2010. 
 -Ownership 
The company’s equity is held by different parties and as a result of placing and trading, the ratio of 
holdings changes almost each year.   As at May 31, 2013, shareholdings of 2.4% or more of the issued 
share capital notified to the company were: Black Rock Investment Management, 13.2%; Timis Diamond 
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Corporation, 12.8%; M&G Investment Management, 12.8%; China Railway Materials Commercial 
Corporation, 12.5%; Capital Group Companies Incorporated, 7.6%; Franklin Templeton, 5.1%; UBS, 
3.9%; Goodman & Co Investment Counsel, 3.6%; JP Morgan Securities Ltd, 3.0%; and Gibril Bangura, 
2.4%. The Government has no shareholding in the company and Gibril Bangura is the only Sierra 
Leonean owning equity in AML.  AML also owns 17.9% of Cape Lambert’s Marampa Iron Ore Project 
in Sierra Leone.  
 
 -Financial Updates 
In February 2005 the company was admitted to the AIM, raising £20 million. It announced the completion 
of a $307 million equity raising and the launch of a secured loan facility in November 2005.  The 
completion of the $417.7 million secured loan facility from Standard Bank was reported in February 
2011.  By the first quarter of 2011, AML had raised over $1.1 billion to fully fund Phase I of the project, 
which entered production in the fourth quarter of 2011.  In 2011, the company reported a total payment 
of $10 million in direct taxes, indirect taxes and royalties to the Government of Sierra Leone. Of the said 
amount, $6.9 million was employee taxes and only $0.6 million was royalty payments. In February 2012, 
the company reported a voluntary prepayment of Sierra Leone employee withholding tax of $20 million, 
which will be offset against future tax liabilities. The company believed this undertaking would support 
infrastructure development in the country.  
Unlike SRL, AML did not take any loans from the Government of Sierra Leone. The company continued 
its self –fund raising by successfully arranging a financing package of $868m in January 2012. At the 
end of 2012, AML paid $34.1 million in direct taxes, indirect taxes and royalties to the Government. This 
payment included $25.7 million in employee taxes and $8.4 million in royalties.  In March 2012, it 
completed a $1.5 billion transaction with Shandong Iron and Steel Group (SISG) in return for a 25% 
shareholding in the company.  This is the largest foreign investment in Sierra Leone so far and the largest 
single investment by a Chinese state-owned enterprise in Africa.  AML reported that a portion of the 
funds was used to repay the $417.7 million Standard Bank secured loan facility and  that the remainder 
will mainly  be used to accelerate the development of Phase II of the mining project.  In November 2012, 
the company established an additional ‘Equipment Finance Credit Facility’.   
The company’s financial future is relatively safe as it has offtake contracts that guarantee customers for 
all produce in 2013 and 2014 and strong relationships with a banking group, thus it  is able to leverage 
its resources to guarantee the lowest cost of capital for its projects.  This research wishes to point out that, 
given that royalties make up a small fraction of past payments by AML, the Government should not rely 
on it as the main source of mining revenue.  It needs to carefully re-evaluate the tax allowances that it 
has granted that severely reduce its revenue collection potential.  
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 -Operational Updates 
The company’s financial success has foundations in its operational success. AML reports key operational 
milestones to boost investor confidence and promote the company’s corporate image.  The company has 
developed significant port and rail infrastructure to support the operation of its mining project via its 
subsidiary, African Rail and Port Services (SL) Ltd (ARPS), in which the Government of Sierra Leone 
has a 10% free carried interest. 
In October 2010 the company announced the ‘Three Phase Strategy’ for the development of the hematite, 
saprolite and magnetite ore bodies at AML Tonkolili mine.  By December 2010, it was reported that   
Phase 1, a dry process plant, was completed and that stockpiling of ore produce had commenced.  The 
first shipment of iron ore left Sierra Leone in November 2011.  During the second quarter of 2013, the 
company reported achieving its Phase I export target.  AML now projects an increase in production and 
the expansion of the current port facilities at Pepel. 
In order to maintain production targets and ensure minimal costs, the company operates with various 
partners, some of which are institutional shareholders. Key partners include   China Railways Materials 
Commercial Corporation, which has a 12.5% interest in the company, and   Shandong Iron and Steel 
Group, owning a 25% stake in the project.  AML has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with China 
Communications Construction Company to complete final engineering designs for the infrastructure 
requirements for the Phase II and Phase III expansions of its project and to be appointed as the company’s 
Engineering, Procurement, Construction and Management (EPCM) contractor. 
  
 -CSR updates 
Whilst maintaining business updates, the company also reports on its CSR activities. As December 31, 
2012, the company reported that  84% of people working on the  mining project were Sierra Leoneans  
and  that they  were making significant strides in attracting and developing skilled Sierra Leoneans across 
the organisation. The company, in partnership with the Government, has formed a Steering Committee 
made up of the Minister of Education and colleagues within the Ministry, the Minister of Mines and 
representatives from African Minerals’ sustainability team to address the educational needs of the nation 
and to seek the assistance from various out-of-country institutes that can offer both in-country and online 
training. The committee is currently assessing the rebuilding and upgrading of the Magburaka Technical 
Institute.  AML is also training Sierra Leoneans to become train drivers to ensure the eventual transition 
to a fleet operated by Sierra Leoneans. 
AML has reported its contributions to community development projects.  The company reported that it 
had rebuilt the Makari and Makinkiba Schools and had redeveloped the Binkolo Health Clinic and 
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Marketplace.  The reconstruction of water wells and reservoirs were reported to have been approved and 
other projects, such as the building of the health clinics at Pepel and Bambuna, had begun. 
In April 2012, the company reported a protest in a village close to their operations by temporary workers 
who had been laid off. The   protest escalated into a civil disturbance, the police responded and a death 
was reported. AML carried out discussions with labour leaders, Paramount Chiefs, the police and the 
Government and as a result, the company negotiated a package of employment benefits that included a 
wage adjustment, annual pay revisions, union recognition, and the establishment of centres for excellence 
in teaching technical skills to employees. 
The company, like the others already reviewed, is transparent with its shareholders and keeps them 
regularly updated on key aspects of the company’s operation; a benefit that the Government would have 
enjoyed if it were a shareholder.   This research fears that the outcome of the protest in 2012 will instigate 
similar protests in other communities where indigenes are dissatisfied with the impact of mining 
companies in their communities.  
 
London Mining Ltd (LML):  
London Mining, like the other companies, regularly reports appointments, resignations of directors and 
other top management staff throughout the year. The company also reports significant changes regarding 
its shares. Share placing, large sales, exercising of options and resulting changes are always reported 
throughout the year.  
 
 -Operational Updates 
For the period ended March 31, 2010, the LM reported that total inferred resource for primary ore body 
had increased by over 300%.  The mid- year 2010 report showed that Phase 1 of the project was on 
track for first shipment in early 2011. By January 17, 2011, LM reported that the mine’s primary 
resource had increased by 70% and significant new higher grade weathered resources had been 
discovered.  
The company’s first shipment of 49,656wmt of iron ore left Freetown for Europe in February 2012 and 
this shipment was closely followed by two further shipments.  Production continued to increase and for 
the year ending December 31, 2012, the production target for 2012 was exceeded, operating costs were 
on budget and, in the fourth quarter of that year, reported sales were up by 30% on the previous quarter. 
In the company’s July 19, 2013 report, sales and production volumes doubled in the  first six months of 
2013. In August 2013, LML revealed that production for 2013 was expected to be at the higher end of 
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previous estimates. The report also showed that 2012 revenue from the mine was up 246% year on year 
whilst operating cost was down 18% year on year. 
 -Financial Updates 
LML reports very specific operational updates; however, financial updates are comparatively limited 
to annual financial statements and key monetary actions.  On January 26, 2011, LML announced a five 
year offtake agreement with the trading house, Glencore International. This agreement, which included 
a pre-payment facility for up to $27 million,  provided guaranteed offtake and shipping for all Phase 
1A production, with the option of extension to Phase 1B.  Along the path of ensuring a long term 
financial future for the project, on January 31, 2011, the company announced the launching of a $110 
million convertible bond, the net proceeds of which were to be used primarily to fund Phase 1 of the 
iron ore mine development project. The January 2012 equity offering of $ 90 million was also reported 
to accelerate the development of the project.   On July 30, 2012, LM L announced that it had completed 
a $110 million royalty transaction with Blackrock World Mining Trust PLC in return for a 2% revenue 
related royalty payment. The April 11, 2011 report on Phase 2 of the project reported that the feasibility 
study revealed that expansion of operations to Phase 2 would produce a robust post-tax net present 
value of $ 2.2 billion with an internal rate of return of 28.8%. 2012 financials revealed that the mine 
generated revenues of $120.6 million and EBITDA of $20.4 million and the company paid $10.8 million 
in royalties, taxes and other fees to the Government that year. 
The company’s financial operations have not been without incident. On January 16, 2012, LML issued 
a report concerning Wits Basin Precious Minerals Incorporated’s counterclaim in court against the 
company’s action to seek recovery of the repayment of the $1 million loan (plus interest and costs). 
Later that year, on June 11, 2012, LML announced that it had reached an agreement with Fraser Turner 
Ltd in connection with the termination of a consulting agreement and   a claim for a 2% revenue-related 
royalty brought by Fraser Turner over production at the Marampa project. 
 -CSR Updates 
London Mining Ltd, whilst working towards making a profit for its shareholders, reported on some of 
its social contributions.  It reported an overall health and safety performance over 2012, but with one 
fatality. As at August 22, 2013, there were zero fatalities and lost time injuries for the period January 
to August 2013.  The company’s main social contributions were related to education and development 
of human capital. The company has created scholarship programmes in primary and secondary schools 
within the local community. The company reported that   it was negotiating a Public Private Partnership 
(PPP) with the German Society for International Co-Operation (GIZ) for an integrated approach 
towards implementing adult literacy, technical and vocational training programs in Sierra Leone. The 
company also reported that it was implementing an internship programme for thirty-six university 
graduates in partnership with the Sierra Leone Youth Commission, UNDP and Restless Development.  
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On the health and sanitation front, LML reported that it had developed a programme to prevent and 
treat HIV/AIDS, to be launched sometime in 2013. The company explained that it would continue to 
support local government in the Community Led Total Sanitation (CLTS) Programme through the 
construction of wells. 
All the companies make efforts to report on their ownerships, issue of shares, sales and acquisitions, 
operations, financials and social contributions. Most of the time, in this research’s opinion, these reports 
are used to signal to shareholders and prospective investors,  so the chances are  these reports, especially 
the CSR related activities, are often  skewed to project a positive image of the company. 
 
5.4.3 ANALYSIS OF COMPANY MEDIA ARTICLES 
The available company reports have been analysed. Whilst most of the reports do not date very far back, 
they do provide a very good picture of current happenings and given good indications of the future.  
Company reports are often skewed towards presenting a favourable public image of the company, 
especially in attracting investment and keeping share prices high.  Local media articles, however, report 
both the good and bad sides of the company. In the case of Sierra Leone, most of the mining company 
related studies are centred on production updates and corporate social responsibility. Payments to the 
Government are rarely reported by the local media.  The foreign media, especially mining news websites, 
report more production and financial updates. In this section, the key sources of information are 
miningweekly.com, a website reporting mining news (foreign media), and local newspapers in circulation 
in Sierra Leone. 
 
- Media reports on Sierra Rutile: 
Just as the company itself make public reports on key production targets, the foreign media also reports 
these production milestones.  Mining Weekly, an online vendor of news related to the mining industry 
around the world, reports most of SRL’s production numbers. On April 10, 2012, Mining Weekly 
reported that the company’s first-quarter rutile production had increased by 48% and that SRL remained 
on track to reach its 2012 rutile production guidance of 80000t.  In the same month, this outlet revealed 
that, due to increased demand and higher prices during the first quarter of 2012, SRL reported a cash 
balance of $35.1 million at April 5, 2012, compared with the $10.7-million cash balance at December 31, 
2011.   Mostly positive production and sales reports were published throughout the year and the financial 
good health of the company in 2012 was confirmed when, on January 9, 2013, Mining Weekly reported 
that    SRL had testified that for the year 2012 that the production of rutile and ilmenite had increased by 
39% and 38% year-on-year respectively. 
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This outlet reported in March 2012 that the Board of SRL had approved a budget of $4 million for 
additional exploration of the SRL licence area   because, as early as 2012, less than 20% of the area had 
been systematically explored.  On October 8, 2012, Mining Weekly reported that the feasibility study 
into the operations of SRL’s new large dredge had projected a   pre-tax net profit value of $472-million, 
a pre-tax internal rate of return of 68% and a payback period of just twelve months. With such profitable 
projections, this study can only wonder what percentage reached the Government coffers. 
In early 2013, Mining Weekly reported that SRL’s production during the first quarter of 2013 grew by 
21% compared with the first quarter of 2012. The report attributed this increase in part to the company’s 
$41 million Lanti Dry Mining project. This Lanti mining operation and concentrating plant are both 
operating in excess of the company’s 3.5 million tonnes a year production capability.  
It was also reported that SRL had secured a 70 000 t rutile supply agreement with an undisclosed major 
pigment producer. The company is to supply seven 10000t shipments of rutile, one each quarter, until the 
end of the contract in December 2014. On April 5, 2013, the news outlet reported that the company’s 
board had approved and implemented a dividend policy to distribute at least 50% of free cash flows to 
shareholders following capital expenditures, committed future expenditures and the repayment of any 
borrowings.   
It is not clear whether all this information is made available to the Government.  It can be seen from the 
reports that the company’s cash balance increases year on.   It is also clear from the media reports that 
this company is operating profitably, has guaranteed future income and, thus, one should expect a greater 
contribution to the Sierra Leonean economy and that the Government would have stood to earn more 
revenue if it had retained its ownership in the company. 
Many of the reports in the local media over the years about the activities of SRL are limited to acts 
covered by the firm’s corporate social responsibility.  After evaluating   the reports, this study noticed 
that most of the good reports reflect donations   to education and health and the bad reports are related to 
unemployment, worker remuneration, damages to the environment and general discontent among the 
indigenes.  Listing these reports by date would make boring reading, therefore reference is made only to 
the key recent (i.e. 2008 to 2013) newspaper articles. 
On October 24, 2008, Sierra Leone News reported excerpts from an interview with the Executive Director 
of the Human Rights Respect Raising Awareness Campaigners (HURRARC) about the operations of 
SRL.  The Director described that the state of affairs in the Rutile community as risky and dangerous. He 
explained that the company’s dredge had reduced a huge proportion of land in the community to the 
extent that dams overflowed leading to   flooding and that the community’s drinking waters were polluted 
by chemicals from the mining operations. 
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The review of the old mining act and the presentation of the new Mining Act of 2009 to Parliament for 
ratification drew a lot of attention in the local press. On   December 23, 2009, Awoko Newspaper reported 
that a prominent Freetown lawyer, Mohamed Fofanah, had pointed out that: “The new mining act is good 
for Sierra Leone, but implementation is the problem”.  Awoko Newspaper reported that, in a workshop 
organised by this prominent lawyer in December 2009, the views that the Executive Director of the 
HURRARC expressed in 2008 had been confirmed. The Programme Director of Children's Welfare and 
Community Development (CWADEP) explained that the general rutile mining area was deplorable and 
there was a huge class gap between the corporate employees and the indigenes of the community.  During 
discussions, the Chairman of the Landowners’ Federation described the ongoing unregulated dumping of 
waste by the company, land degradation, air and water pollution and the creation of massive unprotected 
artificial lakes which are responsible for frequent cases of drowning in the area.   
The Youth Leader of Imperri Chiefdom, Bonthe District, stressed that the operations of SRL in their 
locality had made life very difficult for them, noting that they had lost access to their fertile agricultural 
lands and that one day they would resort to violence if action was not taken to reverse the current trend.    
In May 2012, Uhuru News reported that foreign SRL workers were given weekly allowances of $300 
whilst the minimum monthly wage   paid to local workers was only 300,000 Leones, which is less than 
$100 per month. This grievance over level of pay, alleged ill- treatment and discrimination led to local 
senior staff of the company embarking on a two- week hunger strike, as was also reported in Politico 
Newspaper in October 2012.  The National Chairman for ‘Campaign for Just Mining’ corroborated most 
of the allegations made by the workers against the company and described the company as one practicing 
“corporate apartheid, and corporate arrogance”. 
Local news of  the activities of SRL is not always bleak.  In April 2013, Awareness Times Newspaper 
reported that the Sierra Rutile Foundation had funded the installation of solar street lights in the Moriba 
and Mogbwemo areas as these areas were not connected to the national grid.  This gesture has improved 
safety and allowed more night-time commercial activity in these areas.    
SRL’s rehousing of families affected by its Lanti mining project was reported by Standard Times in May 
2013. The report revealed that the company employed local builders from the village to work on the 
project in a bid to inject income into the affected communities.  The company’s launching of   a career 
development programme was reported in June 2013 by Sierra Media Express. According to the 
newspaper, company representatives explained that this program would identify Sierra Leonean 
employees with high potential and train them to eventually take top technical and management positions 
in the company. 
Over the years, several local newspapers have published articles reporting the company’s repairing of 
roads, rehabilitation of schools,   digging of new water wells and repairing old ones, the establishment of 
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a library, rehabilitation of court barris and markets, the establishment of a banana plantation and the 
building of a technical institute to train youths. 
In August 2013, it was reported that the company was engaged in land rehabilitation and the 
establishment of fish nursing ponds.  However it is worth noting that, in March 2011,  Awoko Newspaper 
reported  the shock and dissatisfaction expressed by  The Parliamentary Oversight Committee on Mines 
and Minerals and a Civil Society Coalition on extractives over the appalling environmental condition of 
mined-out areas,  “without proper reclamation of the land” by the company.  It was observed that, whilst 
most of the land had been destroyed as a result of the mining operation, little effort was being made to 
rehabilitate the mining communities.  
It can be seen that there are mixed effects from the company’s mining activities.  Two of the main issues 
are inequality and low wages.  This study has also concluded that there are discrepancies between 
company reports on the extent of activities such as land rehabilitation and the level of rehabilitation that 
is actually being done.  
 
- Media reports on African Minerals Limited 
 
AML, like SRL, has its key production updates reported mostly in the foreign media.  Production 
forecasts, meeting and breaking of targets are mostly reported.  In 2012, the most popular production 
story featuring in many different media outlets, such as Mining Weekly, The Guardian and Reuter’s 
website, was the reduction in the company’s 2012 production forecast.  It was reported that, citing severe 
wet weather in Sierra Leone and uncertainty, AML had revised its 2012 forecast downwards  twice. As 
at April 2012, the forecast had been revised from 15 million tons to 10 million tons, which was further 
reduced to six million tons in August of the same year.  This resulted in a 13% drop in the price of the 
company’s shares.   
 In May 2012, Reuters reported on the retirement of   the company’s CEO after just three years, following 
the completion of an early stage in its iron-ore project.  The outlet stated that analysts at Canaccord 
Genuity Investment Bank  said the departure was "less than ideal", coming , as it did, after recent unrest 
among workers at the mine and fears that other senior managers who had  followed the CEO to Sierra 
Leone might  also retire or resign. News of this retirement and fears of future high flying resignations 
resulted in AML’s share prices falling by 5.34% that day. 
Reuters reported that AML had committed all 2012 and 2013 production to buyers, including the 
Shandong Iron and Steel group, Standard Bank and commodities trader Glencore, with whom it signed 
4.7 million tons a year, five year contract, commencing in 2013.  
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In spite of the company generating an operating loss of $41.5 million in 2011 and missing its production 
target for 2012, Mining Weekly reported in June 2013 that AML had announced that it had exceeded its 
20 million tons a year export run rate target and that the mine’s processing plants had been consistently 
operating above target rate since May 1, 2013.   
Volatility is not specific to production.  AML share prices also fluctuate, especially with news of large 
investments and appointments. Business Week reported that the company’s shares closed up 7.1% when 
the $1.5 billion investment accord with Shandong Iron and Steel Group Co. was signed in August 2011. 
When this acquisition of a 25% stake in the company was finalised in March 2012, Mining Weekly 
reported the news and stated that, according to the company, this investment would fast-track the 
development of Phase 2 of its project while enabling a payment of $418 million of secured debt. 
Some media outlets, such as Reuters, report detailed financial updates on the company.  They specifically 
follow how the company manages its debt and financing options. Reuters reported that the company’s   
operating loss of $41.5 million for 2011 primarily consisted of employee costs, travel costs of $28.5 
million and share-based payments of $16.5 million. It is also worth noting that, in spite of the company 
generating an operating loss, it still made share-based payments, providing support for this study’s 
recommendation that the Government should be a shareholder in all such companies operating in Sierra 
Leone. Companies always seek to please their shareholders. In August 2011, Reuters reported that the 
Bermuda-registered company, not covered by the United Kingdom's Takeover Code, had asked 
shareholders to vote on increasing its takeover protection, especially since shares in the company had 
risen by about 30%. 
 It will be recalled from the AML mining agreement with the Government, that airline ticket costs are tax 
deductible. Therefore, with deductible travel costs of $28.5 million and an operating loss in 2011, the 
Government received no corporation tax payment from AML that year and will continue to not receive 
any until the company reports a profit. The $868 million refinancing package, including a $350-million 
convertible bond which the company finalised in February 2012, was reported to reduce the average cost 
of the company’s remaining debt down to about 8.3%. 
 
Local media, as explained earlier, mostly report activities related to mining companies’ socio-economic 
contributions.  On December 24, 2008, Cotton Tree News reported that AML and local authorities of the 
Port Loko district had signed a contract for the use of the Pepel Rails and Port in the district.  At the 
signing ceremony, a payment of 180 million Leones ($ 41,860) was made as surface rent to the land 
owners. In the course of the year, various newspapers, including the Standard Times, announced AML’s 
provision of scholarships for primary and secondary school students. The beneficiaries mostly lived in 
and close to the company’s operational areas. On February 20, 2013, Newstime Africa reported that AML 
had revised part of its corporate social responsibilities to improve the capacity and skills of the youth, 
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assist in technical development of workshops and instructional resources and to produce graduate mining 
engineers for the mining community.  The company continued its commitment to improving the country’s 
human capital by establishing a Talent Development Steering Committee to empower qualified Sierra 
Leoneans and reduce the number of expatriate employees, according to a report in Africa Young Voices 
newspaper in May 2013. The newspaper also pointed out that the company would be upgrading the 
Magburaka Government Technical Institute and making arrangements for the establishment of 
partnership programs between the institute and similar colleges around the world.  
The relationship AML and the local community has not been and is not always rosy. The company’s first 
shipment of iron ore from Sierra Leone was met with protests in Makeni and the police had to be called 
in. Demotix reported that the protest was based on fears of perceived exploitation of the country amidst 
persistent poverty and unemployment.  A little over a year later, in April 2012, news of two days of 
rioting over pay by workers from AML was reported in almost all the local newspapers and the 
international press.  The riot reportedly started out as a protest over wages and working conditions as the 
strikers claimed that foreign workers received preferential salaries and treatment. There were fatalities 
and many injuries.  Three weeks after the strike, newspapers reported that AML had announced a 400% 
salary hike for local workers and that contractors who were owed by the company would be paid. This 
research believes that is an indication how low initial salaries were and also the potential conflict that 
might arise as a result of inequitable distribution of mining wealth.   
Several months after the strike and the community’s return to relative calm, Sierra Leone Daily Mail 
reported that the General Manager of AML had complained of bad attitudes, lethargy to work, aggression 
to foreign staff and demand for astronomical wages by local employees.  He also discredited claims of 
poor working conditions and labelled the workers that rioted as inflexible workers who were bad 
examples. He also claimed that local traders inflated the prices of basic goods and services as a result of 
the company’s presence in the region.  
 
- Media Reports on London Mining 
 
The media reports on London Mining, like all the other companies reviewed so far, are often limited to 
key production highlights, a few financials and activities embedded in their corporate social 
responsibility.  The first shipment of iron ore from LML was reported in Mining Weekly in February 
2012. The report also revealed that, according to LML, two more shipments of iron ore had been ordered 
to be sent to China, where a premium price was expected to be realised.  In April 2012, the same outlet 
also reported that LML’s 1.5 million tonsa year processing plant was set to evolve into a five million 
tonsa year plant by 2014. On January 24, 2013, Mining Weekly reported that the company had beaten its 
2012 production target owing to a 46% increase in quarterly production at the company’s mine and the 
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upgraded floating offshore shipping platform. In May 2013, the same outlet reported that, during the first 
quarter of 2013, LML achieved record production and sales volumes. There was more than 220% growth 
in production and 52% increase in sales, compared with the first quarter of 2012.  
On the financial front, on January 16, 2012, Mining Weekly reported the $650 million lawsuit filed 
against the company by its joint venture partner in China Global Mining Resources Ltd, Wits Basin 
Precious Minerals. The lawsuit was a counterclaim against LML’s action to seek the repayment of a $1 
million loan, including interest and costs, which Wits Basin stated was not yet due. in a statement, LML 
said that it believed that the counterclaim was “merely a tactic” to avoid the repayment of the loan. In 
this regard, on February 11, 2013, Business Wire reported that both companies had ended the joint 
venture by mutual agreement. Wits Basin retained 50.1 % of the shares and the remaining 49.9 % were 
used to fund the litigation.  
On March 29, 2012, Mining Weekly reported that LML was now fully funded to boost capacity at its 
mine. This came as the company signed a $45-million offtake-related prepayment loan agreement with 
energy trading company Vitol and an offtake agreement with Glencore, including a $27 million 
prepayment facility.  On August 23, 2012, Mining Weekly reported that, for the first six months ended 
June 2012, LML had  posted a profit of $13.1 million in earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortisation (EBITDA),  up from a loss of $7.1 million in 2011. The company also received $110 million 
from Blackrock financing in August 2012 whereby Blackrock would receive a 2% revenue-related 
royalty calculated on any iron-ore sales from the company over the life of mine.  
As already explained, local newspapers mostly report CSR related activities. The company’s social 
relationship had a rocky start.  A few days following the confirmation of iron ore deposits in Port Loko, 
Awareness Times Newspaper reported that youths in the locality of the ore deposits had executed a 
massive riot that resulted in dozens of arrests. Even though, during a two hour long debate organised by  
BBC Media Action in July 2007,   the company had been reported as having  made some form of tangible 
social contributions in the form of donations for the residents of the community where the company’s 
operations were based,  as per the article published by Politico Newspaper, hundreds of residents said 
they had  had no benefit whatsoever from the company’s activities. According to the report, less than 
twenty people stated that the minerals in the community had been of benefit to them. The key areas of 
discontentment regarding the company’s activities that were cited included marginalisation in the area of 
employment, flooding, displacement, menial jobs and girls dropping out of school owing to prostitution. 
The Minister of Presidential and Public Affairs in Sierra Leone commented on the huge imbalance in pay 
structure between foreign and Sierra Leonean employees. He said that even though only about 10% of 
staff of LML were foreigners,  the combined salaries of the local 90%  did not  come anywhere close to 
the combined salaries of their foreign counterparts.  
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 -Media Reports on Sierra Mineral Holdings Limited 
There are hardly any reports on the activities of Sierra Mineral Holdings in the local media. The company 
also does not seem to be making much contribution in terms of CSR to the local community. To this 
study’s knowledge, the most common story circulating in the local press regarding this company started 
in August 2013 regarding the non-payment of outstanding monies owned to local contractors. All of the 
most widely circulated newspapers reported on this issue. The company is alleged to owe Sierra Leonean 
companies about $11.5 million for services ranging from transportation, fuel, lubricant supplies and 
heavy machine hire, with some of the invoices dating as far back as 2010. The reports revealed that the 
company’s management had threatened to file for bankruptcy if suppliers went to court to file and demand 
payment. A few of the newspapers alleged that Alro, the parent company’s Romanian operations, was 
also said to be paying SMHL $28 per ton of bauxite instead of the world market value of around $58 per 
ton and upwards, thus, over the years, causing the company to be operating at a loss, hence their inability 
to pay their service providers and salaries. A few also reported that the company did not want to pay 
because they believed that they had the  support of the Government and explained that this was  because  
the  firm had  hired the  law chambers of Frank Kargbo,  Sierra Leone’s Attorney-General, as their legal 
representatives.  
 
5.5 TRIANGULATING THE RESULTS 
Hypothesis Five: The estimation results and the qualitative findings reveal that natural resources lead to 
economic development in Sierra Leone. In order to assess whether Hypothesis Five is accepted or 
rejected, this research will triangulate the empirical and qualitative results in three stages.  Firstly, the 
empirical results from the PLS model estimated presented in section 5.2 are compared with the mining 
agreements. The mining contracts reviewed in section 5.4.1 do not provide information regarding the 
activities of households and expectations of indigenes. Therefore, Hypothesis Three, which tests whether 
the activities of households result in development in Sierra Leone, and Hypothesis Four, which tests the 
impact of expectations on the activities of the Government and the firms, are not accounted for by the 
mining contracts. An assessment of the link between the empirical results and company reports is then 
carried out.  Finally, empirical results and findings from newspaper articles are compared. 
 
5.5 .1 EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND MINING AGREEMENTS 
 -The African Minerals Sample:  
Hypothesis One seeks to test whether the Government’s activities, including debt servicing, lead to 
development in Sierra Leone. For the mining industry, the two strong paths by  which the Government 
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can ensure development aimed activities are  through the implementation of mining legislation and 
prudent spending of resource rents. The African Minerals model showed that government activities failed 
to have a significant positive impact on development in Sierra Leone, but had a positive significant impact 
on the firm. These relationships are supported by the terms of the mining agreement between AML and 
the Government. AML benefits from many tax concessions, to the advantage of the company but at the 
detriment of the country.  It has been shown that the company pays corporation tax of 25%, which is 12.5 
% less than the rate required by law. Even though it pays royalty, which is tax deductible at rate of 3%, 
there is no performance bond provision, which can be used in forecasting revenue,   to guarantee it meets 
production targets and that the State is assured a certain amount of money. AML enjoys exemptions from 
all import duties in respect of mining machinery, equipment and parts for the duration of its contract. 
There is also no limit on the amount of loss that can the company can offset against chargeable income. 
Royalty payments should not be depended on as the key source of mining revenue. With all these tax 
exemptions, much needed revenue that could have been used to fill the country’s foreign exchange gap 
and fiscal imbalance is lost and the Government is still on the borrowing and repayment of external debt 
path, resulting in negative impact on development. With deficit financing, not much of the Government 
budget is allocated to welfare spending, hence the significant negative impact on households. Hypothesis 
Two concerns the mining firms’ contribution to development in Sierra Leone.  The African Minerals 
model showed that the company has a significant negative impact on development and a significant 
positive impact on the household. This shows that the donations of medicines, renovation of   schools 
and training of Sierra Leoneans that the company is engaged in within its corporate social responsibility 
only positively affect parties that directly receive these donations and training.  Since CSR is voluntary, 
it is possible that the company does the least it can afford. The negotiated tax deals in addition to the level 
of CSR   provide support for   significant negative impact of the firm on development.   
 
 -The London Mining Model: 
In the London Mining model, the Government’s significant positive impact of the on development in 
Sierra Leone is revealed based on the London Mining sample. The model also revealed a significant 
positive influence of the Government on the firm. However, a significant negative impact on households 
was also shown. Hypothesis Two was rejected with respect to the company’s significant negative impact 
on development. The results, however, also showed that London Mining has a significant positive impact 
on the household. 
These positive effects of the Government on development and the firm have foundations in the adjusted 
terms of the LML agreement. Just like African Minerals Ltd, London Mining Ltd has successfully 
negotiated its own tax deals with the Government. However, in comparison with import duties and related 
charges, LML’s concessions are much lower. The company does not have a blanket duty free concession 
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for the duration of its contract, but has a deal in which payable duty increases progressively until the 
company pays the full customs duty on its imports as required by applicable law.  As at 2013 up to 2018, 
import duties payable by the company is 1% of the invoiced value of the consignment.  This increases to 
2.5% from 2019 to 2020, and applicable law applies thereafter.    The company pays royalty on sales and 
has a Performance Bond agreement with the Government which becomes payable in instances when it 
fails to meet production targets.  However, the company still enjoys GST exemptions and lower 
corporation tax rates. Therefore, it can be concluded that these relatively more stringent financial 
arrangements have resulted in more Government revenue, but still less than required by Sierra Leone’s 
mining legislation and, hence, are advantageous to the company.  The agreement required the company 
to make contributions to the Community Development Fund and also undertake voluntary CSR activities. 
However these provisions have failed to result in positive household effects. 
 
 -The Sierra Rutile Model: 
Similar to the London Mining model, the Sierra Rutile model also showed a significant positive impact 
of the Government on development and the firm, but it also showed an insignificant negative impact on 
the household. In contrast to the results of both the African Minerals and London Mining models, the 
results of this model indicate that Sierra Rutile has a significant positive bearing on development and a 
significant positive impact on the household. This could  be due to the fact that, compared to the two 
previously discussed companies, Sierra Rutile has been in operation the longest and its agreement with 
the Government comes the closest to agreeing to terms almost in line with applicable law. The company 
does not have blanket duty concessions, but pays a reduced rate and has provisions for increases until the 
full rate required by the legislation is paid. Historically, the company has made royalty payments (4%) at 
a rate higher than that required by law (3%).  It must not, however, be forgotten that   both the Government 
and the company have reached an agreement that royalty payments be suspended until 2014. The 
insignificant negative impact on the household shows that the company is implementing the terms of the 
agreement aimed at the promotion of benefits for Sierra Leoneans, but there is room for improvement. 
Some of these terms include employment priority for Sierra Leoneans and the training of Sierra Leoneans 
to gradually replace expatriates. The company also makes payments to the Community Development 
Fund and engages in CSR activities and has provided detailed plans for its contribution to the 
environment’s rehabilitation. 
 -The Sierra Minerals Holdings Limited Model 
Hypothesis One, which seeks to test whether the Government’s activities lead to development in Sierra 
Leone is accepted in the Sierra Minerals Holding model. From the model, it is evident that the 
Government has a significant positive impact on development, the household and the firm. Hypothesis 
Two, testing the mining firms’ contribution to development in Sierra Leone, was also accepted as the 
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results revealed that the company has a significant positive impact on both the household and 
development. The mining agreement reached between SMHL and the Government does not allow blanket 
duty free concessions,  but only a discounted rate. The company also pays the highest corporation tax 
(30%) in comparison to the other three companies, but still benefits from GST exemptions. The company 
also pays royalty at the required rate and its agreement also makes provision for the development of local 
manufacturing, employment of Sierra Leoneans, community development and environmental 
rehabilitation. 
 
   - The Total Sample Model 
At a national level, the Total Sample model showed that the Government has a significant negative impact 
on development and significant positive impacts on the firm and the household.   The significant positive 
impact on firms can be inferred from the large scale duty concessions, GST exemptions, tax discounts 
and exemptions, capital allowances, tax deductible activities and a too liberal treatment of company 
losses. The Government may appoint an audit firm to audit mining companies, but there is no report of it 
having ever been done. The positive household impact can be based on provisions in the agreements for 
promoting Sierra Leonean employment and training, subsequent replacement of expatriates by Sierra 
Leoneans, required contributions to the Community Development Fund and the Environment 
Development Fund.  Apart from the required contributions that the companies make to the Community 
Development Fund, there are no clauses in the agreements regarding specific developmental 
contributions that these companies should make, especially with regards to improving the infrastructure 
of the country.   
The African Minerals Ltd and the London Mining Ltd agreements made provisions for joint reviews with 
The Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. During the interview conducted with a member of 
staff from the Ministry, it was revealed to the author that not much in terms of in-depth reviews of the 
companies had already been done. The researcher was, however, informed that an ‘Extractive Industries 
Revenue Taskforce’ had been initiated to monitor and forecast revenues and to help improve on 
transparency within the mining sector.  The respondent was, however, not aware that  the review  of 
London Mining’s fiscal package had been agreed to commence in 2020 and could not provide any 
reasoning on the part for the Government for not   clearly requiring such reviews at more regular intervals.  
It was also not clear whether Sierra Rutile and SMHL would be subject to joint reviews as well.  The 
official also commented that some form of unreported bribery, lobbying and short-sighted forecasting 
had been practiced behind the scenes; resulting in some of the companies receiving such high levels of 
exemptions compared to others and suggested a review of the agreements. From the respondent’s answers 
to questions and a brief update of the state of government finances, the author’s personal observation is 
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that the Government is desperate for cash injections against its rising borrowing from external sources, 
hence the high probability of it accepting immediate cash settlements rather than equity. 
 
5.5.2 EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND COMPANY REPORTS 
Most of these mining companies use production, sales and operations updates as some sort of indicators 
through which the financial health of the company can be assumed, given a market of incomplete 
information.  All the companies reviewed in their publicly available company reports provide updates on 
major production, sales and operations updates.  They also report financial issues, most often relating to 
trading of their shares, changes in ownership structure and fund raising efforts and results.  It must be 
noted that the information provided in the company reports are mostly for the information of  current and 
potential investors, as some form of ‘signalling’ on the part of the companies.  The Government has no 
influence on what the companies publish in their reports and, from interviews conducted by the author of 
this thesis, relevant staff, such as those attached to the National Revenue Authority, Ministry of Mines 
and Ministry of Finance, do not actually read the company reports published by these companies on their 
company websites. Instead, they rely mostly on information submitted to them based on the reporting 
requirements set out in the mining agreements.  Therefore, in the case of Sierra Leone, it might seem at 
first glance that company reports do not have much connotation with Hypothesis One, which seeks to test 
whether government activities lead to development in Sierra Leone.  However, it is the author’s belief 
that analysis of reports can help with better monitoring of companies, especially with differences between 
financials reported in company reports and those submitted to the Government.  
 
 -African Minerals Limited Model 
The lack of adequate monitoring on the part of the Government can be linked to the African Minerals 
model, revealing that government activities failed to have a significant positive impact on households 
and development in Sierra Leone whilst having a positive significant impact on the firm.  African 
Minerals company reports revealed that only one Sierra Leonean had an equity share in the company 
(2.4%).  The company also reported its successful fund raising activities, the trading of its shares on the 
AIM and production ‘take-off’ contracts. Hypothesis Two, which tests the mining firms’ contribution to 
development in Sierra Leone, was rejected when the results of the AML model presented that the 
company had a significant negative impact on development but a significant positive impact on the 
household.  This negative developmental impact can be seen from the information that, even with 
successful funding and guaranteed take-off contracts, most of the payments made to Government 
comprise of direct and indirect taxes with royalty only a small fraction of the total.  
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The significant impact positive impact on the household lies in the reported workforce being 84% Sierra 
Leonean. The company reported that was making giant strides in educating and training the Sierra 
Leonean work force. It has formed a Joint Steering Committee with the Ministry of Education to foster 
efforts of training Sierra Leoneans in Sierra Leonean universities and also at foreign institutes. The 
company also reported that it was actively recruiting from the country’s two largest universities, Fourah 
Bay College and Njala University.  This shows that the significance of the Human Capital Theory of the 
resource curse is widely acknowledged in Sierra Leone. AML informed the public of the riot carried out 
by some members of staff and their families that occurred in one of the communities and, following the 
riot about the level of wages, the company made certain pay increases to the indigenes.  During the visit 
to the communities where AML’s mining activities are concentrated and where the questionnaires were 
administered, the author observed that a large proportion of the African Minerals workforce are indeed 
Sierra Leoneans.  The company’s wage increase was also well-received by the community. The 
infrastructure of the communities is better developed than in the communities of the other companies. 
However, some locals and the author are of the opinion than the improvements in the infrastructure are 
as a result of Government spending in the area, because it is the home town of the current President, Dr. 
Ernest Bai Koroma. During an interview with one of the women’s leaders in the community, she revealed 
that, because AML has a Sierra Leonean, Gibril Bangura, as one of it its shareholders, in her words, it is 
“because of Fadika (Gibril Bangura) that African Minerals feels pity for the people of Sierra Leone and 
is trying to help the poor people out”.  
 
 -The London Mining Limited Model 
The London Mining model showed that government activities have a significant bearing on development 
in Sierra Leone. The model also revealed a significant positive influence of the Government on the firm. 
However, a significant negative impact of the Government on households was shown. In the case of 
Hypothesis Two, London Mining, as in the case of African Minerals, is shown to have a significant 
negative impact on development and a significant positive impact on the household. As explained in the 
case of African Minerals, the firm is mainly foreign owned and makes available to the public information 
about significant shareholding changes, production and operations updates, financing options and off-
take agreements.  The company also reports on its CSR. Most of the time, updates reveal improvements 
in the health and safety record at its mine, technical training of staff, scholarships to primary and 
secondary school children living in the local community, health initiatives like HIV sensitisation 
programs and construction of water wells.   
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 -The Sierra Rutile Limited Model 
In the Sierra Rutile model, Hypothesis One was accepted as the results of the model indicated a significant 
positive impact of the Government on development and the firm. The results also showed that the 
Government has an insignificant negative impact on the household. For the case of Sierra Rutile, 
Hypothesis Two, which tests the mining firms’ contribution to development in Sierra Leone, was 
accepted as the company was shown to have significant positive bearing on development and the 
household.  Among the usual reports of fund raising, major shareholding changes, sales and production 
milestones, the company reported about a loan from the Government of Sierra Leone through the 
European Union. However, despite increasing production and sales, reduced royalty payments and tax 
discounts, the company has a poor repayment record, which led to a dispute with the Government. 
Surprisingly, but re-emphasising the author’s conviction of  the short-sightedness of the Government  and  
its desperation for cash injections,  repayment negotiations,  which at one stage involved the Government 
swapping the outstanding debt for equity in the company, ended  up with a payment plan being agreed . 
This research discovered that the debt has still not yet been completely repaid whilst the company’s 
profits have continued to rise.  It is arrangements such as this that limit the degree of positive effect that 
the Government and the firm could have on households and development as a whole.  
The company’s reports mostly contain positive CSR reports linked to education, training, land 
rehabilitation, fish farm creations, health and sanitation initiatives. The only negative report concerned 
the dredge that capsized at the mining site, resulting in a fatality and a temporary fall in the value of its 
shares.  This study does not dispute the fact that the company is making some social contributions. 
However, during the author’s visit to the mining community, the actual contributions, such as amount of 
land rehabilitated, fish farms created, and number of Sierra Leoneans employed, are not quite as 
significant as one is led to believe by reading the company reports.  In the Sierra Rutile company 
presentation of June 2013, rehabilitation works were reported to be worth over $1.5million annually. 
However, during the visit to the rutile community, observation and interaction by the author with the 
locals did not reveal $1.5 million per year worth of construction, rehabilitation and health works.  It is 
this research’s opinion that the value of such development initiatives is overvalued for the sake of 
investors and promoting a better corporate profile. 
 
 -The Sierra Minerals Holding Limited Model 
The results of the Sierra Minerals Holding model also presented evidence of a significant positive impact 
of the Government on development, the household and the firm. The estimations from the SMHL sample 
also failed to reject Hypothesis Two.  SMHL, owned by Vimetco, was a profitable firm at the time it was 
167 
 
acquired from Titanium Resource Group in 2008.  However, two years later, the company made a loss 
and did not make any income tax payments to the Government and only royalty payments were made. 
The company makes public   production updates and some summary financial statistics. Unlike the other 
three companies under review, SMHL does not provide updates about top management or fund raising 
activities.  From 2010 up to September 2013, the company has not made public any further reports 
regarding its operations on its website. Surprisingly, the company’s reports on CSR activities are also 
minimal.  
One would definitely be tempted ask why then is there a significant positive impact of the firm on 
development and households. From the author’s observation and the response of a traditional leader, a 
youth leader and a women’s group leader selected from the mining villages where SMHL operates, there 
is a sense of ‘acceptance’.  The people in the communities where the operations of SMHL are located 
have accepted their level of poverty and do not exhibit high levels of positive expectations. The traditional 
leader explained that the company only makes contributions it feels like making. In most cases it is the 
bare minimum and the Government has never sent officials to their locality to observe their standard  of 
living amidst the company’s operations.  The women’s leader explained that they, the local people, are 
not educated or skilled in any mining-related job, hence, in her opinion, they themselves are responsible 
for their current predicament and SMHL cannot do anything about it. She emphasised, however, that the 
younger generation could be trained in technical areas so that in the future they could be employed in 
jobs other than as menial labourers. 
 
5.5.3 EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND MEDIA ARTICLES 
Media articles are, in most cases, post-event reportage. They, therefore, are not significant determinants 
on the impact of the Government, mining firms or households on development. However, they help 
influence the expectations locals form about the activities of the Government and the firms. Most of the 
time, it is the foreign media that reports on production milestones, sales figures, funding arrangements 
and appointments. The local media reports are often mainly limited to reports on CSR activities. These 
media reports, in most cases, do not account for government activities, but mostly the impact of the firms. 
 -The African Minerals Limited Model 
The results of the African Minerals model showed that the company has a significant negative impact on 
development and a significant positive impact on the household.  Proof of this negative impact on 
development can be seen in local riots over export shipments and the need for strikes over the level of 
salaries, resulting in a 400% salary hike. This study can only imagine how low initial wages were that 
the company could agree to and offer such a large percentage increase.  Local media reports of payments 
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of surface rents, scholarships, training and rehabilitation of schools and institutes show how the positive 
impact the company has on households comes about.  
The author interviewed a member of staff at African Minerals. The manager complained that some of the 
indigenes had a lethargic attitude towards work. The official stressed that, due to income differences and 
unequal standards of living, some workers exhibited bad attitudes towards expatriate staff and some 
demanded astronomical wages.  Compared to the communities where the other mining companies under 
review operate, the infrastructure of the AML communities is better. The researcher also observed that a 
high level of  high school leavers move to seek employment at the mines as labourers rather than pursuing 
further education.  
 -The London Mining Limited Model 
The results of the London Mining model revealed that the company has a significant negative impact on 
development and a significant positive impact on the household. The negative reports concerning the 
activities of the company outweigh the positive reports. This can be viewed as an indicator of the negative 
bearing that this firm has on economic development in Sierra Leone. The local media reported that riots 
broke out on confirmation of deposits.  The high school dropout rate observed in the African Minerals 
community was also observed in the London Mining community. The author also observed some form 
of inflated prices. When questioned, one of the traders explained that inflating the prices of certain goods 
to sell to employees of London Mining Ltd is the only chance of them reaping benefits from the mining 
activities in the community.  
 
 -The Sierra Rutile Limited Model 
The results from the estimation of the Sierra Rutile model indicate that Sierra Rutile has a significant 
positive bearing on development and a significant positive impact on the household. SRL has been in 
operation for the longest amount of time compared to the other companies.  The foreign media reports 
about the firm’s sales targets, production milestones, shareholding changes and financials and off-take 
agreements. Off-take agreements guarantee royalty payments to the Government. The local newspapers 
publish articles concerning donations made by the firm towards health, sanitation and education. As is 
often the case, on the other hand, HURRARC reported about overflowing dams, flooding, improper 
disposal of waste and contamination of drinking water. CWADEP also highlighted the deplorable 
conditions in which the local people live and the   huge inequality in the wages paid to expatriates and to 
nationals.  
The author can confirm both the negative and positive reports as the evidence was clearly visible during 
the visit to Sierra Rutile. In a conversation with some of the youths, a high level of dissatisfaction was 
observed. Some even made reference to the fact that it was such poor standards of living and inequitable 
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distribution of diamond wealth that resulted in the 11 year civil war. They said that if the Government 
fails to actually help change the current state of affairs, they would be left with no other option than to 
go on riots and organise strike actions. 
 
 -The Sierra Minerals Holding Limited Model 
The Sierra Minerals Holding model estimation results showed that the company has a significant positive 
impact on both the household and development.  Unlike the other companies considered in this study, 
there are not many reports in the media concerning its activities. There are a few reports of donations 
made towards education and small scale construction projects in its area of operations.  The most recent 
report in the local media concerning its activities is that the company owes local contractors 
approximately $11million for services related to transportation, local supplies and clearing and 
forwarding services.  Despite this negative turn of events, it shows that the company does indeed use 
local businesses to provide services and certain goods and the multiplier effect of such transactions results 
in positive impacts on both households and development.  When a member of staff was quizzed by the 
author regarding this report of non-payment, it was revealed that the company is facing financial issues. 
He explained that the produce of the mine in Sierra Leone is solely for the purpose of supplying the parent 
company in Romania. According to him, the parent company pays less than the market price to the 
subsidiary, SMHL; hence the company struggles to keep up with payments. During the author’s visit to 
the SMHL community, riots were ongoing over the non-payment of surface rents.  This off-take 
agreement with the parent company, Vimetco, paying less than the market price for bauxite, does not 
only have repercussions for the SMHL, it also transmits into lower royalty revenue for the Government 
and lost income in terms of taxes. 
 
 -The Total Sample Model 
On the whole, the Total Sample model showed that, at national level, the Government has a significant 
negative impact on development and significant positive impacts on the firm and the household and that 
firms have a positive significant effect on the households but an insignificant positive impact on 
development.  The analysis of the qualitative data also confirms these results.  Hence, from the estimation 
results and the qualitative findings, this research failed to accept the null hypothesis of Hypothesis Five.  
Currently,   natural resources do not lead to economic development in Sierra Leone at a significant level. 
Two weeks after topping  Transparency International’s (TI)  list of most corrupt  countries , the 
Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) ranked Sierra Leone  as the poorest country in the world, even 
though it   had recently being described  as one of the fastest growing economies in West Africa. 
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According to the MPI report, education, water supply, electricity, roads and health delivery are very 
bad in Sierra Leone, coupled with the low salaries. 
The results of the Structural Equation model estimated for the total sample in Chapter Five revealed that, 
in line with the empirical findings in Chapter Four, the perceptions of Sierra Leoneans confirm the 
existence of a debt overhang-resource curse in Sierra Leone.  Apart from the Debt Overhang Theory, the 
Quality of Institutions, Conflict, Rational Expectations, Human Capital and Rentier theories also provide 
some explanation for the lagging growth experience by the country. 
In 2010, the mining industry accounted for almost 60% of exports (US$200 million), but only 8% (US$24 
million) of government revenue came from the mining sector. Despite increasing global mineral prices, 
mining companies in Sierra Leone hardly declare any profits. Government revenue from mining 
accounted for only 1.1% of GDP (NACE Report, 2009)7. The Government’s finances are under massive 
strain due to misguided borrowing and spending, and this has left the Government with a budget deficit.  
The analysis of the mining agreements signed by the four mining companies reviewed in this paper 
revealed that they have successfully negotiated agreements more beneficial to themselves than the 
country to keep their payments to the Government of Sierra Leone low.  The contracts are not in 
accordance with the Mines and Minerals Act of 2009 and the Income Tax Act of 2000. 
The company reports revealed that the companies’ main aim is to send positive signals to shareholders 
and potential investors.  Ownership information, operation updates, financials and social contributions 
are the main transmission channels. The financial updates revealed that tax payments to the Government 
are minimal.  
The international media articles mostly report what the companies publish in their annual reports and on 
their websites. It is only the local media that stress the adverse effects of mining activities on the socio-
economic lives of Sierra Leoneans. Besides the limited economic contribution because of the poor levels 
of revenue generated by the government from mining, mining impacts adversely on local communities 
and the environment. 
Sierra Leone has difficulties in managing the extractive industry. Poor governance, corruption and the 
lack of human capacity to monitor and evaluate the operations and performance of foreign companies 
operating in the country provide the foundation for less than expected growth and development.  
                                                            
7 National Advocacy Coalition On Extractives (NACE):  Sierra Leone at the crossroads: Seizing the chance to benefit from 
mining; March 2009. 
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The state of affairs that can be deduced from the results of the survey, mining agreements, company 
reports, newspaper articles, interviews and the author’s observations provides further support for the debt 
overhang- resource curse hypothesis in Sierra Leone. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THESIS CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
All the empirical and qualitative investigation of the debt overhang- resource curse hypothesis has been 
done.  The examination started with a panel data analysis of 153 countries between 1970 and 2011.  This 
was followed by a time series SVAR analysis of the Sierra Leone experience for the same time period.  
This thesis continued by carrying out a perceptions-based study to evaluate whether the findings 
regarding the link shared by debt overhang, natural resources and growth in Sierra Leone, from secondary 
data mainly collected by international organisations, are corroborated by the perceptions of Sierra 
Leoneans. The inquiry continued with an analysis of the mining agreements signed with the Government 
by the four largest mining companies operating in the country, the reports these companies have made 
publicly available over the years and the articles that have been printed in the media regarding their 
activities in Sierra Leone. The findings from the GMM estimation, the SVAR estimation, the perceptions 
analysis and documents analysis were then compared. The conclusion reached is reported in the next 
section followed by the author’s recommendations on how Sierra Leone can better benefit from its natural 
resource endowment. 
 
6.1 THESIS CONCLUSION 
The examination of the relationship between debt overhang, natural resources and growth has unfolded 
through the three main studies of this thesis. The investigation commences in Chapter Three - Debt 
Overhang, Natural Resources and Growth: Panel Data Analysis, with a general examination of the 
phenomenon for a panel of 153 countries using regression analysis. The system of simultaneous 
equations made up of a Growth Equation, a Debt equation and a Capital Inflow equation was estimated 
using Generalised Method of Moments.  In answering the first research question, based on the data 
available the results confirm that debt overhang leads to a resource curse, but the impact is not universal.  
Chapter Three’s investigation continued by estimating the system of equations for carefully selected 
sub-panels.  The sub-panels were chosen to account for the role of heavy indebtedness, level of 
development, type of resource endowment and regional location in the debt overhang, resource and 
growth relationship.  The estimation of these sub-panels provided the answer to the second research 
question. The debt overhang –resource curse hypothesis was not confirmed in the case of HIPCS. The 
comparative analysis between OECDs and LDCs revealed a debt overhang effect in LDCs and not 
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OECDs, showing that the level of development attained by an economy is also one of the key underlying 
factors that influence the impact of debt and resources on growth. The consideration of how debt and 
natural resources simultaneously influence growth in mineral rich countries, petroleum rich countries 
and OPECs revealed a significant debt overhang effect in Petroleum Rich and Mineral Rich countries.   
Since OPEC has majority control over the supply of crude oil, the debt-overhang hypothesis did not 
hold for that sample.  
Regional location effects captured by the plainly Sub-Saharan African sub-sample confirmed the 
findings of studies that concluded that the resource rich continent has, over the years, been experiencing 
lagging growth. Even though some other studies’ explanations lie within the Institutional Quality and 
‘Dutch Disease’ theories, this thesis confirms a significant negative impact of the debt overhang-
resource curse hypothesis for SSA.   
As explained in the review of  both the resource curse and debt literature, this thesis has pointed out 
that no one theory can completely explain the growth experience of resource rich countries as growth 
itself is a dynamic process.   All existing and new explanations complement each other. Along this line 
of thought, even though the testing of the debt overhang- resource curse hypothesis was explicitly done, 
the effect of a few other complementary theories, even though with lesser statistical significance, was 
implicitly confirmed.   The Human Capital Theory and Institutional Theory both proved to have a strong 
impact in all the countries and across sub-panels. Hence they complement the Debt Overhang Theory.  
The findings of the GMM estimation proves that is that there is strong evidence of the debt overhang-
resource curse hypothesis in the world. The impact on growth is, however, not isolated. Debt affects 
growth via various transmission channels explained by other theories.  The mixed evidence revealed in 
sub-panels made a case for country specific analysis.  This case study analysis was carried out in 
Chapter Four and Chapter Five. 
 
Sierra Leone was the selected case study explored in Chapter Four- Debt overhang, Natural Resources 
and Growth: A Time Series Analysis of Sierra Leone’s Experience.  This country has characteristics 
that would render a unique perspective on the debt overhang – resource hypothesis. Sierra Leone is rich 
in minerals such as diamonds, iron ore, bauxite, rutile and gold, but still a heavily indebted poor country 
at the bottom of the human development index.  It has also experienced a 10 years civil war, the onset 
of which lay in the dispute about the wealth gained from diamonds, hence its notoriety for ‘blood 
diamonds’. In post-conflict Sierra Leone there has been a surge in investment by foreign companies in 
the extractive industry. This has driven the recent growth projections made by the IMF, World Bank, 
the Ministry of Finance and other international organisations. All these characteristics make Sierra 
Leone an ideal case study for the scope of this thesis’ investigation. 
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The first research question, which Chapter Four of this thesis sought to answer, ‘Does debt-overhang 
account for the resource curse in Sierra Leone?’ was answered by estimating a SVAR model  using 
time series data for Sierra Leone between 1970 and 2011.  The results of the estimation confirmed the 
debt overhang-resource curse hypothesis for Sierra Leone. It was also revealed that even though 
resource rents alone have a positive bearing on growth, this gains are displaced by the costs of debt 
servicing. Some support was also provided for the Quality of Institutions Theory and the Rent Seeking 
Theory; hence in response to Chapter Four’s second research question, other resource curse theories do 
apply to Sierra Leone. 
The fourth chapter went further than the SVAR estimation to determine whether there are long term 
relationships between debt, natural resources and growth in Sierra Leone and to investigate the causal 
relationship between debt and growth and between resources and growth in Sierra Leone.  The 
cointegration analysis showed that long term cointegration relationships exist between natural resources 
and growth and between growth and debt overhang.  Granger causality tests indicated that there is bi-
directional causality between natural resources and growth. Uni-directional causality running from 
growth to debt overhang was also presented. 
Even though Chapter Four confirmed the debt overhang- resource curse hypothesis for Sierra Leone, it 
also demonstrated that the country’s economic growth is intertwined with many aspects of the economy 
via various transmission mechanisms.  When one evaluates these transmission mechanisms, it begs the 
question: Does growth translate into development?  Also given Sierra Leone’s unique characteristics 
and its position at the bottom of the human development index and multidimensional poverty index, the 
author of this thesis deemed it necessary to carry out a more in-depth study of the situation in the country 
within the tenets of development.  This provided the inspiration for the third empirical investigation of 
this thesis. 
 
Chapter Five: Debt Overhang, Natural Resources, and Growth in Sierra Leone: a Perceptions Analysis 
and Documents Analysis.   A mixed method analysis was carried out: triangulation of a quantitative 
analysis, documentary analysis, interviews and author’s observations.  In the quantitative analysis, a 
perception-based study was carried out by estimating a structural equation model by partial least squares 
for a sample of 1,339 respondents randomly selected from the communities where the four largest 
mining companies in Sierra Leone currently operate and a control group selected from the capital city. 
The  conceptual model combined  measures of economic variables with underpinning lying in the 
Human Capital Theory, Institutional Theory,  ‘Dutch Disease’ Theory , Conflict Theory and  Debt  
Overhang Theory  of the resource curse   and measures to capture social dimensions such as health, 
environment and standard of living. 
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From the results of the estimation, it was concluded that there is evidence of the resource hypothesis 
and some evidence of debt overhang resource curse perceptions in Sierra Leone.  A significant negative 
impact of government activities, which include debt servicing on development in Sierra Leone, was 
revealed. It is, however, worth noting that there is more wide spread awareness of Government 
corruption and inadequate spending on health, education, water and infrastructure than awareness of 
the Government’s debt repayment obligations. 
On the whole, from the model estimated, the activities of the household, firm and the Government explain 
84% of the variation in development in Sierra Leone.  It is worth noting that, in absolute terms, the impact 
of the Government on development outweighs the impact of the household on development which in turn 
outweighs the impact of the firm on development.  In addressing the first three research questions, which  
Chapter Five sought to answer, the conclusion reached is that  there is evidence of a natural resource 
curse in Sierra Leone; support for the debt overhang- recourse curse hypothesis  and currently  natural 
resources do not  lead to a significantly improved standard of living and reduced inequality in Sierra 
Leone.  
In its entirety, based on citizens’ perceptions of the impact of resource wealth on growth and development 
in Sierra Leone, Debt Overhang Theory, Human Capital Theory, Conflict Theory, International Trade 
Theory, Welfare Theory, Quality of Institutions Theory, and Rentier State Theory explain, by varying 
degrees, Sierra Leone’s resource related lagging development.   
Following the quantitative analysis, the thesis reviewed the mining agreements which each of the four 
companies had signed with the Government of Sierra Leone. The company reports published by these 
companies over the years were also analysed. The media reports related to the activities of the 
companies were also surveyed. The analysis of these documents was done within the pillars of economic 
and social contributions to Sierra Leone. The findings from the quantitative analysis, document analysis, 
interviews and author’s observations were also triangulated. 
The quantitative and qualitative information having been triangulated, the thesis will now give 
recommendations on how Sierra Leone can better manage its resource wealth. This will provide the 
answer to the final research question.  
 
6.2    POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The quantitative and qualitative results revealed shortfalls in the activities of the Government, the firms 
and households that have culminated in the less than expected development of the country and high level 
of poverty and inequality. The past has been diagnosed and the present has been examined. This research 
now puts forward some recommendations which the author strongly believes can help change the current 
natural resource- led growth situation and improve on the probability of reduced poverty.   
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They key is to maximise revenue from natural resource extraction, manage this revenue stream well and 
diversify investment into other development enhancing sectors. When this is done, the domestic economy 
would expand and there would be less need for external borrowing. The long run impact would be reduced 
debt servicing requirements, hence a potential disappearance of the debt overhang- resource curse. 
This thesis’ main recommendations are: a review of mining agreements between the State and mining 
companies; implementing mining legislation, monitoring companies and reporting to the public, improve 
transparency in the extractive industry sector, curb corruption, take up Government shareholding in large 
mining companies, improve on the infrastructure and the effect of mining on the environment, include 
some CSR related activities in the mining agreements, improve the local manufacturing industry, enhance 
human capital, reform the financial sector, plan Government revenue collection and spending, evaluate 
and choose donors wisely, diversify export activities and promote self-development and realistic 
expectations of Government and company help.  The execution of all these recommendations would in 
this thesis’ opinion, increased domestic revenue, reduced debt servicing requirements, equitable 
distribution of wealth and eventually accelerated economic growth. 
 
- REVIEW MINING AGREEMENTS: 
 
The analysis of the mining agreements between the Government of Sierra Leone and the four mining 
companies under review revealed that, in some cases, there are terms that have been agreed  that are in 
violation of applicable law. Some of the terms are not beneficial to the country and the implementation 
of some of the potential beneficial terms is not adequately monitored.  The first point should be that, as 
in the case of Botswana, the Government should review the ownership structure of companies seeking 
mining licenses. The Mines and Minerals Act of Sierra Leone requires that no shareholder of these 
companies should have been convicted of any offence of which dishonesty is an element in or outside 
Sierra Leone. It is not within the scope of this study  to give details  of cases which have defaulted in 
this area, but during the research  carried out by  the author a few of the large mining companies have, 
within their ownership structure, individuals who have been convicted of crimes in which dishonesty is 
an element outside  of Sierra Leone. 
 
The individual mining and tax agreements signed by the Government with companies have provided 
extraordinary concessions that, in some cases, fail to make complete economic sense and the 
Government’s revenues from mining are miniscule. This study, therefore, recommends a review and 
amendment of the terms of these mining contracts to be in accordance with the applicable regulations 
and associated laws. 
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The advocacy for amendments to mining contracts has been ongoing by several civil society groups, such 
as the National Advocacy Coalition on Extractives (NACE) which wrote ‘Sierra Leone at the crossroads: 
Seizing the chance to benefit from mining’. According to NACE, of mineral exports of $179 million in 
2006 (of which diamonds accounted for $125 million), only an estimated $10 million was paid to the 
Government in the form of royalties and other taxes. The study suggested that, with significant 
institutional and capacity reforms, Sierra Leone could export US$1.2 billion a year in mineral exports by 
2020.  
In the initial London Mining agreement, corporate income tax rate payable by the company was set at 
6%.  Although the contract has since been revised to a new tax rate of 25%it is still below the 37.5%level 
stipulated in Sierra Leone's Mines and Minerals Act. An agreement reached by the Government with 
Sierra Rutile Ltd in 2003, reduced the company’s royalty rate from the required 3%to a minuscule 0.5% 
until 2014 and cancelled the company’s payment of corporate income tax on profits until 2014. NACE 
reported that this royalty concession would result in an estimated $92 million loss of revenue for the 
country.  Despite sales of US$28 million in 2006, NACE revealed that the company may be paying less 
than $1 million in annual remittances to the Government. 
The Government has given contradictory explanations as to what the President meant when, in his 
inaugural speech in Parliament in 2007, he said that all existing mining agreements will be reviewed and 
re-negotiated to benefit the people of Sierra Leone. An unnamed senior Cabinet Minister told Bloomberg 
News that the mining agreement with African Minerals Ltd was not up for review. 
This research recommends that the Government revisit all the mining agreements to ensure all the terms, 
especially those related to the  financials and labour, are in line with applicable legislation with no or 
minimal exemptions or special concessions allowed. The precedence that individual mining companies 
can negotiate excessive tax concessions must be reversed.  If certain allowances are expected to aid 
attracting foreign investment to the country, they must be reasonable and applicable on the same terms 
with all companies. No one company must be allowed a ‘tailor made’ tax package.  For example, 
reduced duty payments on starting up importation of machinery and equipment  is, in the author’s 
opinion,  sufficient, rather than granting  blanket duty free concessions for the duration of the contracts.   
Commodity prices are volatile.  The minerals exported from Sierra Leone are high quality and often 
attract prices higher than the market average.  The Government should consider making a provision for 
an excess profits tax when commodity prices are significantly higher than a specified level.  The clauses 
that allow companies to offset 100% of their start-up capital expenditure against tax must also be 
reviewed. 
 
All the contracts that this thesis has reviewed have provisions for the mining companies to apply for a 
renewal of their mining leases once the current term has expired. The basis on which these applications 
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for renewal would be granted has not been explicitly specified. This study therefore recommends that, 
just as in the case of Botswana, prior to granting a renewal, the Government must check that the 
development of the mining area has proceeded with reasonable diligence and according to the programme 
of mining operations that the company presented when obtaining the original lease. It must be evaluated 
to see whether the   resources have been used in the most efficient manner.  All technical, financial and 
commercial aspects must be re-evaluated in line with economic changes and applicable law and must be 
renegotiated.  If negotiations do not lead to agreement within six months, the application should fail. 
On February 20, 2013, Reuters reported on the official opening of the newly formed National Minerals 
Agency, charged with enforcing Sierra Leone's mining laws.  In an interview, the director, Sahr Wonday, 
explained that the Agency would review the contracts and would recommend changes to the Government 
in cases where they felt the terms were not in the best interests of the country. In the interview, when 
quizzed on the large number of agreements that have not been transparent and not been negotiated in the 
best interest of the country, Wonday said: “Sometimes the excuse is that we had to do it because we want 
to attract these investors." Several governments across Africa are renegotiating mining contracts and 
revising their mining codes to get more revenue from the mining industry, especially, given the global 
rise in commodity prices.  Countries such as Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo have 
reviewed of all their contracts, while Guinea is in the process of reviewing its mining deals. Other 
countries, like Ghana and Ivory Coast, are also considering making changes to mining industry tax and 
royalty rates. Sierra Leone too should join this band wagon. 
 
- INCLUDING SOME CSR  RELATED ACTIVITIES INTO THE MINING 
AGREEMENTS: 
 
All of the mining companies under review undertake various CSR related activities. These activities often 
relate to the donation of medicines, books, granting of scholarships for primary and secondary school 
pupils, renovations of schools and small construction projects. Most of the time these companies make 
some commitments to making contributions to the community in their own voluntary community 
development plans. The problem is that such spending is voluntary only. The companies have sometimes 
reneged on these commitments whilst the local communities affected by mining have retained their 
original high expectations about the commitments made by the companies. 
Sierra Leone’s mining legislation does not require companies to provide  either social or infrastructural 
services – such as electricity, water, education or healthcare to local communities affected by mining , 
yet  these communities  are overwhelmingly in need  of  basic amenities  such as access to safe water, 
electricity and good schools. In almost all cases, as per the author’s observations, the companies do the 
minimum, even regarding the standard of construction. For example, when roads are being constructed 
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or repaired, tarmac is not applied. In the rainy season, they become full of potholes.  The roads in all the 
mining communities are deplorable. When community meeting centres are constructed, for example in 
the case of SMHL, they are not furnished, not even with benches. Sierra Rutile Ltd has developed a 
voluntary community development programme, but has so far failed to spend any significant amounts of 
money.  
During the interviews conducted with   management level staff of the different companies considered by 
this thesis, one   point became clear: a visible difference between what the companies think is required 
by legislation and what is voluntary. When questioned on not maintaining progress on environmental and 
other developmental projects promised and documented, they replied that their companies were not 
currently making profits. However, there is no section in the documents available that stated that 
contributions to community and environmental development programs are conditional on the companies 
recording profits. 
The Government instituted the Community Development Fund to help support development through 
company payments into the fund. However, the fund has been faced with problems linked to poor 
governance at the local and community levels.  There are also hardly any publicly available updates on 
how the money is being used to fund development; especially much needed roads and social 
infrastructure. 
 
This research therefore advices that clauses be included in agreements to convey firmer commitments by 
companies to carry out developmental projects. Given the level of corruption in the country and the 
difficulties associated with administering funds of both the Community Development Fund and the 
Environmental Protection Fund, the author is of the opinion that the mining companies be required to 
contract out the implementation of key projects, especially those related to water supply, the construction 
of roads and provision of electricity rather than contributing to a fund where misappropriation and non-
accountability is likely.   Tangible evidence, i.e. such as these constructions works, would also go a long 
way in fulfilling expectations of the locals and directly improve infrastructure.  
 
-IMPLEMENTATION, MONITORING AND REPORTING: 
Amending current mining contracts and mining legislation on its own does not guarantee positive results. 
The changes need to be implemented. Companies must be monitored to ensure that they abide by the 
rules and regulations and outcomes must be reported to all the necessary authorities concerned.  The 
different mining companies must also keep accurate records that must be reported to the Government.  
The country lacks adequate monitoring mechanisms to ensure that mining companies are operating within 
the laws of the State.  Monitoring in this case encompasses assessing and collecting revenue. It also has 
180 
 
to do with acquiring geological information, especially to determine whether the companies mine only 
the minerals they are licensed to and, in cases where other mineral deposits have been found, such 
deposits have been reported.    
There are concerns that there are discrepancies between what some companies report to have exported 
and what the actual export amounts and values are. The volume of diamond exports, for example, is 
believed to be at least double what is officially declared. The Government should, therefore, outline and 
implement a strategy to combat smuggling.   
There are also wide spread fears in the country that mining companies are underreporting profits or 
involved in creative accounting. These fears could only be laid to rest if the Government has the capacity 
to, and actually does, carry out regular audits of some mining companies. In the interview with a member 
of staff from the Ministry of Mines and Minerals Resources, the interviewee explained that they (that is 
the Ministry of Mines and Minerals Resources) deal with only the financial reports submitted by the 
companies. He explained that it difficult to tell whether these companies are making profits. They could 
inflate costs and the Government does not audit them.  Another interviewee from the National Revenue 
Authority highlighted the possibility of companies bribing mining officials. It is therefore recommended 
that all large mining companies be subject to an independent audit.  
 
Botswana’s Mining Act of 1999 provided for an authorised Government official   who can, at reasonable 
times, inspect mining premises, ascertain whether terms of the act are being complied with, examine 
financial records and take soil samples.  The application of such a monitoring mechanism is needed in 
Sierra Leone especially amid corruption and low revenues from the mining sector.  Reporting losses and 
making losses are two different things. 
 
- TRANSPARENCY 
Monitoring and reporting can contribute to the greater good and improved accountability by all parties 
when there is transparency. Transparency in this case should not only be between the Ministry of Mineral 
Resources and the Mining companies, but should also include inter ministry and inter agency 
communication and also the making of mining information available to the general public. In NACE's 
report, Sierra Leone at the Crossroads (2009), the Director of the Ministry of Mines and Mining 
highlighted the lack of proper coordination and information flow between the Ministry of Mineral 
Resources and the National Revenue Authority, which collects taxes from mining companies. Lack of 
transparency helps drive corruption within the industry and limits the effectiveness of policies.  
In a bid to improve transparency in the extractive sector in Sierra Leone, on January 19, 2012, Sierra 
Leone launched The Government of Sierra Leone Online Repository System, an online mining database. 
This database is a joint initiative between the Government, United Nations Development Program 
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(UNDP), the German Society for International Co-operation (GIZ), the Revenue Development 
Foundation, the World Bank and other international donors.  Before the setting up of the online 
repository, information relating to transactions between the Government and natural resource extraction 
companies was kept at the Ministry of Mines as paper documents. These old records were so poorly kept 
that the new database was only able to include information collected after 2010. At the launch ceremony 
of the repository, the Minister of Mines and Mineral Resources, Minkailu Mansaray, said: "This system 
will stamp out all forms of malpractice in terms of licensing, financial management and general 
information pertaining to the mining sector. The public should be aware of what mining companies pay 
to the Government and what the Government receives from mining and exploration companies."  
The Online Repository System was part of the industry improvements needed to make Sierra Leone 
compliant with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which requires the timely publication 
of payments made by mining companies to governments and revenues generated from the projects. 
However, on evaluation of Sierra Leone’s 2012 Validation report, the Validation Committee of the 
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) concluded that Sierra Leone had not achieved 
compliance with all requirements and, as this was the second Validation, the rules of the EITI indicated 
that the country should be delisted.  However, the Board of EITI instead temporarily suspended Sierra 
Leone on February 26, 2013.  According to the EITI, the suspension will be lifted if the country 
successfully implements   the remedial actions recommended by the Board. If suspension is in effect 
beyond February 25, 2014, the Board will consider delisting Sierra Leone. For a greater scope of 
transparency, this research recommends that all large companies operating in Sierra Leone’s extractive 
industry should immediately commit themselves to publicly report their basic financial data, annual 
accounts, remittances to the Government and their community development spending.  
Sierra Leone has only recently, on October 29, 2013, enacted its freedom of information law that would 
guarantee access to government records, such as the original documents regarding mining agreements 
and transactions.  By comparison, in Botswana the Minister of Mines maintains records which are open 
to inspection by the public as long as the records do not include confidential information. This research 
therefore recommends that the Government of Sierra Leone must commit to meeting all the criteria 
needed for full membership of the EITI and also implement the terms of the Mines and Minerals Act 
completely. Implementing the terms of the Mines and Minerals Act and meeting the criteria of the EITI 
would result in all the following information being properly collected, validated, recorded and made 
available to the public:  information contained in all mining contracts, information on licensing fees, 
royalties, taxes and other contributions from the mining sector to the Government, all mining, trading 
and exporting companies in the minerals sector.  This would help ensure that all the companies operating 
within the country’s extractive industry comply with international trading protocols.  
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Amending Mining Agreements and improving on monitoring and transparency on their own do not 
guarantee maximum returns from extractive activities. This research is of the opinion that other changes 
need to be undertaken to improve on the probability of natural resources leading to economic growth and 
development. The first step to ensuring that the State is at the heart of all mining decisions  is that the 
Government should have shares in all large mining companies. Closely related to the issue of 
transparency is that of corruption. 
 
- CORRUPTION 
The high incidence of corruption in Sierra Leone has played a significant role in negatively affecting the 
trickling down and widespread benefit of resource rents in the country. Corruption is not specific to the 
mining industry. It is evident in all sectors in the country. Sierra Leone is ranked 142nd out of 163 
countries in Transparency International’s Corruptions Perceptions Index.  Preliminary reports from the 
Office of the Millennium Challenge Corporation in Sierra Leone (MCC) revealed that, as at September 
2013, Sierra Leone is likely to fail the control corruption criteria for receiving funds from the MCC due 
to high level of corruption at all levels.  This study therefore recommends that corruption be eradicated 
at all levels of activity in the country.  The Director General of the Ministry of Mines and Mineral 
Resources has stated that ‘reducing corruption and rent seeking’ is one of the challenges facing the 
Ministry, which he recognises ‘has had a reputation for corruption’.  
 
- GOVERNMENT SHARE HOLDING 
 
Government being a shareholder in large mining companies is nothing new in Sierra Leone. In 
September 1970, the Government acquired a 51% stake in Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST) through 
the National Diamond Mining Company (NDMC). However, due to corruption, the then Prime 
Minister,  Siaka Stevens, allowed Jamil Said Mohamed, a Lebanese business man,  to buy 12% of the 
Government’s share without an open bidding process. As shown in the analysis of the mining agreement 
between Sierra Rutile Ltd and the Government, the state had a 47% stake in the company, which it 
eventually gave up in exchange for cash settlements.  In comparison, in Botswana, the Government has 
a 50% equity stake in the country’s largest diamond mining company.  This research therefore 
recommends that the Government seeks to ensure equity shares in all large scale mining companies. 
The Government has the option to acquire equity in large scale mining companies in accordance with 
Section 162 of the Sierra Leone Mines and Minerals Act of 2009: ‘The Government of Sierra Leone 
shall have the option to acquire on such terms as shall be agreed upon between the holder of a large-
scale mining licence and the Government, shareholding interest in any large-scale mining operations’.  
The Sierra Leone Petroleum Act of 2011 permits establishment of a State-owned Sierra Leone National 
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Petroleum Company which should have a 10% stake in any oil block in the country. This research 
therefore recommends that when the Government exercises its equity option in large scale mining 
companies, its stake should be at least 10%.   
 
The potential gains from resource extraction are highly correlated with the country’s absorptive 
capacity. In the case of Sierra Leone, this study believes that the country’s infrastructures all have a role 
to play in enabling the gains from the extractive industry to trickle down to the masses.  
 
 
- INFRASTRUCTURE  AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
 
For the scope of this study, infrastructure encompasses roads, electricity, water supply 
telecommunications and the provision of health and sanitation services. The International Monetary Fund 
country report on Sierra Leone in 2011 and 2012 provided a good update on key sectors of the economy. 
The report revealed that the country needs to develop a ‘Rural Electrification Strategy’ and work towards 
ensuring a stable and reliable electricity supply. The installation of solar street lights in Freetown and 
district headquarter towns is on-going with funding from the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and 
Development (EBID) and the Government. The Government has also constructed a solar technical 
college at Konta Line in the Port Loko district. The report also showed that, with funding from the 
Chinese Government and the European Union, work will also soon commence on the construction of 
mini hydro-electric dams at Makali, Charlotte, Port Loko (Bankasoka) and Moyamba. The key revelation 
from the report related to the country’s electricity supply is that the relatively good performance in the 
manufacturing sector occurred at a time when the electricity supply to Freetown improved following the 
commissioning of Bumbuna in 2009 and the installation of a 10MW thermal power generating machine 
from the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA).This sheds some light on the importance of 
good electricity supply for both economic and social purposes.  
The IMF country report also reported that trunk roads are being constructed in all cities and district 
headquarter-towns. This research recommends that more effort be made on feeder road development as 
these roads are very crucial in improving access by local communities to markets, especially for 
perishable agricultural products. 
Even though Sierra Leone is blessed with lots of rivers, rainfall and underground water resources, there 
is still a problem of access to clean and safe drinking water.  There is also problem with access to water, 
especially pipe borne water, for daily activities.  All the water projects currently undertaken by mining 
companies have to do with digging new water wells or chlorination of existing wells. There are no mining 
company projects for pipe borne water, but mining staff are provided with machine–purified drinking 
water not chlorinated water. Cholera outbreaks are quite common, almost on an annual basis. This paper 
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therefore recommends that steps be made to improve  water supply as it affects not only people’s  health  
but also other aspects, for example hygiene promotion, sanitation and construction works. 
As is often said, health is wealth. Most of the companies in the extractive industry operate health centres 
for their staff and their immediate family. They sometimes make donations of general medicines to certain 
hospitals when it suits or at times of crises. The Ministry of Health is currently implementing the free 
health program for under five year olds and pregnant women. However, the coverage of access to quality 
health care is still a problem in the country and life expectancy is still low when compared to other 
countries. It is therefore recommended that Government expenditure and policy reforms to strengthen the 
health sector are highly needed and can have large multiplier effects for all sectors of the economy. 
Whilst attention is being paid to the infrastructure of the country, the effects of such large scale mining 
on the environment must not be neglected.  The recently incorporated Environmental Protection Agency 
has the legal authority to monitor Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) of mining companies. Since 
it is newly formed, this research advises that a review of the environmental impacts of the mining 
companies be undertaken and it is ensured there are mechanisms in place to monitor them. There is a 
need to also reassess the compensation for damaged land and surface rent currently paid to the local 
communities.  
An improvement in the country’s infrastructure does not only improve standard of living and absorptive 
capacity, it also helps improve the business environment and boost local industries. 
 
- LOCAL MANUFACTURING  
The 2011 IMF Country Report on Sierra Leone revealed that output in the manufacturing sector 
increased,   mainly due to an increase in the provision of electricity. Sierra Leone’s manufacturing 
industry base is limited to the production of paint, cement, alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages, 
acetylene oxygen, flour, common soap and confectionary. It will be recalled that the mining agreements 
gave priority to local products to be used by mining companies. From the aforementioned main products 
manufactured in the country, very few are of significant importance to the mining trade. Therefore, even 
though the provision is there, unless local manufacturing of relevant products commences, such 
provisions would only be for show.  
Closely related to the issue of local manufacturing, this study also recommends  processing plants for the 
main mineral exports be set up  to add value to the produce and help Sierra Leone benefit from the value 
added product through more trading opportunities.  For example, in the case of Sierra Mineral Holdings, 
it sells its produce to the parent company, Vimetco Alum SA’s refinery in Romania, where the bauxite is 
refined and processed into aluminium. Aluminium has a significantly higher value than the raw material 
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and Sierra Leone currently does not get a share of this added value. However, if processing plants are set 
up, the country could benefit from the added value along every step in the value chain. 
 
- EMPLOYMENT AND HUMAN CAPITAL  
Sierra Leoneans should be given employment priority in mining companies according to the mining 
agreements. However, at present, apart for unskilled and semi-skilled labour, only a few Sierra Leoneans 
make up the professional cadre of these companies.  This problem has a twofold approach.  The 
companies need to do more to recruit Sierra Leoneans and Sierra Leoneans need to train in more technical 
skills aligned to the mining trade.   This study acknowledges that the Sierra Leonean labour supply for 
certain technical mining jobs is low. However, there are qualified Sierra Leoneans to fill positions in 
other administrative and semi-skilled areas.   During the launch of the Joint Initiative between African 
Minerals, the University of Sierra Leone and the Ministry of Education to help improve training and 
employment of Sierra Leoneans in the mining industry, the Minister of Education said: “The lack of 
adequate numbers of personnel with marketable skills needed in the mining industry has been a source 
of concern and has resulted in the importation of expatriates to function at both middle level and 
professional cadres.” The key is, therefore, to develop and strengthen human resources in the minerals 
sector. 
This research therefore recommends that training institutions be set up to specifically train individuals in 
the skills that are marketable to the mining industry. The mining companies must also be monitored so 
ensure that they ‘transfer knowledge’, so as to guarantee the gradual replacement of expatriates with 
Sierra Leoneans. During visits to the communities in which the four companies under review operate, the 
author of this study noticed that women are mostly not included in most technical jobs associated with 
the mining industry. This thesis therefore recommends that measures be put in place to encourage gender 
equality and the participation of women in the extractive sector. A high number of school dropouts was 
also observed.  Most of these school dropouts leave to become unskilled workers at the mining sites. If 
apprentice programmes are developed and run by these companies, such school dropouts would 
eventually gain more marketable skills. 
In the analysis of newspaper articles and the author’s findings, there was a vast difference in wage 
structure between indigenes and expatriates. Wages are one of the most direct ways in which households 
can benefit from the impact of natural resources.  This paper therefore recommends a revisiting of the 
minimum wage structure for Sierra Leoneans in all sectors.  Adequate human capital significantly 
improves the absorptive capacity of a nation. 
The Government is currently in the process of presenting a draft ‘Local Content’ Policy to Parliament,  
so it could be enacted.  According to the policy, at least 20% of a foreign company’s management must 
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be Sierra Leonean, at least 50% of intermediate positions must be held by Sierra Leoneans and all junior 
level staff positions, such as drivers, security personnel, secretaries etc.,  must be held by Sierra Leoneans. 
This is a step in the right direction. This research also suggests that the ‘Local Content Policy’ be extended 
to cover the procurement of goods and services from Sierra Leone to strengthen the trickle-down effects 
from the mining sector.   Key services which this study believes should be 100% provided by indigenous 
Sierra Leonean companies and which these companies have the capacity to provide include, but are not 
limited to:  customs clearance and freight forwarding services; logistics, especially transportation; and 
supply of fresh foods. For example, there have been clashes with local transport owners and management 
of the London Mining Company and Bolore African Logistics (a foreign owned company) regarding 
contracts for haulage of iron ore for LML.  This study suggests that such transportation services be 
provided only by indigenous companies.  
Invitations to bid and advertisements for the provision of such services must be advertised in the local 
media. This research discovered that advertisements for the provision of logistics services are often only 
advertised in foreign magazines, to which most Sierra Leoneans do not have access, and not in the local 
newspapers. There have also been incidences where foreigners have successfully bribed corrupt Sierra 
Leoneans to fraudulently register companies in a Sierra Leonean’s name, to pass off as an indigenous 
company.   
The local industry must therefore be empowered and protected at all levels. The sales receipts of the 
mining exports go to the mining companies. The employment of Sierra Leoneans and use of Sierra 
Leoneans companies for the provision of services are the main paths through which the returns from 
mining activities can trickle down to the masses, hence enhancing standard of living, reducing poverty 
and improving development. 
- FINANCIAL SECTOR REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
Whilst work is undertaken to strengthen the labour market in favour of Sierra Leoneans, this research 
also recommends that the country’s financial sector be strengthened. The capital market has a very 
significant role in contributing to economic growth by providing access to capital.  When the fund 
raising activities of large mining companies is scrutinised, from the company reports it is clear that all 
these companies are listed on  stock exchanges in foreign countries. Even Koidu Holdings, which is not 
already listed, is considering listing on the Hong Kong Exchange in a bid to raise $400 million to boost 
production (Financial Times, 2012). There is, therefore, a need to reform the financial sector and 
develop the capital market in Sierra Leone so as to enable mining companies listed on the Sierra Leone 
Stock Exchange to access capital and raise funds and give Sierra Leoneans the opportunity to invest in 
these companies.  It will also enable investment in trusts and mutual funds and provide investment 
opportunities for institutional investors. 
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In 2001, the Sierra Leone Stock Exchange Company was registered under the Companies Act of Sierra 
Leone as a private company limited by guarantee.  The Other Financial Services Act of 2001 was also   
amended to allow for the establishment of an interim stock trading facility and the licensing of brokers 
and dealers in securities. The Bank of Sierra Leone is the technical service provider and regulator of 
the stock market until the establishment of a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Sierra Leone 
only currently operates an interim stock exchange and there is widespread lack of interest, mainly due 
to the shortage of listed companies and the lack of knowledge of how capital markets work. 
 
This study advises that steps be taken to reform the financial sector in the country to aid the development 
of a robust capital market. Some of these steps include strengthening regulations on investment, 
reviewing bankruptcy laws and laws to protect investors. A well-developed capital market, especially  a 
developed stock market, would give companies access to investment capital  outside the banking system 
and often  prove  to be cheaper  and longer term than bank loans.  It also encourages the investment of 
private savings. A well-developed capital market also promotes corporate accountability, transparency 
and regulation. It also enables companies to meet their funding needs,  invest directly in Sierra Leone and 
avoid the use of tax havens, and grow and create employment opportunities,  helping overall economic 
growth.  
- GOVERNMENT REVENUE, SPENDING AND LENDING 
 
As explained in the theoretical framework of the empirical part of this research, external debt is 
accumulated to fill the foreign exchange and savings gap in the domestic economy.  In Sierra Leone, 
government expenditure continuously exceeds government revenue, hence the need for external sources 
of revenue: debt and aid.  The 2011 International Monetary Fund country report for Sierra Leone (2011) 
showed that, as at the end of December 2010, the country’s outstanding debt was US$ 767.9 million 
compared to the stock of US$ 692.6 million as at December 2009.  Reports from the Ministry of Finance 
also reveal that the country’s outstanding debt continues to increase annually.  Multilateral debt accounts 
for the largest share of Sierra Leone’s external debt portfolio, representing 61.9 % at the end of 2010 
(Public Debt Management, 2011). This largest proportion of multilateral debt is maintained, despite the 
HIPC status of the country.   Since Sierra Leone reached HIPC Completion Point in December 2006, 
annual debt service payment obligations have declined by over US$25 million annually. 
 
This clearly highlights the significance of the main research question of this thesis. Debt overhang has 
severe implications on the impact of resource rents on development.  With such a large value of 
outstanding debt, debt sustainability will remain a priority in Sierra Leone. Much of the Government 
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receipts should be spent on debt servicing, deficit financing and spending on donor projects to keep in 
line with the donor conditionalities attached. 
 
There have been improvements in the country’s debt reporting system.  A comprehensive national Debt 
Law and procedures manual has been enacted by Parliament.  The Public Debt Unit of the Ministry of 
Finance,  in collaboration with other Government agencies, is  working on improving the quality of debt 
data and reporting in order to better monitor commitments, disbursements and debt service obligations. 
The Government is also seeking assistance from the World Bank and the IMF to develop a comprehensive 
Medium-Term Debt Management Strategy (MTDS). The Commonwealth Secretariat Debt Recording 
and Management System (CS-DRMS) will be electronically linked with the Integrated Financial 
Management Information System (IFMIS) to further improve on debt management. 
 
Notwithstanding these steps to improve transparency and management in the debt sector of the economy, 
this research wishes to stress that the first step should be reducing the need for external lending by 
improving on Government revenue and managing Government spending. There are many loopholes in 
the country’s revenue collection system, both tax and non-tax revenue.  Considering the extractive 
industry alone, the amount of revenue currently being collected from that sector is miles below the 
potential revenue the sector can generate.   The Government must learn to invest in other sectors from 
which they can earn returns and help reduce the need for external lending.   
 
Closely related to the issue of Government lending is the role that donors play in influencing Government 
expenditure. 
 
- DONORS AND CREDITORS 
 
The huge budget deficits faced by the Government often constrains it to abide strictly to the conditions 
attached to donor funds, whether they are in the best interest of the country or not.  The two main lenders 
that severely impact on Government policy in Sierra Leone are the World Bank and the IMF. The 
potential growth limiting effect of donor conditionalities has been revealed by studies such as Oxfam 
(1995) and Collier (1997). 
In a similar light,  in the DanWatch  Report it was explained that,  in a confidential 2007 document shown 
to NACE researchers by an official in the World Bank, there are ten policies that  the Government must 
implement  (triggers) in order   for it  to receive a US$10 million loan from the World Bank. According 
to the report, one of the policies the Government must implement is ‘make changes to the mining tax 
regime in line with recommendations from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The report explained 
that, although some of these recommendations were reasonable some areas in which changes should have 
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been recommended were left untouched. It reported that the IMF did not recommend any increases in the 
royalty or other tax rates and asked that the royalty rate for precious metals, currently at 4%, be reduced 
to 3%.  It also recommended that the terms of the mining agreement between Sierra Rutile and the 
Government in 2003 should be implemented.  It will be recalled that this thesis has highlighted the 
shortfalls of that agreement; especially the Government’s relinquishing its shares in the company and the 
concessionary financial terms.  It is therefore worrying that such an institution fails to see the harm in 
such terms.   
Most multilateral donors to Sierra Leone have often stressed on institutional strengthening and capacity 
building. A large portion of funds are assigned to such activities and often expatriates are paid large sums 
of money to train Sierra Leoneans. For example, the United Kingdom’s Department for International 
Development (DFID) has provided £2 million over two years to improve the institutional capacity of the 
Ministry of Mines. This project is implemented by Adam Smith International (ASI),   a British 
consultancy, and the implementation of this project partly involves funding an expatriate in the position 
of Director General of the Ministry. DFID is also planning to spend £16 million to help reform the 
National Revenue Authority.  
This research welcomes such support as it helps enhance the institutional capacity of various institutions 
in the country with long term positive effects on the economy. The bone of contention, however, is that 
some donor conditionalities are counter- productive to the revenue generation and collection capability 
of the country. It is this research’s opinion that donors must recommend and support mining tax reforms 
that result in greater revenue to the Government. Without adequate internally generated funds, the country 
will always be in a debt overhang cycle. 
Even if the Government of Sierra Leone and the mining companies implement all the above 
recommendations, the revenue generation process to eventually deliver the country from its debt 
overhang resource curse dilemma lies within the diversification of export activities.  
 
- DIVERSIFY  EXPORT ACTIVTIES 
Sierra Leone is highly dependent on primary exports in the mineral and agricultural sector for revenue, 
apart from what is generated locally through taxes and duties, receipts from external donors and external 
creditors. If it is assumed that the revenue collection is 100 %, which is not the case, the country still 
remains highly vulnerable to conditions on volatile international commodity markets.  
The Government should therefore continue to pursue strategies to diversify the export base.  Sierra Leone 
should seek to encourage production and export of non-traditional exports and commodities from the 
secondary or tertiary sector, including manufactured goods, refined primary commodities and services 
and commercialisation of the agricultural sector. The country should consider developing tourism and 
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large scale rice and rubber production and fishing activities. In Botswana, the economy was diversified 
into the production and export of textiles and leather, tourism, business outsourcing and research. 
 
- SELF DEVELOPMENT AND EXPECTATIONS 
Notwithstanding all the steps and activities the Government are expected to take, the issue of sustainable 
growth and development does not rest solely with the state. Expectations in the communities affected by 
mining are high.  From the author’s observations, mining communities sometimes have unrealistic 
expectations of what mining firms will or should deliver.  Whilst this research has shown that 
expectations have positive significant impacts on the activities of the Government, it is recommended 
that communities be involved in self -help and development projects which the Government and 
development partners can support.  Making efforts to achieve at least basic reading and writing skills can 
help provide the foundation for further training, especially technical training.  It is not advisable that the 
development of every aspect of life in the country be conditional on what the Government can do. Self- 
help can foster more rational expectations and help drive development at an even faster rate. 
 
The main recommendations therefore cover reviewing all the current mining agreements between 
mining companies and the Government of Sierra Leone, ensuring transparency in the extractive sector, 
prudent spending of resource rents, selecting donors and lenders wisely, promoting the local 
manufacturing industry, improving on infrastructure and human capital, diversifying the investment of 
resource wealth into other sectors of the economy and revising expectations to include the need for self-
development and not complete dependence on  the Government and international firms.  
 
6.3 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
This research has developed a framework and methodology than can be readily applied to any economy 
in the world. Following this methodology would not only provide empirical solutions but would also 
go beyond the numbers to give ‘behind the scene’ coverage of the debt, resource and growth 
relationship, not only from the standpoint of the Government, but also the firm and the household. 
Notwithstanding, the empirical estimation is limited by the availability of data. It is also possible that it 
suffers from data source bias in the case of the time series data collected. The time period in the GMM 
estimations is only between 1970 and 2011.  Such time series data are updated annually.  The world is 
always evolving; therefore there is always the need for more studies using much more up-to-date data.  
This is especially true for the qualitative analysis conducted.  Most of the companies that have been 
reviewed have been in full time uninterrupted operation in Sierra Leone for less than ten years. There is 
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still time for the long term effects of their operations to be felt at all levels of the economy. There is also 
the possibility for changes in regulations and legislation to be applied. This research believes, therefore, 
that there is room for further research in this area in years to come. 
Markets are imperfect. Most countries are always faced with shortfalls in domestic revenue and savings, 
hence the need for borrowing. Resources can be depleted, but the expectation of them promoting 
development and alleviating poverty is ever increasing.  The main investigation carried out by this 
thesis, ‘Debt Overhang and Natural Resources: Revisiting the Resource Curse Hypothesis’; will not 
become obsolete any time soon. It is the author’s opinion that the debate will remain relevant until all 
the countries of the world are developed and poverty is completely eradicated.  
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX ONE: LIST OF COUNTRIES 
 
OPEC: Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela 
 
Mineral rich Countries:  Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Botswana, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, China, 
Columbia, Congo DRC, Congo Rep, Cote D’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Djibouti, Dominican Rep, Egypt, 
Equatorial-Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, 
Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, 
Korea Rep, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi 
Arabia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda, 
Ukraine, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
 
Petroleum Rich Countries: Albania, Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, 
Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Canada, Chad, Colombia, Congo Rep, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Croatia, Cuba, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Netherlands, 
Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar , Romania, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Trinidad & Tabago, Tunisia, United Kingdom, 
United States of America, Venezuela, Yemen 
 
HIPC: Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, 
Congo DRC, Congo Rep, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, 
Haiti, Honduras, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,  Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia 
 
LDC: Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros , 
Congo DRC, Djibouti, Equatorial-Guinea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Lao PDR, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, 
Rwanda, Samoa, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Yemen, Zambia 
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OECD: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea Rep,  Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand,  
Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America 
 
SSA: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Comoros, Congo DRC, Congo Rep, Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sudan, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
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APPENDIX TWO: SYSTEM RESIDUAL CROSS-CORRELATIONS AT LAG 12 
 Growth Equation Debt Equation Capital Inflows 
Equation 
WHOLE PANEL 
GDP -0.009863 0.042396 0.033470 
DSV 0.008304 0.016388 0.008663 
CAPFLOW -0.004554 0.002644 -0.000546 
OPEC PANEL 
GDP -0.036029 -0.029492 0.003993 
DSV 0.038077 -0.004191 -0.023230 
CAPFLOW 0.000529 0.003357 -0.001222 
OECD PANEL 
GDP -0.005880 -0.008245 -0.019751 
DSV 0.060041 -0.027601 0.030129 
CAPFLOW 0.035828 0.006082 -0.009610 
LCD PANEL 
GDP 0.040768 0.028230 -0.000812 
DSV -0.023576 -0.039267 0.000917 
CAPFLOW 0.005664 0.016285 -0.020034 
HIPC PANEL
GDP -0.018925 ‐0.003895  0.002610 
DSV 0.030467 ‐0.007302  ‐0.005042 
CAPFLOW 0.009874 ‐0.037944  0.016495 
MINERAL RICH PANEL 
GDP 0.001028 -0.003357 -0.001222 
DSV -0.020333 0.002644 0.008738 
CAPFLOW 0.037621 0.000184 0.005883 
PETROLEUM RICH PANEL
GDP -0.006242 -0.031358 -0.026774 
DSV -0.012298 -0.046981 0.027385 
CAPFLOW 0.003567 -0.010813 -0.009283 
SSA PANEL 
GDP 0.049545 -0.003895 -0.000812 
DSV -0.023576 0.007077 0.002610 
CAPFLOW -0.036443 -0.064493 0.000917 
 All the  correlations are  not significantly different from zero at  the 5% significance level. 
 
 
APPENDIX THREE:  SVAR RESIDUAL SERIAL CORRELATION LM TESTS 
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
1 NA NA 
2 NA NA 
3 205.4568 0.0006 
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at Lag Order h 
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APPENDIX FOUR:  SAMPLE OF SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
1. RESPONDENT’S INFORMATION (Please mark (x) where applicable)  
 
1.1 Occupation:        …………………………………………………………………………...  
 
1.2 Age:   ………years                 1.3 Sex:    Male [  ]   Female [   ]  
 
1.4 Educational Level:     None [    ]    Primary [   ]   Secondary [   ]    Tertiary    [   ]  
 
1.5 Marital Status:       Married [   ]   Single [   ]     Divorced [    ]         Widowed [    ]  
 
1.6 How long have you lived in this community/village?  
 Less than 1 year [    ] 1 to 3 years [     ] 4 to 6 years [    ] 7 or more years [    ]   
 
1.7 What is your homeland/background status in this community?  
Indigenous [     ]  Settler/Settler descendant [       ]  Migrant [        ]  
 
1.8 If you are a migrant, Why did  you  move to this community? 
.................................................................................................................  
……………………………………………………………………………………….  
 
1.9 Does your family live with you in this town/village? Yes [    ] No [   ]  
 
2. COMMUNITY PROFILE  
 
2.1 What are the two principal economic activities for men in this community?  
(a)…………………………………….. (b)…………………………………………..  
 
2.2 What are the two principal economic activities for women in this community?  
(a)…………………………………….. (b)…………………………………………..  
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2.3 Approximately how many people of working age are unemployed in the community?   
<10% [   ]     11%-20% [    ]       21%-40% [    ]   41%-50% [    ]    >50% [     ] 
 
2.4 In the last three years, availability of employment has:  
Improved    [    ] Worsened [     ] Remained the same [ ]  
 
2.5 Please, give reasons for your answer in 2.4  
…………………………………………………………………………………  
……………………………………………………………………………………….  
2.6   In your opinion, the overall standard of living in the community is: 
 Prosperous [  ]   Good [    ]     Average [  ]    Poor [      ]   Very Poor [      ] 
 
 
 
3.   THE EFFECT OF MINING ACTIVITIES ON HOUSEHOLDS  
 
3.1 Which mining company is operating in your area? 
African Minerals [  ]   London Mining [    ]    Sierra Rutile [   ] Sierra Mineral Holdings [  ] 
  
3.2 What was your occupation before the commencement of mining operations?  
Agriculture [ ] Civil service [ ] Mining [ ] Petty Trading [ ] Self-employment [  ] Unemployed [  ] 
Private Sector [  ] Other…………………… 
 
3.3 What is your current occupation?  
Agriculture [ ] Civil service [ ] Mining [ ] Petty Trading [ ] Self-employment [ ] Unemployed [ ] 
Private Sector [  ]   Other …………………….. 
 
3.4   Mining activities have benefited my household? 
Strongly Agree [   ]    Agree [   ]    Neutral [    ]     Disagree [   ] Strongly Disagree [     ] 
 
3.5 How has mining activities benefited your household?  
Employment           [    ]             Petty Trading   [  ]           Contract with mining company [  ]  
Education/Training [   ]              No benefit        [  ]  
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3.6 What was your monthly household income before the commencement of mining activities in 
your community? 
<Le500, 000 [   ]      Le 500,000 – Le 1000, 000 [   ]          Le 1000, 000 – Le 1, 500, 000 [    ] 
Le 1, 500, 000 – Le 2, 000, 000 [   ] Le 2, 000, 000 – le 2, 500, 000 [  ]    > Le 2, 500, 000 [    ] 
 
3.7 What is your household income after the commencement of mining activities in your 
community?  
< Le500, 000 [   ]    Le 500,000 – Le 1000, 000 [   ]      Le 1000, 000 – Le 1, 500, 000 [   ]  
Le 1, 500, 000 – Le 2, 000, 000 [   ]   Le 2, 000, 000 – le 2, 500, 000 [  ]   > Le 2, 500, 000 [  ]  
 
3.8 Is the change in your household income influenced by mining activities in your community?  
Yes [   ] No [   ]  
 
If yes in Question 3.8  , Please briefly  explain how.  
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………  
 
4. THE EFFECT OF MINING ACTIVITIES ON MINING COMMUNITIES 
 
4.1 Mining activities have benefited my community. 
Strongly Agree [   ]    Agree [   ]    Neutral [    ]     Disagree [   ] Strongly Disagree [     ] 
 
4.2 How has mining activities benefited your community? 
Employment [   ]   Education/training [    ]   Health/ sanitation [    ]   Electricity [     ] 
Infrastructure [   ]   Investment   [   ]   Business Services [     ] 
 
4.3 Mining activities divert attention away from other activities e.g. farming, manufacturing. 
Strongly Agree [   ]    Agree [   ]    Neutral [    ]     Disagree [   ] Strongly Disagree [     ] 
 
4.4 Mining companies are doing enough in promoting health, Agriculture, Education, local 
business and investment. 
Strongly Agree [   ]    Agree [   ]    Neutral [    ]     Disagree [   ] Strongly Disagree [     ] 
 
4.5 Mining companies employ enough Sierra Leoneans 
Strongly Agree [   ]    Agree [   ]    Neutral [    ]     Disagree [   ] Strongly Disagree [     ] 
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4.6 Expatriates are willing teach and transfer skills to locals. 
Strongly Agree [   ]    Agree [   ]    Neutral [    ]     Disagree [   ] Strongly Disagree [     ] 
 
4.7 Locals are willing to learn from Expatriates. 
Strongly Agree [   ]    Agree [   ]    Neutral [    ]     Disagree [   ] Strongly Disagree [     ] 
 
4.8 Mining activities have increased corruption in the community. 
 Strongly Agree [   ]    Agree [   ]    Neutral [    ]     Disagree [   ] Strongly Disagree [     ] 
 
4.9   Mining activities destroy the environment and wild life 
Strongly Agree [   ]    Agree [   ]    Neutral [    ]     Disagree [   ] Strongly Disagree [     ] 
 
4.10 Resources generally lead to development. 
  Strongly Agree [   ]    Agree [   ]    Neutral [    ]     Disagree [   ] Strongly Disagree [     ] 
 
4.11 Please give a reason for your answer in (4.10) 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
4.11 The Government Spends money from mining companies on paying Sierra Leone’s debt. 
Strongly Agree [   ]    Agree [   ]    Neutral [    ]     Disagree [   ] Strongly Disagree [     ] 
 
4.12   Most of the Money the Government gets from mining companies is lost in corrupt 
activities.  
Strongly Agree [   ]    Agree [   ]    Neutral [    ]     Disagree [   ] Strongly Disagree [     ] 
 
4.13 Government spends money from mining companies on health, education and infrastructure.  
Strongly Agree [   ]    Agree [   ]    Neutral [    ]     Disagree [   ] Strongly Disagree [     ] 
 
4.14   What do you think the Government spends money from mining companies on? 
Salaries [  ]   Infrastructure [  ]   Agriculture [  ]   Paying-off external debts [  ]   
Self-enrichment [  ] National Savings [   ]    Other……………………………. 
 
4.15   What do you think the government should spend money from mining companies on? 
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Salaries [  ]   Infrastructure [  ]   Agriculture [  ]   Paying off external debts [  ]    
Self-enrichment [  ] National Savings [   ]    Other……………………………. 
 
4.16 What do you think Mining Companies should do for the community? 
Employment [     ]   Health projects [    ]   Agriculture projects [    ] Electricity [   ] 
Roads [    ]     Other……………………. 
 
4.17  If we do not gain sufficiently from the mining activities, we would riot or go to war. 
Strongly Agree [   ]    Agree [   ]    Neutral [    ]     Disagree [   ] Strongly Disagree [     ] 
 
4.17 If you and your neighbours are strongly dissatisfied about any activity of mining companies 
you would:  
Demonstrate peacefully [   ]   Write letters of complaint to the local leaders [      ]    
Write letters of complaint to contact mining staff [      ]     Riot [   ]  
 
 
4.19 What should the Government  do to increase chances of Sierra Leone benefiting from her 
natural resources in the long term? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
4.20    I expect the Government   and Mining companies to do more in helping Sierra Leone 
develop. 
Strongly Agree [   ]    Agree [   ]    Neutral [    ]     Disagree [   ] Strongly Disagree [     ] 
 
4.21   I expect myself to do more to help Sierra Leone develop. 
Strongly Agree [   ]    Agree [   ]    Neutral [    ]     Disagree [   ] Strongly Disagree [     ] 
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APPENDIX FIVE: SELECTED PICTURES FROM FIELD WORK 
 
Picture  Brief 
Description 
 
London 
Mining Ltd’s 
mining site. 
 
Farming land 
destroyed as a 
result of 
African 
Minerals Ltd’s 
mining 
activities 
254 
 
 
Proof that the 
rosy pictures 
of land 
rehabilitation 
and 
agricultural 
projects 
reported in 
Company 
Reports are 
exaggerated. 
 
Poor sanitation 
and poor 
quality 
drinking water 
projects. 
Supporting 
this thesis’s 
view that for 
CSR activities 
companies do 
the bare 
minimum. 
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Lack of pipe 
borne water 
for cooking, 
drinking and 
general 
hygiene in the 
AML Ltd 
community. 
 
Flooded and 
polluted land 
as a result of 
London 
Mining Ltd.’s 
activities. 
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Village 
relocated by 
London 
Mining Ltd. 
Notice the 
newly built 
houses, not 
previous mud 
houses. 
 
Evidence of 
companies not 
applying 
tarmac on the 
roads their 
vehicles use 
and villagers 
subjected to 
high levels of 
dust inhalation 
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Off –site view 
of railway 
operated by 
AML Ltd. for 
the 
transportation 
of iron ore 
 
Sierra Rutile 
Ltd operation 
site. 
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Sierra Mineral 
Holdings Ltd’s 
truck 
transporting 
products on 
poor quality 
roads 
 
New 
constructed 
radio station 
by Sierra 
Rutile  Ltd. 
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The most 
common 
occupation in 
the mining 
areas: 
commercial 
bike riders.  
i.e. using bikes 
as taxis. 
 
Typical type 
of mud and 
thatch housing 
where locals 
of SMHL 
community 
live. 
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Market close 
to  AML Ltd 
operating site 
where the 
prices of most 
items are 
inflated due to 
nearby mining 
activities. 
 
SMHL 
workers 
returning 
home from 
work. The 
company 
provides used 
school buses 
from the USA 
for this 
purpose. 
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Typical 
housing in 
Sierra Rutile 
Ltd 
community. 
Poor roads, no 
electricity, no 
pipe borne 
water, poor 
sanitation. 
 
Typical AML 
Ltd 
community 
housing. 
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Community 
primary school 
in Gondama , 
Sierra 
Minerals 
Holding 
Limited  
mining 
community. 
 
Sierra Mineral 
Holdings 
Limited 
mining site. 
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SMHL casual 
labour. 
 
Bathing and 
drinking from 
the same water 
source. 
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Sierra Rutile 
community 
football team. 
 
Local 
community 
leader’s house. 
Identity 
protected so 
cannot specify 
exactly which 
community. 
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APPENDIX SIX : SUMMARY DATA  ANALYSIS OF SURVEY DATA 
Comparison of Occupational Diversity 
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